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Abstract 
The Speculum of Divine Justice and Obedience in Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes 
by 
Maria del Rosario Jazmín Puignau 
!
Most contemporary scholarship affirms that the Christian and Islamic medieval political 
imperative was about the preservation of order and stability. We considered this 
characterization insufficient, given the treatment of the concept of religious and political 
justice by medieval thinkers in both traditions. In fact, Christian and Islamic political 
theologies stress that the rulers of their respective communities should ‘mirror’ divine justice. 
They also emphasize the need to obey the ruler for the sake of preserving order in their 
societies. The present study then argues that there is an inconsistency between the emphases 
on political obedience on the one hand, and the religious imperative of political justice on the 
other. As a result, Islamic and Christian thought is permeated with a certain degree of anxiety 
that made more than one Muslim or Christian author uncomfortable. This dissertation is a 
study of such anxiety. We first survey the influence of Greek and Persian philosophical 
heritage, centered in harmony and stability for both traditions, as found in the Eastern 
political concept of the “Circle of Justice.” Second, we contrast this influence with the 
religious meaning of justice as religious righteousness, a theological imperative found in both 
traditions, and represented in Islam under the maxim of “commanding good and forbidding 
evil.” To do so, we focus on Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes up to the 16th century, 
 #vii
a literary genre known as part of the political and theological discourse in both traditions. 
The major contribution of this study is to show the commonalities in Christian and Islamic 
political theology, particularly in their treatment of the key religious and political values of 
justice and obedience. 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Introduction 
 The present research is a work of comparative political theology, as it concerns the 
notion of political and theological justice and obedience in Islamic and Christian medieval 
discourse. Although the common knowledge is that both medieval Islamic and Christian 
theology and political theory were primarily concerned with order and stability, an 
examination of justice shows the rebellious strain in both traditions. More specifically, there 
is an inconsistency between the emphases on political obedience on the one hand, and the 
religious imperative of political justice on the other. As a result, Islamic and Christian 
thought is permeated with a certain degree of anxiety that made more than one Muslim or 
Christian author uncomfortable. The present study focuses on this anxiety.  
 Prior scholarship has noticed the efforts of medieval jurists, philosophers and 
theologians to harmonize political stability with the imperatives of religion. The anxiety has 
been called a dilemma, or inconsistency within the authors’ own work. In general the 
inconsistencies have been explained as the capacity of scholars to adapt to different historical 
circumstances or that the discussion of justice is testimonial.  It has been also argued that the 1
theoretical discussion on justice was for the most part irrelevant to Muslim societies.  The 2
present study contests these views based in two assumptions: first, we submit that most of the 
studies have not differentiated between legal and theological treatises, particularly in the case 
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 The discussion of both concepts has been called an ingenious solution or a careful negotiation, Eric 1
Ohlander, “Enacting Justice, Ensuring Salvation: The Trope of the ‘Just Ruler’ in Some Medieval 
Islamic Mirrors for Princes,” The Muslim World 99 (2009): n. 2009.
 Rosenthal says that the ideal was seen to be too prevalent to require a systematic discussion. But he 2
also argues that, although most influential disciplines were marginally interested in the discussion of 
political justice, the more explicit statements were present in works of philosophy and Adab dealing 
with kingship, as in the case of Mirrors for Princes. Franz Rosenthal, “Political Justice and the Just 
Ruler,” Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980): 110.
of Islam. Whereas the inconsistency between the absolute duty of obedience to the ruler and 
God could have been resolved in legal terms in the case of Islam, it was never resolved and 
remained as a sort of ‘anxiety,’ particularly in Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes. 
Second, we submit that the dilemma or anxiety is part of the very nature of Islamic and 
Christian political theologies challenged by the encounter between politics and revelation. In 
fact, in both traditions there are theological bases to justify the necessity of obedience, or to 
emphasize the need for justice, since both are vital values to their religious doctrines, and 
should ‘mirror’ or reflect the divine order. The emphasis on justice is part of what we call the 
“theological imperative,” which intends to contest the historical imperative focused on 
obedience as posed by prior scholarship. The selection of these analytical categories is based 
on the fact that in both traditions the explanation for obedience lies in certain beliefs that 
Muslims and Christians have about justice conceived as righteousness and, ultimately, about 
God’s nature.  
 The main argument of this study is that the concept of justice in its theological and 
philosophical implications has not yet been fully explored. So far, scholarship on both 
traditions has emphasized the influence of Greek and Persian historical and philosophical 
heritage centered in order, harmony and stability. The present study surveys the religious 
meaning of justice as religious righteousness, a theological imperative represented in Islam 
under the maxim of “commanding good and forbidding evil.” To do this we focus on the 
nuances and uses of the term justice by Christian and Muslim authors of Mirrors. 
 Another argument this research seeks to make is that, given the sacred character of 
authority for medieval Christian and Muslim authors, the discussion of obedience and justice 
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was also a tool for criticizing rulers and political institutions, in order to transform them 
according to the Christian or Islamic ideal. The reason for the common concern is part of a 
shared feature of Muslim and Christian political theologies: the insistence that the political 
order must be linked to a transcendent one; or, in Platonic terms: that any political 
association has a connection with an eternal truth.  The idea of political obligation as part of 3
a higher obligation to God created the conflict or anxiety in Muslim and Christian political 
theologies. The notion of political obligation has been found more suitable than political 
theory to resolve the problem of political authority.  4
 In order to explore the concepts of justice and obedience and how to correlate them 
within a single author or between different authors, we will focus on the genre known as 
Mirrors for Princes, or Furstenspiegel. The selection of the genre Mirror for Princes is based 
on several factors. First, Mirrors are present as a genre in both Christianity and Islam; 
second, Mirrors are considered part of the political theology of both traditions (although as a 
contested category); and third, Mirrors discuss the double aspect of justice (human and 
divine); in both traditions human justice should mirror divine justice, and that is the role of 
the vicar of God on earth. On the other hand, in Christian and Muslim Mirrors, the discussion 
of obedience has a specular character, since the duty of obedience to the ruler reflects the 
duty of obedience to God. Further, the speculum metaphor allows us to work in several 
dimensions: first, Mirrors for Princes as a reflection of Muslim and Christian political 
 #3
 Sheldom Wolin, Politics and Vision, Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought 3
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 51.
 Alexandre Passerin D’Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought (New York: 4
Humanities Press, 1959), 3.
theologies; second, Mirrors for Princes as a reflection of divine justice; third, the metaphor 
of the ‘mirror’ working simultaneously in Muslim and Christian political theologies as the 
possibility of one reflecting the other. 
 This research begins working in the field of political theology through the complexity 
and potentiality of the genre Mirrors for Princes in Christianity and Islam. As preparation for 
the comparison of the concept of justice and obedience, we first explore the metaphor of the 
“mirror’ in Christian and Muslim authors to show how in both traditions the idea of reflection 
of the divine was a powerful instrument not only in the spiritual, but also in the political 
realm.  
 We then continue to see how the idea of mirroring the divine attributes was essential 
for this-world polities in general, and for the figure of the ruler in particular. The chapter 
devoted to the institution of kingship in Christian and Muslim traditions also shows the 
contested traditions for the notion of worldly authority. This dissension towards power will 
later on be reflected in the ways Christian and Muslim authors also considered the justice 
owed by the ruler vis á vis the obedience due to the ruled. The next two chapters are the core 
of the dissertation since they explore justice and obedience in its theological, legal, and 
political implications. Starting from the scriptural notions (quranic, biblical) of justice we 
then move to the conceptions of justice inherited from the Eastern traditions (Sassanian, 
Greek), and finally explore the more theological meaning of justice as a reflection of God’s 
attributes and as the duty of the rulers to reflect divine justice. We trace the encountered 
traditions in both political theologies, which indicate a notion of justice which leads to the 
preservation of order, and a parallel concern for justice as an instrument to criticize and 
 #4
contest authority. The chapter on obedience is the “mirror-image” of what we said on justice, 
with the same encountered traditions which indicate unconditional obedience to the ruler, 
along with the more rebellious stream where obedience is due only to just ruling. We end this 
dissertation by coming back to the genre of Mirror for Princes to show how the encountered 
traditions on justice and obedience were present in both Christian and Islamic Mirrors.  
 In some chapters we tried to keep a balance between the Christian and Muslim 
authors. In these cases, the authors in the other tradition were used as mirrors to attain a 
better understanding of the subjects under study. But in other chapters we stressed the study 
of these concepts in the Islamic side; in this case the one holding the mirror is the Islamic 
tradition. 
!
Choosing a Field: Political Theology 
Why do we prefer to talk about political theologies rather than political philosophy or 
theologies directly? What constitutes the object of study of political theology? Schmitt says 
that authority, obedience, and revelation are the substance of political theology as a 
discipline.  Political theology also occupies itself with the opposition between authority and 5
anarchy; faith in revelation and atheism; and obedience and rebellion against the supreme 
sovereign. To these we add the antinomy of the present research based on obedience and 
justice. The definition of the discipline is based on the question it poses and not on the 
answers it provides. Political theology and political philosophy agree that the important issue 
 #5
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of any Political Theology (Cambridge: 5
Polity, 2008), 45. Also Heinrich Meier, Leo Strauss and the Theological-Political Problem 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80.
concerns what is right or what is just rule and just order on the grounds of revelation and 
human reason. The present study goes along these lines, posing the question about the 
theological and political reasons that explain the parallel emphasis on justice and obedience 
by medieval Christian and Muslim authors.  
 This interest in political theology as a field went through different periods of 
academic euphoria. The study of political theology was popular for the study of ancient, 
medieval, and remarkably, the twentieth-century social and political movements inspired by 
Liberation Theology and its discussion on political and social justice. Regarding ancient 
societies, Dale Launderville in his comparative study warns us against the risk of divorcing 
piety from politics.  He argues that the ancients’ reflection on authority in their communities 6
took the form of political theologies rhetorically shaped by metaphors, symbols, and 
narratives, rather than the form of political theories composed primarily to meet the 
expectations of reasoned argument.  The reason is that the question of what is right is posed 7
to man particularly in the political sphere, since he is subject to the law of the political 
community, the commandment of God, and the demand of obedience. Leo Strauss also 
engaged in the confrontation with the challenge of revelation. Strauss writes his politico-
theological treatises in confrontation with the philosophical oblivion of politics in the 
twentieth century. The starting point of the philosophical explanation of revelation would be 
 #6
 Dale Launderville, Piety and Politics: The Dynamics of Royal Authority in Homeric Greece, 6
Biblical Israel, and Old Babylonian Mesopotamia (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 2003), 2.
 Ibid, 2.7
the fact that the foundation of belief in revelation is the belief in the central importance of 
morality.   8
 For our period of study, medieval political theology is particularly concerned with a 
morally meaningful government. Ideas of the divine harmony of the universe were imbued 
with spiritualistic and theocratic traits. The principles of unity and order were transferred to 
human society, which was seen as a mystical body. Thus, political and theological thought 
was directed primarily to the attainment of that ideal, based on ethics, not politics. Obedience 
to God depended upon the interpretation of his commandments and his Will. Thus a life of 
obedience remained a life of conflict, in discord over the right or wrong interpretation. 
Political theology is founded on the binding force of revelation and the service of obedience. 
For that very reason it may support worldly authority or revolution, since obedience to faith 
may be the very reason for rebellion. Although not the purpose of this study, this double 
character of political theology can in part explain that Christian and Islamic political 
theology bear two contradictory principles: a quietist and an activist one.  However, the 9
competing principles of ensuring order and questioning the ruler’s authority explain why 
political theology is the ideal field for the study of Christian and Islamic justice and 
obedience in medieval times. 
!
 #7
 Meier, Leo Strauss, 32.8
 Bernard Lewis in his book The Political Language of Islam discusses both principles (Chicago: 9
University of Chicago Press, 1988); also Kahled Abou El-Fadl in his dissertation takes “activism” and 
quietism” as two competing principles in Islamic law: “The Islamic Law of Rebellion: The Rise and 
Development of the Juristic Discourses on Insurrection, Insurgency and Brigandage” (Ph.D diss., 
Princeton University, 1999).
Methodological Anxieties: The Comparison of Influences 
 Although this study is a work of comparative political theology, there is a slight 
emphasis on the Islamic side. The metaphor of the ‘mirrors’ is again useful: Do Islamic 
Mirrors for Princes have their specular version in the Christian Mirrors? In other words, 
does this anxiety about simultaneously emphasizing justice and obedience have a mirror-
image in the other tradition? In order to show how a political theology reflects the other, a 
comparison of justice and obedience is needed across the selected Muslim and Christian 
authors.  
 Although originally we meant to devote a chapter to the methodology of comparative 
political theology we then decided that doing so would take focus away from the main 
research on Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes. Nevertheless, since comparative 
studies of Christian and Muslim authors on theological-political topics are scarce, we feel 
obliged to at least discuss the problem and the potentiality of finding the right methodology 
to carry out such studies. The comparison of Christian and Islamic political theologies bears 
the same methodological risks of comparing their political theories. Quentin Skinner initiated 
the debate, and his ideas have since affected the methodology of comparative studies in the 
field of the history of ideas.    10
Skinner has posed a series of methodological errors or ‘fallacies’ committed in the 
history of political ideas: textualism, con-textualism, and the "history of ideas" proper. He 
warns us not to engage in ‘fictitious’ debates with authors and their texts, to dismiss their real 
 #8
 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 10
(1969), 31, 37, 48.
intentions in favor of their specific historical context, or to trace an idea over time, which 
usually “fetishizes” that word. Many times throughout this research we questioned ourselves 
regarding the possibility of merely playing with words rather than ideas. 
 Many authors have replied to Skinner’s historical fundamentalism and his critique of 
the ‘textualist approach,’ saying that historical analogies are possible, as long as we are not 
simply focusing on the same answers to similar problems, but recognizing that the same 
questions have been raised over time. The discussion more or less goes in the direction of 
acknowledging the same ‘universal questions’, something that even Skinner may agree 
with.  Ironically Oakley calls this debate an ‘epistemological hypochondria’ that saves room 11
for playing the card of influence in order to detect continuities between and beyond 
traditions.  But our problem in the case of Christian and Islamic political theology is not 12
based in its universality (a hypothesis that we intend to contest as posed by Patricia Crone 
with Islamic political theory in general and with the genre Mirrors for Princes in particular). 
Instead, it is based on specific moments in the history of both theological traditions, together 
with parallel theological concerns that made their authors produce similar philosophical 
elaborations for the polis and its ruler, as reflected in the genre Mirror for Princes.   13
 #9
 Kenneth Minogue, “Method in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner's Foundations,” Philosophy 56 11
(1981): 533-552; and Bhikhu Parekh and R.N. Berki, “The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. 
Skinner's Methodology,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (1973), 163-184.
 Francis Oakley, Politics and Eternity; Studies in the History of Medieval and Early-Modern 12
Political Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 186.
 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 13
170.
Amidst similar theoretical discussions in the field of comparative intellectual history, 
there is another strategy for the comparative enterprise, what Eric Voegelin called the 
phenomenon of ‘equivalences’ that makes the study of comparative political philosophy 
possible.  Once such equivalence is discovered we can deepen our understanding of our own 14
tradition and engender understanding for the tradition of others. The success of this strategy 
is based on selecting ‘significant representatives’ across their boundaries. Going back to the 
thesis of our investigation, it seems we can locate in key representatives of both traditions the 
same feeling of anxiety. Thus we do not fear facing methodological ‘inconsistencies.’ 
Political philosophy and political theology provide a rationale for acknowledging the 
benefits of politics (without denying other realities to which man is open).  And here is 15
where theology plays a crucial role making the human experience of politics intelligible 
through revelation. Does politics solve the problem of man’s ultimate destiny? If politics can 
answer these questions, then the political system itself will provide answers to the questions 
raised by the idea of God, immortality, man’s nature and destiny. But the capability for 
politics to do so is based on the metaphysical grounds provided by religion and its particular 
theology. 
 In the case of Christianity and Islam it was not only revelation but also reason (as 
encountered in both traditions through Greek rationalism), which helped politics to provide a 
satisfactory philosophical and practical rationale. How do reason and revelation help to 
 #10
 Anthony Parel and Ronald Keith, Comparative Political Philosophy, Studies Under the Upas Tree, 14
(London: Sage Publications, 2003), 12.
 James V. Schall, Reason, Revelation, and the Foundations of Political Philosophy (Baton Rouge: 15
Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 37.
explain what it is? The meaning of political philosophy is not complete without a 
consideration of all that is presented as intelligible to human reason on the basis of its own 
experiences and questions. Hence, reason and revelation stand as the foundation of political 
philosophy because the ultimate questions are posed to everyone in every regime, Christian 
or Islamic.  16
 Francis Oakley presents a thorough discussion on the historiographical developments 
of medieval and early modern political thought. But his more important contribution is his 
discussion on the ‘anxieties of influence’ in the trends of the study of the history of ideas, 
particularly the developments after WW II. As he says, “there has been no theory of the 
nature of the world, . . . no theology or cosmology, perhaps even no metaphysics that has not 
sought a reflection of itself in the mirror of political philosophy.”  For the purpose of this 17
investigation we submit the same for the case of political theology. 
 The key question is then set for the political theologies of Christianity and Islam. 
How did revelation influence Christian and Muslim philosophers, jurists, and theologians? 
What did it mean for them to talk about the city, the just ruler, and justice and obedience in 
light of their theological doctrines? Did the writings of these authors make more intelligible 
their historical political arrangements, preventing them from becoming themselves an 
ontology? How did their respective political philosophies contribute to make their polities 
compatible with reason and revelation? 
 #11
 Ibid, 37.16
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwells, 1946), xi-xiii.17
Back to the problem of political theology, the question revolves around how to 
compare the theoretical elaborations of two different religious traditions, in often different 
geographical and historical settings. Furthering the discussion on the plausibility of political 
philosophy, a wide range of studies has been focusing on the possibilities of developing 
cross-cultural comparisons.  In this line, comparative studies have been researching 18
Christian and Islamic political thought, but most of them have been based on how Western 
Modernity has influenced contemporary Islamic thought. In other words, they focus on the 
Islamic responses more than on identifying the originality of the intellectual developments. 
The present research focuses on the time during which Christianity and Islam were 
developing their political theologies in response to historical challenges. The similar 
discussion on obedience and justice can be explained as the exposure to, as Ninian Smart put 
it, similar ‘cultural accidents’ or the emergence of ‘theoretical moments’ in their respective 
theological discourses.  Cultural accidents include real and theoretical encounters with other 19
cultures, the incorporation of Greek philosophy, and the creation of religious and educational 
institutions. Theoretical moments include inspiration by historical events, the centralization 
or fragmentation of political power, and the quest for religious and political legitimacy. Both 
have triggered the theological reflection on the particularities of the indigenous political 
arrangement. 
 #12
 Fred Dallmayr, Border Crossings; Toward a Comparative Political Theory (Oxford: Lexington 18
Books, 199), 3.
 For the notion of  ‘cultural accidents,’ see Ninian Smart, “The Analogy of Meaning and the Tasks 19
of Comparative Philosophy,” in G. Larson and Eliot Deutsch, Interpreting Across Boundaries: New 
Essays in Comparative Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 176. For  
‘theoretical moments,’ see Roxanne Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western 
Travelers in Search of Knowledge (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 12.
 On the genre Mirrors for Princes, the historical approach has been prevalent in prior 
scholarship. Stephen Humphreys refers to Mirrors for Princes in his discussion of 
propaganda, and calls it a means for the communication of ideology. He says that:  
it is a fallacy to suppose that once we have identified some ideological aspects in an 
object [or a text], we have thereby discovered its true meaning. . . . To study their 
ideological dimensions is not to unmask their ‘real’ nature or purpose, but simply to put 
them in a specifically political context.  20!
 Although the purpose of this study is to examine significant representatives in both 
traditions who have experienced the dilemma between stressing justice or stressing 
obedience, the historical settings in which they struggled with these two political and 
theological goods will be taken into account. But more relevant for the field of comparative 
political theology is the identification of ‘equivalences’ in Islam and Christianity, as we 
intend with the notion of intellectual anxiety. 
 It is important to clarify that this is not a work of literary analysis. We have chosen 
the ‘thematic approach’ to organize the material according to both traditions to show the 
extent to which they are isomorphic. This comparative methodology can be categorized as a 
typological approach rather than a historical-genetic one. The typological approach is 
comparative and contrastive, and has heuristic value.  Much is left to historians to compare 21
and explain the historical circumstances under which these Mirrors for Princes were written 
and how the emphasis on justice and obedience responded to the historical imperative of that 
period. The organizing principle of this study is based on the theological interpretations of 
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specific texts in each tradition when they address political obedience and justice having its 
“mirror” on revelation. 
 Among the contributions of the present research we note that first, there are not many 
studies on the field of political theology in Christianity and Islam. Most of the current 
scholarship has its departure point in their philosophical, juridical, or theological doctrines. 
Second, there are no systematic works on compared political theology. Third, there is still 
confusion on which works belong to the field of political thought in Islam. Some authors 
include juridical treatises and some exclude works of Adab literature. Fourth, the same 
confusion is found in the genre Mirror for Princes. Some authors claim that there are 
chapters in juristic or theological works that might be called Mirrors.  The boundaries of the 22
genre seem to be subject to redefinition according to the stress given to ethics or expediency. 
Fifth, the study of justice in Islam has its focus on the Persian contributions to the concept, as 
it is the case of A. Lambton, or on the Greek influence, as in the case of Gutras. There is a 
recent work by Ohlander on the notion of the just ruler, but it examines Mirrors for Princes 
in response to the political turmoil of the time.   23
 We took the methodological risk of comparing theological concepts across time and 
space, focusing on the commonalities of Christian and Islamic medieval political theology. 
Despite the limitations we encountered while conducting this research, we are also aware of 
the benefits of carrying out this comparative study. By selecting representatives of both 
traditions, the coming chapters will show a common tendency for Mirrors for Princes to 
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emphasize both justice and obedience. The dual emphasis stems from Christian and Muslim 
authors’ efforts to provide advice to the ruler while attending to dual imperatives: the 
historical one requiring order and emphasizing the duty of obedience, and the theological 
imperative of justice, as the duty of the ruler to reflect God’s attributes and order for this 
worldly polity.  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Chapter One  
The Metaphor of the Speculum in Christianity and Islam: Setting Boundaries for the 
Genre Mirror for Princes !
 The present chapter adopts the thematic approach of the “mirror” for comparing the 
medieval political theology of Christianity and Islam. We first analyze the common use of the 
metaphor of the mirror by Christians and Muslim authors; and second, we expound on 
difficulties in setting the boundaries for the common genre of Mirrors for Princes as found in 
both traditions. We begin by showing how the term “mirror” has triggered theological 
reflections in Christian and Muslim classic and esoteric (mystic) authors, as well as across 
time and space. We examine how the metaphor of the mirror has proved to be a powerful 
image to convey the encounter of the human with the divine, the way to lead a moral and 
religious life, as well as a way to deal with epistemological concerns. The common use of the 
mirror across traditions will also help us to understand what we have seen as common 
expectations among Christians and Muslim thinkers regarding the rulers of their 
communities.   
In the second part, by examining the different formats Mirrors for Princes may adopt, 
we will also show the common concerns that Christian and Muslim authors encountered 
when dealing with the tension between politics and religion in their zest for their polities to 
reflect the divine order. The common treatment of the mirror imagery, and the common 
formats and contents that Islamic and Christian Mirrors for Princes have adopted, prepares 
us to focus on the commonalities in their treatment of kingship, obedience, and justice, the 
core concept of the present study. As a final note, we want to clarify that first, both sections 
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have the character of a survey for the use of the medieval reference to the “mirror,” and for 
the possible formats of the genre Mirror for Princes. Second, this chapter also serves as a 
review of the literature regarding the genre of Mirrors, both in Christianity and Islam, 
emphasizing the lack of and the potentiality of comparative studies. Lastly, the merit of this 
chapter lies in the efforts to compare Christian and Islamic political theology by selecting 
significant representatives in both traditions. 
!
Theological Reflections 
This section revolves around the notion of the mirror as a theological metaphor for 
Christian and Muslim authors. We will show how the mirror functions as a powerful image to 
express the tension between the human and the divine. The mirror is thus a theological 
reflection.  As it will be shown later in this chapter, this reflection alludes to the appearance 24
of the transcendent in the immanent, leading to the indirect knowledge of God.  
 The most important previous study of this metaphorical use of the mirror is Grabes’s 
monumental work on Mirror for Princes, a survey that includes literature related to terms 
such as speculum, mirror, and looking-glass, together with other titles which suggest some 
kind of "reflective" connotation.  Grabes also does an exceptional typology of works 25
bearing “mirror” titles. Although the present research is not concerned with the tradition of 
mirror metaphors in book titles (which Grabes says cannot be traced back beyond the ninth 
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century), it is essential to see how the mirror has been used as a metaphorical image in the 
literary cultures of Christianity and Islam. 
 Among the multiplicity of images of reflections, the metaphorical mirror refers to God 
as a mirror, which could be traced back to Alcibiades, and was then taken up by the 
Neoplatonists and by the Hellenistic mystics and early Christian Fathers.  Although the 26
mirror image was not used by Plato, who speaks of shadows in his allegory of the cave, he 
hints at the reflection of the 'ideal' in human beings.  Parallel scholarship dismisses the 27
theory that points to the many mirrors in the Plato dialogues, which are also archetypical, but 
affected principally aesthetics and art criticism.  Nevertheless, we can affirm that the 28
Platonic metaphor alluding to ideal reflections to be reached for was a powerful 
philosophical image for medieval writers.  
 In the typology of the term “mirror,” the concept it represents can be used in literature 
as suggesting the extremes of both, perfection and imperfection. Such has been the use of the 
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term “mirror” in the Bible and in the literature on virtues and vices, which was based on the 
pattern of de vitiis et virtutibus,  and so popular in medieval times.  29 30
 More importantly for the use of the mirror as a theological metaphor is its reference 
as a mirror of knowledge.  Thus, the mirror was exploited not only as a metaphor for the 31
knowledge of God, but also as a source of knowledge and insight.  Also the mirror as an 32
instrument of spiritual and moral improvement presents a continuity in literature.  God is 33
then presented as the paramount mirror, supporting the conviction that the soul is purified by 
the contemplation of the divine mirror, and our imperfections are made evident; this is then a 
first step to self-improvement.  This image-reflecting mirror is based ontologically on the 34
model of the analogy and is oriented epistemologically and aesthetically towards imitation. 
This idea of imitatio was familiar to medieval Christianity through Augustine of Hippo (d. 
430), since Christians were urged to conform themselves to the image of the Word as 
mirrored in their minds.   35
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 But before Augustine, other biblical references reflect this Judeo-Christian idea of 
God as a mirror. In effect, in ode 13 of the Odes of Salomon  we read: 36
Behold, our mirror is the Lord. 
Open the eyes and look at them in/by him. 
And learn how your face is! 
And declare hymns to his spirit! 
And wipe [the dirt] from your faces,  
And over his holiness and put it on! 
Then you will be always unblemished with him. 
Hallelujah! !
This reference to a "mirror" is said to be based on Wisdom 7:26, where we read, in allusion 
to wisdom:  
For she is the reflection of eternal light, 
the spotless mirror of the power of God, 
the image of his goodness. !
The influence of this passage on the New Testament and other early Christian writings is 
beyond doubt. It is also argued that this passage of Ode 13 is not concerned with the 
mirroring of God, but with God as the mirror for the theological self: for understanding, as a 
way to purify the soul and a metaphorical change. Nevertheless, these two ways of reflection 
(reflecting God’s attributes, and God as mirror for self-knowledge) seem to us to be simply 
part of the same reflection with God in one side, and human beings in the other. The mirror is 
regarded as a symbol of both the receptivity and the reflectivity of the universe.  We can 37
also point to Gnostic texts to support the idea of self-understanding, as found in the Acts of 
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John 95: “I am a mirror to you who know me.”  Furthermore, the reference to a “mirror” in 38
the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I prompted the use of the image of the mirror. 
Looking at God we encounter the finest mirror of the human soul. This idea of the "mirror of 
the soul" is present also in Plato and Plotinus (ca. 204/5–270 CE) with same ascendant notion 
of reflecting archetypical ideas, and descendent motion to the world of shadows.  39
Mentioning Plotinus is relevant to our research given that his influence on subsequent Arabic 
and Jewish Neoplatonists was significant.  For Plotinus, the soul is a reflection of a higher 40
being. In a famous passage he compares imagination, a way of knowledge, to a mirror: 
When the intellect is in the upward orientation which contains that life of the soul is, so 
to speak, flung down again and becomes like the reflection resting on a smooth and 
shinning surface of a mirror. When the mirror is in place, the image appears. . . . In the 
case of the soul, where is peace in that part that is capable of reflecting images of the 
rational and intellectual principles, these appear. When on the contrary, the internal 
mirror is shattered through some disturbance of the body, reason and the intellectual 
principles are unpictured. Intellect is unattended by imagination.  41!
As we can see, for Neo-Platonism, only the “pure heart” could see perfectly in the divine 
mirror.   42
 In the New Testament, a well-known passage is Paul’s reference in 1 Corinthians, xiii, 
12: “For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I 
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know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known.”  It is argued that this 43
reference to the mirror in Paul's letters is enigmatic and does not offer the key idea of a 
paragon.  However, the use of the use of the term “mirror” in Paul’s metaphor can also be 44
deceptive, since to look "through a mirror" is to look "in a mirror."  The verse occurs in a 45
discussion of what the sayings of the prophets can add to our knowledge of God. 
Furthermore, the use of the mirror metaphor can be explained by the fact that Paul was 
addressing the Corinthians, who were known to specialize in the production of mirrors. Paul's 
argument is that even with the knowledge of the prophets, our image of God will not be more 
than an obscure reflection, in contradistinction with the beatific vision of God in the afterlife. 
Paul’s tension between the worldly life and the afterlife will be part of Christian theology for 
the next three hundred years.  
 Augustine’s use of Paul's verse seems to show the limitation of human knowledge of 
God in the Confessions. But in his final work De Trinitate, Augustine accepts that any 
understanding of the mystery of the Trinity by analogy will help restore the image of God in 
our souls.  Augustine’s interpretation of 1 Corinthians 13:12 now suggests that since man is 46
created in the image of God, and man's mind is an image of the Trinity, then a mirror will 
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reflect God’s image.  Here Augustine is not using the mirror as a metaphor for a deceptive 47
image, but for the contemplative resources of the human mind.  
 The explanation for Augustine's change in the use of the mirror metaphor lies in 
Augustine's uses of another Biblical passage, this time from Paul's second Epistle to the 
Corinthians (2 Corinthians 3:18): "But we, with face unveiled, reflecting the glory of God, 
are transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, as through the Spirit of the Lord."  48
The image of the veil in the Old Testament signifies the limited knowledge of God before 
Incarnation. After the coming of Jesus Christ and the knowledge of the Gospels, man's face 
may shine with the rays of reflected divinity. Finally, it is suggested that what Augustine has 
in mind with the use of the word "reflecting" is etymologically connected with the word 
speculum, which is also linked  to what was the prevalent Platonic optical theory. According 
to this theory, a reflection is formed when the fire from an object meets the fire from the eye 
in the reflective surface.  But putting different conceptions of vision aside, it is clear how 49
powerful Augustine's metaphor of the speculum turned out to be for later medieval authors. 
 It is also relevant to understand the actual manufacture of the ancient and medieval 
mirror. As Hughes comments: 
Such mirrors had to be kept and polished in order to preserve their reflective qualities 
and, furthermore, it required great skill by the craftsman to make a perfectly flat 
surface. With such a mirror, therefore, there was always a possibility of surface 
deterioration and distortion. Thus, so long as the mirror was perfectly polished and flat, 
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the observing subject might see his own form or image perfectly reflected on its 
surface, in which case the otherness of the mirror itself is reduced to minimum in the 
observing consciousness, or even effaced completely. To the extent, however, that the 
mirror reflects a dulled or distorted image, it manifests it own otherness and detracts 
from the identity of image and subject.   50!
It therefore appears that a mirror’s capacity to reflect the divine traces in this world lies in the 
smoothness of the reflective surface, the purity of the heart, and the unveiled face with which 
we encounter God.   
 In the Christian world, earlier users of the image of the mirror were Gregory of Nissa 
(Cappadocia, c. 335 – c. 395), Ambrose (c. 340 – 4 April 397), and Basil (329 or 330– 
January 1, 379). These authors all hinted at the ascendant idea of the mirror of the soul 
reflecting the divine beauty. In effect, Gregory of Nissa discussed the second way of 
knowledge of God “within the mirror of the soul."  The mirror was a pervading motif in 51
Gregory’s opus. For the Cappadocian Father, the surface in which light is gathered creates 
depths where none previously existed, by which the light is reflected back to the source of its 
radiance.  This “mirroring” is the one original act of knowledge in which each of the 52
Persons shares; the Only Begotten, says Gregory, who dwells in the Father, sees the Father in 
himself, while the Spirit searches out the depths of God.  53
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 There is also a parallel tradition coming from classic Latin authors like Cicero, which 
Christian authors may have known about.  Classic authors like Seneca also looked at the 54
metaphor of the mirror. In the mid-first century, Seneca dedicated his De Clementia to the 
Roman Emperor Nero as his tutor and moral guide; Seneca's De Clementia is essentially the 
first Latin "mirror of a prince."  Seneca addresses the emperor in this way: “I have resolved 55
to write to you, Nero Caesar, in order that I might function as a sort of mirror and reveal you 
to yourself, you who are poised to achieve the most prized of all possessions.”  Seneca's 56
mirroring function in De Clementia is based on the notion that the emperor is supposed to 
represent some kind of divine emissary page and God's political representative on earth.  As 57
we will see later in this chapter, this notion of the ruler as a "mirror" is key to the genre 
Mirrors for Princes, and traces its lineage to the 14th Century when Egidio Romanus (Gil of 
Romes) writes in his De Regimine that "the king must be a mirror, model of life and an 
example for the people."  This idea goes back to the Franciscan author Francisco Eiximenis 58
(Gerona, 1340-1409), who held the thesis that the king receives his authority originally from 
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God through the people.  But it was already present in Plutarch's Discourse to an Unlearned 59
Prince, where, resorting to sun and moon imagery, Plutarch (c. 46 – 120 AD) affirms that the 
good prince is the image of God, his vicar, resplendent on earth.  As we will see in the next 60
chapter devoted to kingship in Christianity and Islam, this idea of the ruler as mirroring God 
and mirroring God’s order is central to understand the theories which lead to royal absolutism 
as well as the theories which criticize and limit the ruler’s authority. 
 Moving on to other uses of the metaphor of the mirror as a theological image, we 
encounter the "book as mirror," in reference not only to Scripture, but also to other religious 
books capable of revealing things as they were, are, will be, or should be. The "book-mirror" 
leads to the examination of what the mirror conventionally reveals, and its influence on the 
beholder. This image goes back to John Chrysostom (Antioch, c. 347–407), and Augustine, 
since they portrayed the Bible as a mirror. John Chrysostom was one of the first to use Holy 
Scripture as a mirror. He explains, "there is a mirror, spiritual, and far more excellent, for it 
not only shows our deformity, but transforms it too, if we were willing, into surpassing 
beauty."  The parallel of this image that links knowledge of the Scripture with beatitude is 61
found in Augustine's Enarratio in Psalmum 103.”  Thus, the use of the image of the mirror 62
has a two-fold function in Augustine’s commentaries: “in its resplendence it shows you what 
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you should be; and, it also shows you your own image in order to see your deformities and 
begin to adorn yourself.”  The same function is also found in Augustine’s commentary of 63
Psalm 118.  His other uses in the Psalms Commentaries go in the same direction of showing 64
Scripture as a mirror of knowledge, of right living, reading or recalling the Word. This image 
has its full theological connotation when used by Augustine in his commentary of Psalm 30: 
“If the Psalm prays, do you too pray; if it laments, do you lament; if it rejoices, rejoice with 
it; if it hopes, express your hope too, if it fears, do you also fear; for all things written herein 
serve to mirror ourselves.”  65
 The same use of the mirror-image is found in Augustine's later work Speculum de 
Scriptura Sacra, a compilation of selected passages from the Old and New Testament, and in 
Specchio di precetti morali dalla sacra scritura. Here Augustine exhorts the reader "to mirror 
[specchiarsi] in this Book in order to see how much one has moved in life sanctity and in 
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good works, and how much is left undone.”  66
 The influence of Augustine's use of the mirror is also found in versions of the Rule of 
St. Benedict (530 CE), where "mirror" is used to signify mandates from the Scripture. In 
effect, in Augustine’s Epistulae CCXI 16, the world is presented as a mirror. But a clearer 
example of how Augustine used the mirror metaphor is in his letter to the sisters at the 
monastery in Hippo in 424. He tells them to use this letter as a "mirror" in which they can see 
how much progress they have made, asking them to read the letter on weekly basis.  67
Augustine continues, 
But in order that you may see yourselves in this little book as in a mirror, have it read to 
you once a week lest you overlook anything through forgetfulness, and, when you find 
yourself doing what has been written give thanks to the Lord, the giver of all gifts. But 
where anyone of you sees that she is lacking something, let her be sorry for the past and 
watch out for the future, praying that her debt may be forgiven and that she may not be 
led into future temptation.  68!
Ritamary Bradley summarizes the use of the term mirror by Augustine as the "mirror of the 
soul," reflecting archetypical ideas, and the "mirror of the mind," attending to religious truth 
and thus Scripture as mirror for holy life.   69
 Eight centuries later, the same meaning of the imagery of the mirror was employed by 
brother Leo of Assisi, Francis's companion, disciple, friend and confessor. In 1227, Leo 
wrote the Mirror of Perfection as a way to record what he believed was the truth about the 
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not yet canonized saint. Brother Leo ends his Mirror of Perfection: “Wherein we may most 
sufficiently behold as in a glass the perfection of his calling and profession.”  70
 As we can see, the line of continuity up to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries with 
Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure is clear. By this time, the moral-religious mirrors were 
part of an established tradition.  Resorting to this accepted imagery Thomas Aquinas used 71
the metaphor of the mirror to clarify problems of knowledge of God, angels, and men.  72
When it comes to the mirror of God, Thomas emphasizes the "spiritual mirror" of divinity as 
capable of leading to the knowledge of other things at the intelligible level. God's 
foreknowledge and providence may be designated as the mirror of eternity.  73
!
 Does the Mirror As a Theological Image Have Its Reflection in Islam?  
 The Andalusian Ibn Tufayl (c. 1105–1185) was a novelist, philosopher, vizier and court 
official who also used the image of the mirror as a symbol and way of access to truth and 
knowledge. In his philosophical novel Hayy ibn Yaqzan, Ibn Tufayl talks about this 
experience or journey: 
Passing through a deep trance to the complete death of self (fana’) and real contact 
(wusūl) with divine, he saw (shahada) a being corresponding to the highest sphere, 
beyond which there is no body (la jism lahu), a subject free of matter, and neither 
identical with the truth (al-haqq) and the one nor with the sphere itself, nor distinct 
from them. Just as the form of the sun appearing in a polished mirror is neither sun nor 
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mirror, and yet distinct from neither. The splendor, perfection, and beauty he saw in the 
essence of that sphere were too magnificent to be described and too delicate to be 
clothed in written or spoken words. But he saw it to be the pinnacle of joy, delight, and 
rapture, in blissful vision of the being of the truth, glorious be his majesty.   74!
  The Sufi Ibn 'Atai Allah al-Iskandari (d. 1309), talking about the concept of the 
Intellect (al-ʿaql), also shows how the intellect is a mirror. In a counterpoint between 
"secrets" (asrār) and the lights (anwār), al-Iskandari mentions that the divine lights (anwār) 
"flow according to the purity of the secret. This is like a mirror which reflects the divine 
realities and polarizes them, according to his dispositions (istiʿdad)."  The intellect is also 75
considered as a mirror with one face turning to God and the other to the world, as in the 
saying of the Prophet: "the first thing God created was the intellect (al-ʿaql). He said to it: 
receive (iqbal), and it received: then he said to it: transmit (idbar), and he transmitted it."  
 But the one who really elaborated on the metaphor of the mirror and thus clarified the 
epistemological premises of faith was al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). He uses the mirror analogy to 
clarify the nature of knowledge through an example (mithāl): 
Know that the locus of knowledge is the heart. . . . It relates to the realities of 
knowable concepts as a mirror does to the forms of colored objects. Just as [every] 
colored object has a form (ṣūra) whose image (mithāl) is impressed upon and appears 
in the mirror, so every knowable concept has a reality (ḥaqīqa) whose form is 
impressed upon and becomes manifest in the mirror of the heart.   76!
 Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī further explains that the object of knowledge does not 
become united or identical with the heart or dwell (ḥulūl) in it. In contrast to what Ṣūfīs have 
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argued, al-Ghazālī finds it impossible to unite with the object of knowledge. This 
impossibility becomes even more significant when the object of knowledge is God. Al-
Ghazālī tries to make clear that God does not appear in the heart, but merely reveals himself 
to it: “Just as the sky, the earth, trees, and rivers can be seen in a mirror, as if they exist in the 
mirror and as if the mirror encompasses them all, so also the entire divine presence (al-haḍra 
al-ilāhīya) can be impressed upon the human soul.”  In this way al-Ghazālī cautions the 77
reader against pantheistic ideas and what he thinks were Ṣūfī misinterpretations of their 
mystical states (aḥwāl). 
 Al-Ghazālī also points to the same metaphor of reflection in another work, the Niche 
of Lights (Mishkāt al-anwār), where he provides an interpretation of the well-known Light 
Verse (āyat al-nūr, Quran 24:35). We can say, without stretching the parallel between the 
mirror and the glass as we have seen supra, that al-Ghazālī points to the same imagery to 
convey the reflection of truth. 
When clarifying the levels of luminous human spirits, in order to know the 
similitudes of the Quran, al-Ghazālī describes glass as the first similitude for the imagined 
spirit. He describes the characteristics in relation to seeing the lights of the visible world only 
in a glass. As he explains it: “Originally, glass (zajāj) is a dense substance, but once it is 
purified and made clear, it does not veil the light of the lamp. Rather it conveys the light in a 
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proper manner.”  As we have seen before, the idea of a smooth surface, a pure heart or soul, 78
and the “unveiled,” returns to emphasize the capacity to reflect the divine. 
 From epistemological assumptions to the moral sphere in Islam, al-Ghazālī also uses 
the metaphor of the mirror to point at the heart. In effect, by equating the heart with a mirror, 
al-Ghazālī tries to convey that the heart is obscured or “covered” as it is expressed by 
inappropriate actions.  Thus, wrong actions in the moral sphere produce a veil of rust over 79
the inward mirror. Eaton argues that this recalls a major theme found both in the Qur’ān and 
in a saying of the Prophet, according to which the heart is comparable to a mirror over which 
a cast of rust forms when the soul and the body fall into sin (Eaton reminds us that ancient 
mirrors were made of metal). Al-Ghazālī mentions that the mirror of the heart can reflect the 
true nature of things only if it is “polished, illuminated, and maintained in proper balance.”  80
Al-Ghazālī talks about this balance as governed by the laws of harmony. When the balance is 
achieved, then the heart attains a “natural disposition” and is capable of “absorbing Reality” 
in the same way that a mirror in proper balance reflects the true forms of objects without 
distorting them.  
 This image of the heart as a mirror has its perfect application in the figure of Jesus 
Christ. Al-Ghazālī argues that divinity was reflected in Christ's heart as light is reflected in a 
polished mirror. Those who saw this reflection erroneously thought that Christ was “united” 
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with divinity (ittiḥād) or that divinity “indwelled” him (ḥulūl), and hence called him God. 
This error thus became part of Christian teaching. Al-Ghazālī insists, by contrast, that no 
union or indwelling took place, but rather that this was a case of “reflection” of divinity in 
the mirror of Christ's heart.  Later al-Ghazālī adds:  81
[The heart] is analogous to a polished mirror (mir'āt majlūwa), for it has in itself no 
color, but receives the color of what is present in it . . . . This is one of the stations of 
the science of unveiling (maqām min maqāmāt 'ulūm al-mukāshafa), and it is from here 
that the false imagining sprang forth of him [i.e. al-Ḥallāj] who claimed [to have] 
indwelling and union (idda‘ā al-ḥulūl wa-l-ittiḥād), saying ‘I am the real.’  82!
This use of the mirror image provides al-Ghazālī with a powerful conceptual tool to rebut the 
erroneous notions of ḥulūl and ittiḥād, ascribed by him to both the Christians and the ecstatic 
Ṣūfīs (as well as to certain other groups). 
 There are other mystical figures who resort to the imagery of the mirror to express the 
relationship between the human and the divine. In effect, the metaphor of the mirror is a 
common link among mystics, who use it to illustrate their experiences with their originalities 
and differences.  For example, Betul Cavdar crosses traditions when she expounds on the 83
metaphors of the mirror in the work of Andalusian mystic Ibn Arabi (1165 –1240) and 
Christian mystic Clare of Assisi (July 16, 1194 – August 11, 1253).  Although the images of 84
the mirror that they take as models are different, the exemplary concepts and qualifications 
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they see in these mirrors are not.  We are aware that this comparison questions the limits of 85
the methodology of interfaith writings, however, the challenge may be overcome by selecting 
a common point shared in the theological writing of both authors. This common point is the 
mirror imagery used both by Clare of Assisi and Ibn Arabi in their interpretation of the 
relationship between human beings and the divine. The mystic character of Ibn Arabi and 
Clare of Assisi is also a starting point, where knowledge of God and the human soul are key 
in their relationship with one another. In Islam, the tension between creation as a mirror, and 
the soul of the believer as a truthful mirror for God is reflected in the well-known Islamic 
saying that reads, "My heavens and my earth embrace me not, but the heart of my believing 
servant does embrace me.”    86
 According to Clare in her letters to Agnes of Prague (1211-1282), Jesus Christ appears 
as the mirror of perfection in divine and human dimensions who is to be taken as a constant 
model. In his divinity, Jesus is the perfect mirror of eternity and the perfect presentation of 
the divine Father. Jesus is then the only accessible manifestation of God and thus the only 
mirror of the divinity for human beings. Writing to Agnes, Clare tells her that it is the poverty 
and humility of Jesus that she must see in the mirror of the heart and imitate continually. 
 Clare uses the image of the mirror for the first time in her third letter to Agnes, urging 
her to place her mind in the "mirror of eternity:” “Place your mind in the mirror of eternity; 
place your soul in the splendor of glory; place your heart in the figure of the divine 
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substance; and through contemplation, transform your entire being into the image of the 
divine one himself.”  The Christian mystic uses "the mirror of eternity," "the splendor of 87
glory," and "the figure of the divine substance" interchangeably. Later in her fourth letter to 
Agnes, she develops the image of the mirror with a focus on the human character of Jesus: 
 Because the vision of him is. . . a mirror without tarnish. Look at this mirror everyday, 
O queen, spouse of Jesus Christ, and continually examine your face in it, so that in this 
way you may adorn yourself completely, inwardly and outwardly. . . . Moreover in this 
mirror shine blessed poverty, holy humility, and charity beyond words, as you will be 
able to contemplate throughout the entire mirror.   88!
 The untarnished mirror of Christ is then able to reflect any tiny piece of imperfection. 
Imitating Christ is then to place his reflection in front of the imitator so that the imitator 
notices his faults in comparison to Christ. Clare even calls Jesus the "mirror of the cross" and 
tells Agnes to ponder this image: 
Indeed, ponder the final days of this mirrored one, contemplate the ineffable love with 
which he was willing to suffer on the tree of the cross and die a kind of death that is 
more shameful than any other. The mirror suspended upon the wood of the cross there 
kept urging those passing by of what must be considered, saying: O all of you who pass 
by this way. Look and see if there is any suffering like my suffering.   89!
 Born thirty years before Clare in Spain, Ibn Arabi (1165 –1240) experienced the 
mystical vision of God being reflected in his creation. In the first chapter of his Fusul al-
hikam, Ibn Arabi explains, focusing on God's creation and on Adam's:  
 The reality (God) wanted to see the essences of his most beautiful names or to put it in 
another way, to see his own essence, in an all inclusive object encompassing the whole 
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(divine) command, which . . . would reveal to him his own mystery. For the seeing of a 
thing, itself by itself, is not the same as its seeing itself in another, as it were in a 
mirror.   90!
 For Ibn Arabi, it seems that the whole creation is then the mirror that God uses to 
visualize himself. Thus, the creation seems not to have any reality beyond that of a reflection 
in the mirror. Anything beyond God is merely a reflection of him. But as Cavdar notes, Ibn 
Arabi explains that the creation does not satisfy God's desire to be mirrored because it lacks 
spirit, "The reality gave existence to the whole cosmos as an undifferentiated thing without 
anything of the spirit in it, so it was like an unpolished mirror.”  Only Adam represents the 91
polished mirror that received the spirit and can reflect the names of God. Furthermore, 
creation is in its own "veil" and cannot perceive the Truth.  Thus, for Ibn Arabi all human 92
beings have the potential to reflect all God's names in their being through acquiring the 
divine moral values (takhaluq bi-akhlāq Allah). The term akhlāq has the double 
interpretation of something engraved in the person through creation, but also something 
acquired by living a moral life.  93
 Prophets have also the potency to reflect certain names of God better than others, but it 
is Muhammad who is able to represent God in an all-comprehensive manner: 
Whenever the Real discloses himself to you within the mirror of you heart, your mirror 
will make him manifest to you in the measure of its constitution and in the form of its 
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shape. You know how far you stand below Muhammad's degree of knowledge of his 
Lord. So cling to faith and follow him! Place him before you as the mirror within which 
you gaze upon your own form and the form of others. . . . So the manifestation of the 
real within the mirrors of Muhammad is he most perfect, the most balanced, and most 
beautiful manifestation.   94!
 Finally, in Ibn Arabi's understanding, the perfection of Muhammad is in relationship to 
God's mercy reflecting the Christian association of Jesus with love. But as we commented 
supra, the intention of this dialogue between Clare and Ibn Arabi on the notion of the mirror 
is intended to show how the mirror of the heart of the believer is able to overcome the 
restrictions of our vision of God through Clare's charity, poverty and humility, and through 
Ibn ʿArabi's mercy. 
  In a similar comparison, the image of the mirror of the intellect as a way of self-
knowledge takes place between Meister Eckhart and Ibn Arabi.  As we have seen supra in 95
the first chapter of the Bezels (the chapter on Adam), Ibn ʿArabi has in view the universal 
manifestation of God in creation and the vision that God has of himself in the mirror of 
creation, particularly, the mirror of the word of Adam. Later in the chapter of Seth, Ibn ‘Arabi 
refers to the “interior revelation” of God in humanity, and the knowledge or “vision” that 
humans have of themselves on the divine “mirror.” Whereas the chapter on Adam describes 
the manifestation of the universal of God, or the vision that God has of himself in the 
universal being, the chapter on Seth focuses on the inner revelation of God or the knowledge 
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that human beings have of themselves in the “mirror” divine.      96
 As an analogy for self-knowledge achieved by saints, Ibn Arabi uses his famous 
metaphor of the mirror where God reveals himself only through the perfected self-knowledge 
of the saint. God is the “mirror” in which the saint is able to see himself, that is, his 
immutable identity. Just as the mirror is the condition for the reflection of one’s image, so 
God is the condition for the self-reflection upon one’s immutable essence. But just as the 
mirror cannot itself be seen, and becomes more invisible the more perfect its surface is, so 
God cannot be seen directly by the saint, but only insofar as the divine mirror is polished and 
made smooth by the law of the prophet. Thus, the recipient sees nothing other than his own 
form in the mirror of the reality. He does not see the reality itself, which is not possible, 
although he knows that he may see only his [true] form in it. As in the case of a mirror and 
the beholder, he sees the form in it, but he does not see the mirror itself, despite his 
knowledge that he sees only his own and other images by means of it. God makes this 
comparison so that the recipient of a divine self-revelation should know that it is not him 
whom he sees. This analogy of the mirror is the closest and most faithful one for a vision of a 
divine self-revelation. The tension between the duality and the oneness of this experience lies 
in the fact that the reflection that the perfect saint sees of himself is the same reflection that 
God sees of the saint in God himself. But still the saint cannot see God, just as in looking at a 
mirror we can see the mirror but not its back or how the image is produced. As Ibn Arabi 
says, “We know that our existence subsists through God, just as we know that the image we 
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see ‘subsists’ through the mirror.”  Here the saint is simply a transparent image or vehicle in 97
and through which the divine essence sees and knows itself.  
 Crossing again the threshold of tradition and time, the Anglo-American Christian 
mystic Thomas Merton (d. 1968) expresses the same mystical metaphor where God sees 
himself in the believer as “through a glass”: Man is the image of God, and his inner self is a 
kind of mirror in which God not only sees himself, but also reveals himself to the “mirror” in 
which he is reflected.  98
 From the mirror of the heart to the mirror of creation, in Islam the tradition of hadith 
also speaks of a sadness and longing in God: "I was a hidden treasure and I yearned to be 
known. Then I created creatures in order to be known by them."  The same concept of 99
creation as God's mirror is found in Bonaventure, who teaches that our mind approaches God 
through creation, "putting the whole world of sense-object before us like a mirror through 
which we may pass to God, the highest creative artist."   100
 However, regarding the mirror of creation in Ibn Arabi, it appears that God needs no 
mirror other than himself in order to “view” and know himself. Nevertheless, Izutsu notes 
that:  
the absolute has also an aspect in which it is an essence qualified by attributes. And 
since the attributes become real only when they are externalized, it becomes necessary 
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for the absolute to see itself in the ‘other’. Thus the ‘other’ is created in order that God 
might see himself therein in a externalized form.  101!
 The “other” as a mirror is also reflected in the Persian poetry of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmi (d. 
1273) when he evokes a Six-Faced Mirror talking about the Pearl of the Heart in the six-
volume Mathnawi:  102
The Prophet said, “God doesn’t pay attention to your outer form: 
so in your improvising, seek the owner of the heart.” 
God says, “I regard you through the owner of the heart, 
not because of prostration in prayer 
or the giving of wealth in charity.” 
The owner of the Heart becomes a six-faced mirror: 
through him God looks out upon all the six directions. 
      Mathnawi V, 869-70, 874 !
Know the mirror of the heart is infinite. 
Either the understanding falls silent, 
or it leads you astray, because the heart is with God, 
or indeed the heart is he. 
       Mathnawi I, 3488-91 !
Those with mirror-like hearts 
do not depend on fragrance and color: 
they behold beauty in the moment. 
They’ve cracked open the shell of knowledge 
and raised the banner 
of the eye of certainty. 
Thought is gone in a flash of light. 
       Mathnawi I, 3492-94 
Someone with a clear and empty heart  
mirrors images of the invisible. 
He becomes intuitive and certain 
of our innermost thought, 
because “the faithful are a mirror for the faithful.” 
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 In some of Rūmī’s stories from the Mathnawi, we can see how the mirror was for Rūmī 
a symbol for truth. Amidst a dispute between Mohammad’s disciple and a man from a nearby 
village, the Prophet said smiling:  
‘You have spoken the truth. . . . I am a mirror, polished by the divine hand. People see 
their own images in me. The world appears blue through a blue glass, red through a red. 
Everything they see is a reflection of themselves.’ ‘Is there no truth in the world, then?’ 
his disciple asked. ‘Is nothing real?’ Mohammed answered, ‘Purify yourself of your 
passions if you seek the real. Polish your heart till it becomes a white and colorless 
mirror. Then truth will shine through you.’   104!
 Finally, in line with this philosophical alterity  or “otherness” that the mirror triggers, 105
the Muslim believer also appears as a mirror, as Abu Dawud's hadith reads: “Narrated By 
Abu Hurayrah: ‘The Prophet said: The believer is the believer's mirror, and the believer is the 
believer's brother who guards him against loss and protects him.’”  106
 All these different references to the mirror as a reflecting metaphor of the encounter 
between the divinity and human beings show how influential the mirror and its analogue 
images have been in Christian and Islamic literature. From the Old Testament passages in 
Wisdom 7:26, James 1:23, Exodus 38:8, and Job 37:18, to thinking of saints as mirror-
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examples, to the magic mirrors made for Alexander the Great, and magic mirrors in the 
Policraticus of John of Salisbury, to the “engraved mirrors” dating from thirteenth-century 
Iran and Anatolia, mirrors were used as a way to access the transcendent.  But they signify 107
not only the encounter and knowledge of the divine. They also represent a way to make sense 
of the gap between the divine order and the worldly one, as well as a striving for some 
continuity of Christian and Islamic values and beliefs as they encounter reality. In effect, as 
we will see when we examine the genre of Mirrors for Princes, Christian and Muslim 
authors of Mirrors were concerned with how the realities of their concrete polities were 
capable of reflecting the divine polis or primeval religious community and its religious 
values. What kind of advice should be provided to the representative of God or the Prophet's 
representative for him to be a mirror of the divine, and a mirror for his subjects?            
!
The Limits of the Reflection 
 The genre Mirrors for Princes has been a contested category in Islamic and Christian 
political thought. This section deals with the problems of the genre and the flexibility of its 
limits in both Islamic and European literature. Earlier scholarship was based on the history of 
ideas where scholars tended to focus on depictions of the ideal ruler and other aspects of the 
 #42
 Grabes mentions the proceedings of the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD, which he says offers the 107
earliest instances of the Virgin Mary's being apostrophized as a mirror, present also in the Litany of 
the Blessed Virgin of Loreto, where the Virgin Mary is called a 'mirror of justice'. See also Grabes, 
Mutable Glass, 127, for magic mirrors. For the Iranian mirror and their talismanic properties see 
Word of God, Art of Man: the Qur’an and its Creative Expressions: Selected Proceedings from the 
International Colloquium, London, 18-21 October 2003, ed. Fahmida Suleman  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2007). For biblical references to 
mirrors, see Adam Clarke's commentary on the Bible, particularly Exodus 38:8: “silver mirrors 
became so common that even the servant girls used them: When the Egyptian women went to the 
temples, they always carried their mirrors with them. The Israeli women probably did the same, and 
Dr. Shaw states that the “Arabian women carry them constantly hung at their breasts," 150. 
‘political thought’ expressed in the mirror literatures.  A secondary area of interest 108
concerned itself with the textual transmission within and across these literatures. More recent 
scholarship has continued to develop these established approaches, but exploring the 
meaning and significance of individual mirrors in the historical settings.   
 The discussion also regards two additional controversies. First, if these books bear or 
not the word speculum or its equivalent (glass, etc.); and second, if the contents of these 
treatises should be considered a Mirror. Some authors claim that there are chapters in juristic 
or theological works that might be called Mirrors.  Furthermore, the boundaries of the 109
genre seem to be subject to redefinition, depending on the stress given to ethics or 
expediency. If we take this last distinction into account, how can Niccolo Machiavelli’s 
Prince be compared to John of Salisbury’s Policraticus? Or can we consider al-Māwardī’s 
Naṣīhat al-mulūk a Mirror for Princes in the same way we treat al-Rayrāyī’s Hidāya? This 
methodological issue is addressed in the last chapter devoted to the comparison of Mirrors 
for Princes in both traditions. Nevertheless, in this section we want first to account for the 
heterogeneity in the genre, to later show that the comparison is possible if based on the key 
theological and political concepts of justice and obedience, as found in medieval Christian 
and Islamic Mirrors for Princes.     
 Mirrors literature or Fürstenspiegel is so named for the Latin titles Speculum regis, 
Speculum principis, Speculum regale, or De regimine principum, given to various European 
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works from the late twelfth century onwards; works intended as guides for the education and 
conduct of princes and rulers.  But examples of the genre may be traced back to the ancient 110
Near East, China, India, and the Islamic Near East, and as early as the 9th century in 
Medieval Europe. In Islam there are many terms to refer to this kind of literature, found 
either in prose or poetry. To begin with, they are part of the corpus of “advice literature” or 
“naṣīhat al-mulūk” (“advice for kings’), that deals with the ‘art of government’ also known as 
‘political wisdom.’ It is also considered to belong to the adab literature cultivated in Islam as 
Allen includes it.  The idea of intellectual nourishment, manners and education is present as 111
it expanded in Islamic sciences, mainly when Islam encountered Persian courtly traditions.  112
In effect, Allen notices that adab developed at the moment when the Muslim community 
encountered its cultural complexity (shu’abiyya polemics).  As Crone argues, those who 113
wrote on government in the tenth and the eleventh centuries were first and foremost educated 
layman who cultivated the Persian and the Greek traditions.  114
 Mirrors for Princes within the limits of adab literature is present in the case of the 
caliph Hishām and his chancery Salim Abu al-‘Ala, who was responsible for translating 
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manuals of advice on conduct of the ruler based on Aristotle’s epistles to Alexander.  He 115
was a pioneer in the development of adab. His pupil was ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Kātib (d. 750), 
who served as the secretary of the last Umayyid caliph Marwan II. He wrote epistles, one 
dedicated to Marwan’s son ‘Abd Allah, considered one of the earliest examples of Mirrors 
for Princes, although he expands less on the conduct of the good ruler and his subject, turning 
into more practical issues of military strategy. But his epistles have been overshadowed by 
Ibn al Muqāffa (d. 757) of Persian origin as well, but educated in the intellectual center of 
Basrah. Among his productions in the genre of adab is Kitāb al-adab al-kabīr, on court 
manners, and his translation from Persian of Kalilah wa dimnah, a collection of didactic 
fables originally from India.  
 Later on, al-Jāhiz (d. 869) and then Ibn al-Qutaybah (d. 889) were responsible for the 
diversification of adab and its expansion, but mainly oriented to enlighten, entertain, and to 
educate. The epistolary style as found in Kitāb al-Tāj by Abu Ishāq al-Sabi (d. 994), as 
chancery of the Buwayhi sultan Izzi al-dawlah, and later in Miskawah, followed the trends of 
the court salon, called ‘inshah diwani or chancery composition, known for its embellishment 
and elaboration (what is also called artistic prose).  As Crone notes, these epistles often 116
took the form of a ‘testament’ (waṣiyya) passed, as we will see in the case of European early 
mirrors, from father to son, or by an older man to a member of the next generation.   117
 But as Marlow shows, there are a number of scholars, among them Dimitri Gutas, 
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Cornell Fleischer and Muzaffar Alam, who have differentiated between Mirrors for Princes 
and works of political philosophy and ethics (akhlāq).  Both of these types of literature are 118
often presented as works of advice for rulers, but in many cases they differ markedly not only 
in their contents and intellectual outlook but also in their literary forms and style.  119
However, other well-known works, such as Siyasatnameh writen by Niẓām al-Mulk (1018–
1092), and Qabusnameh by Kai Ka’us Iskandar (b. 1021) do not follow these conventions. 
Moreover, a number of other didactic or ethical (akhlāqi) texts, which are not directed 
specifically at political leaders, also contain practical wisdom and advice for kings, princes, 
and other courtiers. Generally speaking, all of these works, including Mirrors literature, may 
be categorized broadly as belonging to the genre of Persian advice (andarz) literature. 
 From the criteria of format to the content of Mirrors for Princes, Crone notes that such 
works of advice are dubbed as Mirrors by modern Islamicists.  She affirms that although 120
the name of the genre is borrowed from medieval European history (Latin specula regis), the 
contents might justify the use of the term, since “It casts the advice as a mirror in which the 
prince would look at himself and try to improve his appearance, and this idea is encountered 
on the Muslim side too, even though the term itself is not.”  To show the presence of the 121
concept in Islamic treatises she quotes an eleventh-century Turkish work that says: “A loyal 
man may serve one as a mirror: by regarding him one may straighten one’s habits and 
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character.”  Crone affirms that all mirrors usually exhort the ruler to piety and remind him 122
of the judgment to come, trying to make the king (or other reader) reflect on himself.  But 123
she is aware of the problems of limiting the genre, and affirms that mirrors overlapped with 
wisdom literature, works of etiquette, religious instruction, and above all ethics. The author 
notes that governance or siyāsa was considered to be of three types, following the 
Aristotelian three branches of practical philosophy: of the self (i.e. ethics), of the household 
(i.e. economics or household management), and of the cities (i.e. politics). She confirms that 
all mirrors spoke about the moral ideas to which the ruler should aspire, and a few discussed 
government of all three types.  124
 Braulio Calabozo, working on the Hidāya of al-Rayrāyī (d. 1470) as a medieval Mirror 
for Princes, also notes that not all the treatises are of the same kind. Some like Sirāj al-mulūk 
are authentic Mirrors for Princes; others are more technical, dealing with law or politics.  125
Some of them are imbued with religion, whereas others are secular like Adab al-kabīr, whose 
moral is practical; its advice does not reach any ethics, does not go beyond the exploitation of 
human passions in its own benefit.  In comparing the Hidāya with other medieval European 126
Mirrors, Calabozo notices that whereas the sources for Muslim authors were the Qur'an, 
Sunna, mystic literature, and Muslim sages, Christian authors resort in their Mirrors to 
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Christian sources such as the Bible, Holy Fathers, and the Scholastics.  It seems then that 127
both have some knowledge of the Greco-Latin wisdom and the Aristotelian tradition. 
 In sum, it is difficult to contain advice literature within firm boundaries; it frequently 
overlaps with other types of writing. Moreover Eberhardt, after presenting a lengthy 
discussion on the limits of the genre and how they differ from panegyrics and admonitions 
also says that Oriental and Western mirrors are still paraded for inspection.  This 128
observation not only points at the difficulties of the genre, but also makes evident the lack of 
comparative studies that would help in classifying different mirrors across time, space, and 
traditions. Marlow also explains that other designations that appear in titles and are 
considered as part of the naṣīhat al mulūk include adab al-mulūk (‘manners of kings’) and 
siyar al-mulūk (‘conduct of kings’). Marlow notices that some scholars (he does not specify 
who) have rejected the term Mirror for Princes and chosen instead to refer to ‘advice 
literature,’ in order to avoid imposing a literary category that lacks an analogue in the Arabic 
and Persian literature. However, as this study argues, we can trace the similarities and 
parallels in both European and Islamic Mirrors for Princes. The only objection would be that 
the term “mirror,” is not actually present in the title of Islamic treatises, although as Crone 
notes, the idea is encountered in Muslim works of this type. 
 This takes us back to our prior discussion on the use of the mirror as a metaphor. 
Whereas the use of the mirror as an object in all this literature is a symbol, the use of the 
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mirror as a title is a metaphor, which is exclusively a language phenomenon.  In the same 129
line, the parallels between the naṣīhat al-mulūk and the European Mirror for Princes as 
described by Jónsson suggest rich possibilities for cross-cultural comparative study.  130
Finally, Nederman also attempts to expand the limits of the genre taking into account its 
presence in medieval oriental and occidental literature, arguing that the medieval "mirror" 
was, most essentially, a book of advice addressed to an individual or (more commonly) a 
group, detailing a code of conduct or set of values appropriate to its addressee's social 
position or standing.  131
 Regarding the authors of these Arabic and Persian mirrors, A. K. S. Lambton conceived 
of the Mirror literature in contradistinction to the writings of jurists and philosophers in her 
foundational study of “Islamic Mirrors for Princes,” published in 1971.  She argues that the 132
distinctive character of the authors of Mirrors as jurists, philosophers, or couturiers affects 
not only the contents, sources, and emphasis on certain virtues or vices to be adopted or 
avoided by the ruler, but also certain ideas of kingship and government. Lambton 
distinguishes between three ‘formulations’ that emerged within an evolving body of Islamic 
political ideas: those of the jurists in their works of fiqh, and especially those that dealt with 
al-ahkām al-sultāniyya; those of the philosophers in their elaborations of the virtuous polity; 
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and those of a less clearly defined group, often secretaries or administrators, in their works of 
counsel and manuals of conduct for rulers and governors. It was in this third formulation that 
Lambton situated Mirrors for Princes. The association of Mirrors with secretaries has been a 
common perception of Mirrors as a vehicle for the promotion of primarily Persian or Islamic 
conceptions of kingship and government.   133
 Recent scholarship, however, has noted the voluminous literature of counsel for rulers 
that was produced not by secretaries or administrators, but by authors of varied professional 
and cultural backgrounds, including religious scholars. Carole Hillenbrand’s article on certain 
Arabic and Persian works of al-Ghazālī points in such a direction.  Hillenbrand argues that 134
chapter ten of al-Ghazālī’s theological treatise Kitāb al-mustazhirī is considered firmly 
within the Fürstenspiegel genre.   135
Meisami and Aziz al-Azmeh have also identified the ‘homiletic’ strand of mirror-
writing, and a prevalence of more ‘ethically-inclined’ mirrors and the role of the ulema in the 
composition of Mirror for Princes.  Most of them concentrate also on the moral virtue of 136
the ruler. But more importantly, these studies have demonstrated the limits of another 
formerly widespread assumption, namely, that mirrors were typically concerned with the 
practical aspects of governance.   137
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 In the West the kind of material generally treated as Mirrors for Princes is found in 
verse rather than in prose, dating from the fourth century or later production from Italy and 
the most important centers of learning in Africa. The growth of the genre took place in the 
fourth century with the flourishing of the schools of rhetoric, particularly in Gaul.  The 138
purpose of these early mirrors is eulogic and it is parallel to the genre of the Specula 
Principum. After Constantine converted to Christianity, Eusebius, bishop of Cesarea (d. 340), 
resorted to ancient Near Eastern, Iranian and Greek ideas to portray the king. He depicted 
him as the image of God, a copy of divine perfection, the representative (hyparchos) of the 
supreme God, a bearer of the divine light and carrier of the divine name of king, a replica of 
the logos. Doyle affirms that Mirrors for Princes were rooted in the continental Latin 
culture.   139
 One of the oldest works in Medieval Europe of this kind was The Testament of Morand, 
dated around 600 and completely pagan in its description of kingship. In the ninth century 
Sedulious Scottus, an Irish poet and scholar, wrote “On Christian Rulers” (Rectoribus 
Christianis). He belongs to the Irish monasticism movement extended from the sixth to the 
ninth centuries. Scottus’ Rectoribus Christianis was composed for Emperor Lothar I’s son 
and written in 859, based on models and precepts from the Bible and Roman historical 
sources.  It was intended to advise the king of his royal responsibilities. The more 140
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outstanding work in the Speculum principum genre was the anonymous “De doudecim 
abusivis saeculi” (On the Twelve Abuses of Age), a very popular work in later centuries. It 
addressed topics familiar in European political thought, i.e. a king must avoid the crime of 
tyranny, but no king can govern justly unless he first govern himself with virtue and 
discipline. This work was quoted in church councils and synods in the ninth century, and 
there is no reason to doubt that Christian as well as Protestant political thinkers used it, as we 
shall see they did with the Muslim version. Here we find the same topics addressed in 
Islamic thought and the same theoretical notions, i.e. an unjust king is subject to divine wrath 
and suffers wars and natural catastrophes for it. A king receives his power and authority from 
God and is answerable to heaven for his stewardship of the people. It was an effort in the 
Carolingian period to regenerate society in accordance to the dogmatic notion of Christianity, 
around the Augustinian notion of the “Civitas Dei.” 
 In linking rulership and ethics, Carolingian political thought was not that different from 
ancient political thought, notably Stoicism.  Stoicism’s influence on Christianity is well 141
known and came very early: Paul’s treatment of the fellowship of Christians as a kind of 
body politic is already extremely Stoic (I Corinthians 12). Carolingian authors of Mirrors for 
Princes were imbued with this influence. Thus, their insistence that rulers cultivate the four 
cardinal virtues (justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance) was a Stoic commonplace, 
transmitted partly by the Roman philosopher Cicero (d. 43 BCE), partly through Pope 
Gregory the Great (d. 604). It is often assumed that Augustine of Hippo (354-430) was the 
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most important Patristic author for the formation of early medieval Christianity. Even though 
Augustine was important, Gregory surpasses him in his relevance as an authoritative figure, 
and the reasons are paramount for the understanding of European political ethics. Gregory 
transmitted the basics of Stoic ethical teachings in a way that could be adopted fully by 
Christian societies. Gregory assumed that here is a division of society between rulers and 
ruled, but still insisting on an underlying human equality, affirming that all people have the 
same rights by virtue of being the children of God. The corollary of this caveat is that tyranny 
is persistently deemed as evil.  142
 Lester K. Born in his introduction to the translation of Desiderius Erasmus, Education 
of a Christian Prince, argues that this kind of treatise can be traced down to Isocrates.  In 143
1504 Erasmus asserted in his own panegyric to prince Philip of Burgundy that  
no other way of correcting a prince is as efficacious as presenting, in the guise of 
flattery, the pattern of a real good prince. Thus do you instill virtues and remove faults 
in such a manner that you seem to urge the prince to the former and to restrain him 
from the latter.  144!
Furthermore, twelfth-century Europe witnessed the commencement in Latin literature of its 
own body of Exempla, with the appearance of the Disciplina Clericalis of the Spaniard 
Petrus Alfonsi. Strikingly, this work was composed of narratives of Arabic provenance. 
Oriental collections with their maxims and illustrations also inspired Spanish treatises of 
 #53
 Ibid, 189.142
 Erasmus, Education, 46.143
 Desiderio Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince. Translated by Lisa Jardine, Neil M. 144
Cheshire, and Michael J. Heath. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xx.
government.  It seems that the Muslim ‘sententious’ literature had its mirror image in the 145
rising of the ‘exempla’ in Europe in the 12th century.  
 A secondary area of interest concerned itself with the textual transmission within and 
across these literatures. In this line, it is argued that the thirteenth-century Norwegian 
Speculum Regale, of unknown authorship, had its prototype in those books written in India 
for the imitation of princes, but no explanation is provided.   146
 Notwithstanding, as Calabozo argues, authors of Mirrors like Alphonso X the Wise, the 
Segunda Partida, and the author of Libre de Saviesa, all resorted to Oriental sources.  It is 147
also the case for the Bonium or the Bocados de oro, Poridad de Poridades, Ensenamientos e 
castigos de Alexandre y Fechos e castigos de los filososfos.  Also in the Castigos e 148
documentos del Rey don Sancho, the author shows that he knows the Qur’an well. Since this 
study is not a work on comparative literature, the hypothesis of the “percolation” of these 
treatises from East to West is not under examination. Nevertheless, a thorough study on the 
similarities in structure and content of Eastern and Western Mirrors for Princes is still 
pending. 
 This study focuses on the advice provided to rulers, despite its different formats. 
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Themes such as the origin of authority, the role of law, and mainly the proposed tension 
between justice and obedience will set the boundaries for us to consider Christian and Islamic 
treatises as Mirrors for Princes. In medieval writings on rulership wisdom, understood as 
justice, was consistently regarded as the crowning virtue of rulers. It was impossible to talk 
about political power without insisting on the need for leaders to make decisions based on 
virtues like wisdom and moderation. This does not mean that leaders were wise in judgments 
and moderate in actions, but that political policy was discussed in such terms. As Koziol 
notices, Mirror for Princes discuss a wide range of issues, including the purpose of kingship, 
the governance of the royal household and the royal court, and preeminently the nature of 
justice.   149
 Ohlander produced a recent study on the notion of justice in the genre Mirrors for 
Princes in Islam.  He argues that the Fürstenspiegel were intimately tied to the historical 150
context in which they were produced. They constituted a recognizable literary genre, which 
emerged within disturbed political situation characterized by the progressive dissolution of 
centralized authority in the Muslim heartlands beginning in the mid-11th century. 
Nevertheless, as we will see further on, there are well-known texts that can be identified as 
Mirrors for Princes before the decline of caliphal authority. 
 Methodologically, the thematic approach focusing on justice as treated in Islamic and 
Christian Mirrors for Princes allows the comparison that comprises authors like al-Ghazālī, 
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al-Māwardī, Augustine or Aquinas. All this arises from the metaphor of the ruler mirroring 
God’s justice, key to the genre Mirrors for Princes as found in al-Ghazālī: “In truth, the 
sultan is he who spreads justice [‘adl ] among his servants, who does not commit injustice 
and depravity.”  Aegidius Romanus' De regimine 'mirrors' the concept: “The king must be a 151
mirror, model of life and an example for the people."   152
!
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Chapter Two !
The King As a Mirror: Christian and Islamic Discussion of Kingship and Royal 
Authority !
The shadow of God is man, 
and men are the shadow of Man. 
Man, that is the king,  
(who is) like the image of God  153!
 Much has been written on the Christian notion of kingship and on the Muslim idea of 
kingship and the caliphate. Little, however, has been written comparing the same concept in 
both traditions.  The purpose and the merit of this chapter is to find the specular image of 154
the ruler in the other’s tradition. We survey the commonalities in the institution of kingship to 
see to what extent we can compare the common symbols, images and justifications of 
kingship across traditions. While the former chapter was focused on specular images, this 
chapter takes these images further into theological and political symbols of power and 
authority, particularly the institutions of Christian kingship and the Muslim caliphate. This 
chapter also explores how these symbolic commonalities in Christian and Islamic political 
theologies processed the influences of Eastern traditions on kingship. In addition, this section 
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accounts for the tensions between both traditions’ notions and symbols of rulership, which 
highlights the fruitfulness of a comparative analysis. 
 The commonalities in Christian and Muslim notions of rulership have as their origin a 
basic theological principle shared in both religious communities: that the worldly political 
order should reflect or mirror the heavenly one. In other words, the relationship between the 
king and his subjects mirrors that of God and his creation.  It has been argued that, as in the 155
case of early Muslim polities, the enunciations of royal and imperial power were inflections 
of Late Antique discourse on royal power. Thus, we can also say that Christian and Islamic 
theological images of kingship were a reworking of earlier ecumenical, imperial, and 
politico-soteriological traditions.  Nevertheless, we can also argue that the particular 156
development of Christian and Muslim theologies brought about the distinctive elements of 
royal power and authority, as well as their tension and perplexities. 
 After tracing the tensions and contradictions within Christian and Muslim discourse 
on the notion of kingship, this chapter is divided into two sections focused on the symbology 
and imagery of kingship. The first part covers the image of the ruler as he mirrors divine 
attributes to the point of divinizing the figure of the Christian and Muslim prince. We thus 
examine the mirror-image character of the ruler as he reflects God’s attributes. The image of 
the ruler as a sun, light, and shadow of God are explored and compared. We also account for 
the idea of vicariate in Christian and Muslim theological and political discourse, as well as 
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the origin of the ruler’s authority. Finally, we compare the sacred character of the ruler, its 
symbology, and the theories that held kings and caliphs as superior to their subjects. The 
second part examines the shared images which call on the ruler’s responsibility and set limits 
to his power. As part of this analysis, we survey the figure of the ruler as a shepherd, his role 
when facing the law, and his main role when facing divine justice. 
!
Tensions concerning the Notion of Kingship 
 This section identifies the shared tensions of Christian and Islamic notions of 
kingship, tensions which draw our attention to the value of a comparison. The first detectable 
tension regards the origin of authority. Is the authority of the ruler-king-monarch absolute as 
many medieval authors in both traditions affirm? Asserting the absolute power enjoyed by 
the ruler contradicts God’s absolute power and sovereignty. This was borne in mind by 
medieval Christian and Muslim authors at the time to limit the ruler’s authority, or even 
invoke the possibility of the right of rebellion on the part of the community of believers. In 
fact, if the ruler’s power is absolute, how can the community deter or change an unjust ruler? 
These topics are treated in the coming chapters on justice and obedience, but our intention is 
to account here for the tension that existed in the political theologies of kingship in Christian 
and Muslim authors. 
 In early medieval political literature, only God is the sovereign. Governments and 
princes, Christians and pagans, enjoy only the delegated authority they hold as a dignitas 
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from God for the accomplishment of a divine purpose.  The ideal prince in medieval 157
political literature is rex gratia Dei.  The idea that all power comes from God is already 158
found in Proverbs: “Because of me, kings reign, and rulers make just decrees. Rulers lead 
with my help, and nobles make righteous judgments.”  We find similar sentiments on 159
wisdom: “Because authority was given you by the Lord and sovereignty by the most high, 
who shall probe your works and scrutinize your counsels! Because, though you were 
ministers of his kingdom, you did not judge rightly.”  In addition, the monarchy appears 160
incompatible with God’s theocracy, as found in Hoseah.   161
They set up kings without my consent; 
they choose princes without my approval. 
With their silver and gold 
they make idols for themselves 
to their own destruction.  162!
Where is your king, that he may save you? 
Where are your rulers in all your towns, of whom you said, 
‘Give me a king and princes’? 
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So in my anger I gave you a king, and in my wrath I took him away.  163!
 During the Patristic age, the theocratic concept of kingship was accepted, and the 
relevance and role of the ruler also began to exercise considerable influence on the 
development of medieval political thought. The church Fathers were particularly influenced 
by Old Testament examples of the ideal ruler (especially Saul, David, and Solomon), as well 
as by Apostolic theories on the divine establishment of political authority, particularly Paul in 
Romans 13:1-7.  Still, with the idea of the anointed king in mind, bishop Ambrose 164
addressed the Emperor Theodosius in these terms: “It is convenient that you know your 
nature and how it is mortal and ephemeral, and that the beginning of your origin was dirt and 
you will end up as dirt; so do not let yourself get confused by the purple mantle you wear and 
do not ignore the misery of the body which you cover.”  The bishop reminded the emperor 165
of a basic theme of medieval political theology, that the reflection of the divine order on earth 
should also limit the emperor’s authority: “So your majesty as a lord and catholic king has to 
know and confess that the royal majesty is God’s gift, . . . and to know that this majesty is 
like an image of the celestial majesty for those on earth.”  166
 The same tension between absolute power given to the king and absolute divine 
sovereignty was continued later on by authors like Augustine. In the City of God, he affirms 
that for Christians, “the office of the king is an ancient institution established by God which 
 #61
 Hoseah 13: 10-11.163
 Dosher, The Concept of the Ideal Prince, 5.164
 Ibid,  16.165
 Ibid, 17.166
requires the love which God asks of the king for his people and of the people for their 
king.”  In addition, attributing absolute power to the ruler contradicts the notion that rulers 167
and other institutions of society were considered a necessary evil. This idea, according to 
Dosher changed only with the Tomistic introduction of Aristotelian political thought in 
thirteenth century.  The divine attributes attached to the figure of the ruler also encounter 168
the opposite conception of power as a moral instrument. In Christian and Muslim early 
political theologies, the ruler is seen as a servant and the task of ruling as a heavy task 
imposed by God. Given the difficult task of ruling the Christian community according to 
God’s ways, the prince is in a state of captivity and servitude.  Similarly, in his 169
Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn says that the ruler carries a heavy burden.   170
 In Islam, theological analogies and some aspects of theology elevated the figure of 
the caliph as king. However, this elevation contradicts formal theology, which stresses the 
indivisible sovereignty of God.  This is already clear in the Quran, where we find that the 171
idea of mulk belongs only to God, and not to God’s representative: “Unto God belongs the 
kingdom of the heavens and earth. And God, having power over all things and events, has 
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appointed laws in due measure.”  And: “[and] to whom [God] the dominion of the heavens 172
and the earth belongs. But God is witness unto everything!”  Thus, in the Quran, the word 173
mulk is one of the divine attributes and is endowed with sanctity. But when the term is 
associated with humans, it is in a pejorative sense, as in the use of the term “king” regarding 
the person of the pharaoh.   174
 Early reports in Islam also display reticence in using the term mulk for earthly rulers. 
For example, when Muʿāwiya was in Medina to obtain support in designating his son Yazīd 
as his successor, he found that the son of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb protested against Muʿāwiya for 
acting as king and not as a caliph: “The caliphate is not like the power of Heraclious or 
Caesar or Chosroes (Anūshirvān the Just, a Sassanian king) which is transmitted from father 
to son.” He was alluding to Persian and Byzantine practices.   175
 This condemnation of royal prerogatives for the early communitarian and democratic 
Islam stands in stark contrast to the claims of universal kingship by Yazīd III (d. 744), shown 
in a painting in the Umayyad palace of Quṣayr ʿAmra. This painting portrays the six kings of 
the world (including the monarchs of Persia and Byzantium), paying homage to the new 
caliph as the master of the world. Yazīd claimed that he was the descendant not only of his 
grandfather, founder of the dynasty Marwān b. al-Ḥakam, but also of Chosroes and Caesar, 
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referring to the Byzantine monarchy.  Among many possible interpretations, it is argued 176
that the painting also portrays the notion of the spiritual family relationship between the 
rulers of the world and the common father of all, the basileus of Constantinople.  177
 The other tension in Islam is the hostile attitude of the Arabs towards monarchy 
which, according to Azmeh, possibly stems from their tribal origins.  The rule of hereditary 178
transmission was also considered as contrary to the right notion of caliphate. Abu Bakr and 
ʿUmar discarded their sons and families as successors. The introduction of the hereditary 
succession by the Umayyads was considered by Rashīd Rida as the “first factor in the 
decadence of Islam.”  Although hereditary succession was not alien for the Arab clans, 179
particularly within the Quraysh clan, the reports indicate that the hereditary succession which 
began in the Umayyad dynasty created tension with prior practices, since it was considered 
part of the tradition of kingship, and thus not compatible with the early model of the 
caliphate. Saʿīd b. Musayyab, an important character of early Islam, said: “God forgives 
Muʿāwiya, because he was him the first who made of the institution of the caliphate a 
mulk.”  Even in the tradition of ḥadith hereditary succession is discarded, and election is 180
emphasized by claiming that hereditary succession was the reason the sons of the Prophet did 
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not survive their father. The tension between election and hereditary succession is clearly set: 
in the regime of mulk, the sovereign does not allow the community to choose the caliph but 
he himself does so. Whereas the mulk is a reign of aggrandizement, the caliphate is simplicity 
and clemency.  In contrast also with kings, the caliphs did not enjoy any special court 181
ceremonies. The insignia of royalty were unknown to them, as they also emphasize that “the 
parade/march of ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, was the parade/march of a monk.”   182
 On the other hand, the transformation of the caliphate into mulk was also considered 
an ineluctable law. Another famous hadith of the Prophet reads: “The caliphate after me, it 
will last thirty years, then it will become a mulk.” This period of thirty years coincides with 
the time between the death of Muhammad and the ascension of Muʿāwiya, who promoted the 
regime of mulk. The inescapable character of mulk is also found in the words of a companion 
of the Prophet who declared, “There is no prophecy that is not abolished by mulk.”  The 183
derogatory sense of the term in early times evolved into a title for glorification of the ruler; 
by the mid-tenth century malik (king) is found not only in official usage, but also in 
inscriptions and on coins. Lewis attributes this change to the caliphate’s loss of central 
authority, particularly in those regions of strong Iranian influence.  According to Tyan, 184
Mutawakkil is referred to in official correspondence as “mālik of the Arabs,” and al-Maʾmūn 
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is referred to as “the king with the lion’s and fire’s dignity.”  Tyan links mulk with the 185
caliphate by noting the use of minbar, the main insignia of the caliphate, which is also called 
“the minbar of mulk” or the “minbar of the caliphate.”  186
 Still, in the Muslim tradition, the word mulk is associated with a decline in legitimacy 
and considered as merely a step away from tyranny. Arabic historians in the Abbasid period 
established the difference between the caliphate and the mulk of the Umayyads with the 
exception of ʿUmar II (d. 720), who in recognition of his piety was called caliph.  The 187
distinction between caliphs and kings had mainly to do with the relationship of the ruler to 
sacred law, as well as to the key value of justice. The caliph, according to Ḥasa b. Aliis, is he 
who “conforms to the will of God and the Sunna of his Prophet; it is not a caliph who 
conducts himself with injustice, . . . the imāms are distinguished from kings (mulūks) by their 
submission to the precepts of law.”  Tabari comments that ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭab one day 188
asked to Salmān al-Fārisi: “Am I a king or a caliph?” Salman answered, “If you get a land 
tax from Muslims, an extra dirham, or if you employ it beyond the legal means, you are a 
king and no longer a caliph.”  The tension was established also in the caliph’s attributes and 189
the scope of his authority. Protesting against the privileges of the caliphate, Nuʿaym b. 
Ḥammād (d. 842) affirmed what he considered the only valid criterion for considering the 
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ruler as a real caliph: “whoever enjoins good and prohibits evil, is the khalīfa of God on 
earth.”  190
 The tension between the true sense of the caliphate and its foreign development into 
the demeanor of kingship was expressed sometimes in an author's single work, as in the case 
of al-Jāḥiz. Jāḥiẓ employs the term mulk and mālik for the sovereign and his sovereignty.  191
In his kitāb al-Tāj, Jāḥiẓ affirms that kings should be addressed as khalīfat Allāh, amīn Allāh, 
and amīr al-muʾminīn.  Even further, al-Jāḥiẓ with propagandistic purposes opposed the 192
rule of the Umayyads, affirming that “the imamate became a Persian kingdom and the 
caliphate a Byzantine usurpation a Chrosrean kingdom and a Caesarian usurpation.”  In 193
fact, Jāḥiz declares that: “Muʿāwiya got himself installed in power and imposed his authority. 
. . . It was not a year of reunion, but a year of separation, oppression, violence, a year where 
the imamate became a kingdom in the fashion of Chosroes and the caliphate a tyranny 
worthy of a Caesar.”  194
 However, the ambivalence towards kingship was not limited to the early Islamic 
tradition. When in 1971 in Persepolis the shah of Iran (king of kings) was extolling the 
virtues of 2,500 years of Persian kingship, the Ayatollah Khomeini (d.1989) denounced him 
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from exile for the use of the anti-Islamic title “king of kings.”  The title of king was seen as 195
a usurpation of a prerogative that belongs only to God.  196
 Thus, as we have seen, the very notion of the ruler’s power and its prerogatives 
encountered theological tensions in Christian and Islamic discourse on the scope of rulership, 
whether in the form of kingship or the caliphate. But the limitations of the ruler’s authority 
vis á vis God’s absolute authority were softened when the images for the ruler followed the 
model of the reflection of the divine.  
!
Part One: The Mirror-Image for Rulership: Reflections of the Ruler as “Sun,” “Light,” and 
“Shadow” of God on Earth  
 This section explores the scope of this reflection in the symbology of rulers as a 
“sun,” “light,” and “shadow” of God, which expressed the increasing power of the sovereign. 
We will also see how Christian and Islamic theologies were able to reconcile Eastern images 
of rulership with the more democratic and communitarian origins of their respective polities. 
As the Christian and Islamic communities evolved into more complex societies, a recurrence 
of metaphors of terrestrial power in reference to the sacred order, as well as those images of 
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the sacred referring to terrestrial power could be observed. They seem to establish a set of 
equivalences expressed in a play of mirror images, projections, and analogies.   197
 In Christianity, as in Islam, we find multiple theological, sacral and messianic images 
of kingship, beginning with the divine origin of the king and kingship, the figure of the king 
as God’s vicar, the king as anointed, and the organicist images of the king as the head, soul, 
or heart of the body.  As we will see, this sacred imagery for the figure of the ruler has 198
precedents not only in scripture, but also in the percolation process from the Greek, Persian 
and Roman representations of royal authority.  The likeness of a king to a god was mentioned 
by Aristotle, following Plato’s theory that the best man should become a king, and should be 
divinized. In effect, Aristotle compares the superman-ruler to Zeus.  Similarly, Isocrates 199
considered that because of his virtue the king should be exalted to the rank of a god.  This 200
theory of the “best man” as a ruler  contributed to the deification of the king, as was the case 
in the figure of Alexander the Great.  The king is not only a reflection of God’s attributes, 201
but a reflection of the heavenly order; the earthly ruler becomes central to the cosmos, best 
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reflected in the prototype of the sun king.  As we will see later, by mirroring the ruler with 202
the cosmic order, the king is compared to the idea of nomos or law, or in the Hellenistic 
version, the ruler is seen as the very incarnation of reason. 
 A beneficent prince, as Plutarch once said, is a kind of living likeness of God, who is 
at once good and powerful. His goodness makes him want to heal others; his power makes 
him able to do so:   203
As God set up a beautiful likeness of himself in the heavens, the sun, so he 
established among man a tangible and living image of himself, the king. But nothing 
is more communal than the sun, which imparts its light to the rest of the heavenly 
bodies. In the same way, the prince must be readily accessible for the needs of his 
people, and have his own personal light of wisdom in himself so that, if everyone else 
is in some respect blind, yet his own vision is never at fault.   204!
The Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (d. 50) portrayed rulership itself as the image of 
God by drawing a parallel between God and the universe and the king with his kingdom.   205
 From the fourth century, the Christian prince who serves and loves God and whose 
attitudes reflect the spirit of the divine law is portrayed as the ideal ruler in medieval political 
literature.  This interplay of images and reflections evolved into the medieval designation 206
of the king as “rex imago Christi” and “rex vicarius Christi,” which in turn became “rex 
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imago Dei” and “rex vicarius Dei.”  This mirroring function of the ruler in relation with the 207
heavenly kingdom entailed also the perils of semi-divinization of his persona, in part due to 
the influences of pagan rituals in the process of Christianity becoming the religion of the 
Roman empire. Eusebius of Cesarea (d. 339) portrays Constantine (d. 337) as a quasi-priestly 
figure “like a universal bishop appointed by God,” and conveys the idea that the terrestrial 
empire is an image of the heavenly kingdom.  Eusebius presented the Christian emperor 208
and the earthly kingdom as a copy of the rule of God in heaven. In De laudadibus 
Constantini, Eusebius declares: “So crowned in the image of the heavenly kingship, [the 
emperor] steers and guides men on earth according to the pattern of his prototype.”  209
Similarly, in the fourth century, anonymous author Ambrosiaster wrote, “the king has the 
image of God, just as the bishop has that of Christ.”  In the fifth century Cyril of 210
Alexandria even addressed the emperor as the image of God on earth.  But despite the early 211
cult of the figure of the emperor as a consequence of the encounter of Christianity and early 
pagan practices, there was a parallel development of the figure of the Christian ruler who is 
no longer a god, but his image, his representative, his imitator. The mortal character of the 
emperor appeared with the successors of Constantine, but most clearly in the time of 
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Theodosius (d. 395). The ruler is no longer above the Church; he is intra Ecclesiam.  We 212
can also argue that this simultaneous development for the image of the Christian ruler is also 
due to the tensions in the concept of Christian royal authority. In addition to this we find the 
clash between the influences of the pagan deification cults with a different Christian 
theological reading of the figure of the ruler. The resolution of the tension came with a 
change in the notion of the reflection or image of the divine, which became evident in the 
condemnation in 885 of the Byzantine prince as imago Dei by the pope.  213
 In medieval times, the ruler as a public person and bearer of the imago aequitatis 
becomes the servant of Equity, aequitatis servus est princeps.  As we will see in the coming 214
chapter on justice, these two ideas of justice and equity will be the qualities expected to be 
reflected by the figure of the ruler, as well as by his polity. The king as an image of the divine 
will then be expressed in equivalent terms as vicarius Dei, minister Dei and imago Dei.  In 215
John of Salisbury’s (d. 1180) Policraticus (1159), the prince is portrayed as "a likeness of 
divinity,” responsible for the health and stability of the political and social system.  For 216
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Thomas Aquinas, the prince was considered to bear "a special likeness to God, since he does 
in the kingdom what God does in the world,” as he writes in his Mirror for Princes (of 
discussed authorship), On Kingship, dedicated to the King of Cyprus.  For Erasmus (d. 217
1536), the role of the Christian prince is to work for universal peace and he mirrors God’s 
role.  Similarly, Lope de Vega (d. 1635), in his play El Principe Perfecto, writes: “Adverse 218
fortune will not beset the king if he imitates God, because he is an image of God.”   219
 The idea of the ruler as the image of God is also reflected in some metaphors that 
convey the particular conditions of Middle Eastern culture. For example, under the hard 
conditions of the Middle Eastern sun, portrayals of God as a refuge providing shadow are 
common in both Christianity and Islam, and extend to the reflected role of the ruler on earth. 
This metaphor of the king as the shadow of God was found in Assyrian times.  If the idea 220
of a shadow is a very self explanatory image given the harshness of the desert sun, also it is 
the sun itself as an eastern image for the figure of the ruler in both Christianity and Islam. In 
contrast to the powerful idea of the king as shadow, the sacred character of rulers is also 
identified with the moon and with light and radiance. In ancient Iran some kings are regarded 
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more as sun-kings, others as moon-kings.  The divine character of the Iranian ruler, 221
considered to have descended from the gods, was indicated by the nimbus of fire around their 
heads. Further, the radiance of the king burns like the sun and thus some subjects were veiled 
at all times.  The Sassanian kings were portrayed as brothers of the sun and the moon.  222 223
 The sun and moon symbols passed from the Persian to the Roman emperor and then 
to the rulers of the West. For Eusebius of Caesarea, the emperor “like the radiant sun 
illuminates the most distant subjects of his empire through the presence of his Caesars as 
well as by the far-piercing rays of his own splendor.”  In the elevation of the Byzantine 224
emperor Justinus Minor (d. 527), he appears as the new sun: “And the mighty prince stood 
upon the shield, having the appearance of the sun, a sublime light shone forth from the city.” 
Here the images and metaphors multiply: not only is the emperor Sol in suo clipeo elevated 
to cosmic significance, but also he is connected with justice as seen in Sol Iustitiae.  Later 225
on, Dante Alighieri (d. 1321) in Canto VI of the Paradise in his Divine Comedy described 
Constantine as a shadow where people find refuge under his sacred plumes.  As we can see, 226
these juxtapositions of titles for the figure of the ruler shows us the relevance of the images 
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and metaphors to convey the divine origin of royal authority, linking not only the ruler with 
the sun, but also the shining sun with the theological and political idea of justice.  
 In Islam the association of the ruler and the sun was through the image and 
symbolism of the rayed nimbus around the person of the caliph al-Walīd b. Yazīd (r. 
743-744), reflecting the analogy with the sun.  But a chain of equivalences is also 227
established between the terms light-sun-moon to convey the sacred character of the Muslim 
caliph. In this line, a contrast between sun and darkness was conveyed in the courts of the 
Syrian Umayyads, where the caliph was described as a rightly guided (mahdi) imam who 
showed humanity the way to salvation after fitna; like a beacon in the darkness, he appears 
as a redemptive figure.  Referring to the “luminous” essence and attributes of the Muslim 228
ruler was also common in the court of al-Andaluz. In effect, Abd al-Rahman III’s legitimacy 
was explained as divinely sanctioned. He was God's caliph, chosen over all creation, marked 
by visible signs and the divine “illumination” in his face. According to the contemporary 
historian Ibn Maslama, God illuminated the darkness with his reign, or in the words of Ismail 
ibn Badr, "he is the full moon of kings, the radiance of his sunna dispels the darkness from 
the religion and the world."  229
 In Islam, the ruler as the shadow of God was also assimilated from Sassanian sources. 
Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 1512) affirms that:  
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The sovereign is a person distinguished by divine support so that he might lead 
individual men to perfection and order their affairs. . . . The first concern of the ruler is 
to act in accordance with the injunction of the Sacred Law. . . . Such a person is truly 
the shadow of God, the caliph of God, and the deputy of the Prophet.  230!
The king, according to a saying of the Prophet, is God’s shadow on earth: “a sultan (the ruler) 
is the shadow of Allah on the earth..." We are aware that this report is regarded in different 
ways by scholars, but most of them considered it to be a ‘weak’ report or a ‘fabricated’ 
report. The idea is that the ruler repels the harm of injustice from his subjects as the shade 
prevents the heat of the sun.  Although as in Christianity the ruler as “sun” is connected 231
with justice shining upon people, in this case the ruler as “shade” depicts the securing of 
justice in his kingdom. 
 The other way to refer to the ruler as a shadow is through the notion of “divine 
effulgence,” inherited from Zoroastrian sources and attributed already to Sassanian kings. In 
Sassanian literature the ruler also appears as the “shadow of God on earth.” Niẓam al-Mulk 
and then al-Ghazālī used these terms to legitimate rulership within the temporal sphere.  232
Niẓām al-Mulk in his Siyāsat nāmeh incorporates the theory of divine effulgence to the point 
that it even replaces the classical theory of the caliphate.  Assessing the impact of Greek 233
writings on his political thought, Ghazālī in his Naṣīḥat al-mulūk cites the qualities Aristotle 
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bestowed on kings and adds the notion of divine effulgence as well as the idea of radiance of 
the soul:  
Aristotle was asked, “What great man is worthy to be called king, or is God alone 
(worthy)?” He answered, “The man in whom you will find certain things, however 
lacking he be in other qualities.” Then he continued, “First of all knowledge, and 
[then] forbearance, compassion, clemency, generosity and the like. Because great men 
owe their greatness to the divine effulgence and to their radiance of the soul, pureness 
of body, and breadth of intellect, and knowledge, as well as the domain which has 
long been in their family.”  234!
 The powerful Middle Eastern images of the ruler as sun, moon, shadow, or the 
iconography emphasizing the “luminous” character of the Christian and Muslim sovereign 
paralleled discussion of the ruler’s authority. At some points the imagery went hand in hand 
with the theory of the ruler’s absolute power, following his reflection of the divine. In other 
instances, the magnificent images for the figure of the sovereign were used to question his 
authority, or limit the absolute character of his power. 
!
Whose Vicar, Whose Authority 
 Does this ruler who reflects God’s qualities, his light, order, and justice, also receive 
his authority directly from God? And if he does, is this authority absolute or limited? Is the 
ruler endowed with religious and political authority or does the religious authority of the 
priests set boundaries on the power of the ruler? For Christian and Muslim authors these 
questions will be answered in different ways, showing that there was some degree of anxiety 
in considering the authority of the leader of their respective communities. In the case of the 
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Christian Patristic era, authors like Ambrose subscribed to the Pauline theory of the divine 
origin of all political authority. Nevertheless, the ruler was considered to be limited by his 
own conscience if he violated the divine law.  After all, and as is the case in Islam, the 235
prince one day must face God and be held accountable for his conduct as ruler. It is thus in 
early Christian authors that we can already find the later medieval distinction between the 
just and unjust ruler.  
 The Christian king is then whose vicar? Four Christian writers between the end of the 
fourth century and the beginning of the sixth century called the emperor vicarius Dei: Pseudo 
Ambrogio, Aponio, Pope Anastasio II, Epifanio.  The Christian empire had assumed a 236
greater majesty by being a Christian empire with the force of the idea potestas Deo. In 
addition, the emperor assumed a sacred character which, nevertheless, was in sharp 
distinction with the divinization of the pagan emperor. At the same time, the title vicarius Dei 
begins to be considered an office that submits to the pope, who was held as superior to the 
emperor and the only judge in ecclesiastic matters. It is argued that for this reason the title 
vicarius Dei did not become the title to refer to the emperor at the end of the Patristic era. 
The office of God’s vicariate was then conditional, as in the case of Charlemagne (d. 814), 
who was given his vicarius Dei title as a result of his role as the executor of the law of 
God.  In the ninth century Sedulius Scottus (d. 858) conceives of the figure of the emperor 237
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as Vicarius Dei for his primordial role of executing justice, while he considers bishops to be 
an independent and superior authority.   238
 This contrasted with the religious idea of the imperial authority predominant in the 
Christian East, where in ceremonies and formulae the emperor was celebrated as co-reigning 
with Christ.  The Eastern Christian king became the pantocrator who was considered to 239
reign together with the divine. However, this Byzantine pantocrator was also in service to 
the church, and his participation in the divine potestas was then delimited. But this 
participation in the divine was still resisted in the West. Indeed, the French bishops in 
Council of Pittes (862) declared that the co-reigning or co-sovereignity with Christ was 
scandalous as it was found in the Libri Carolini.  They talked instead of a partecipatio 240
nominis et numinis in God’s potestas. The emperor’s potestas was then limited to the extent 
that the bishops assumed for themselves the very title of vicar of Christ. Thus, the title of 
vicar for the Christian king developed in the West not around the persona, but around the 
office.  
 By the time of Aquinas, the monarch will owe his authority to his virtue and to the 
election that has consecrated such virtue. Following Aristotle, Aquinas describes a monarchy 
as a regime where the monarch governs not in conformity with the laws but according to 
virtue.  Thus, we can see that the limits to the ruler’s authority, as it was also for Patristic 241
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writers, is the ruler’s own conscience. Is then the king’s authority absolute? Although he had 
the plenitude of power, and personified authority, the king is still conditional to his function 
of executing justice, seen as the paramount virtue found in the person of the king and 
reflecting God’s order. 
 In Islam, the title “vicar of God” was as controversial as in Christianity. This is 
understandable, since this title entailed for both traditions a strong claim for authority, 
particularly religious authority. This controversy took a parallel development in Christianity 
and Islam, given that both rulers and religious figures were making a claim for authority as 
the heirs and guardians of religion. For the bishops of the Council of Pittes, attributing the 
title of vicar to the ruler left little space for them as religious authorities. In Islam, 
particularly after the ulama developed their authority and consolidated their status as the 
law’s experts and custodians of the Sunna of the Prophet, the religious authority of the caliph 
as the interpreter of law was also contested. 
 In the case of Islam, the title khalīfat Allāh, expressing vicarage, has scriptural 
precedents in the cases of Adam and David. Khalīfa appears twice in the Quran, first 
referring to Adam:  
Recall that your Lord said to the angels, “I am placing a representative (a temporary 
god) on earth.” They said, “Will you place therein one who will spread evil therein and 
shed blood, while we sing your praises, glorify you, and uphold your absolute 
authority?” He said, “I know what you do not know.”  242!
Referring to David, the title khalīfa combines not only religious but also political authority: 
“O David, We have made you a successor on earth. Therefore, you shall judge among the 
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people with truth, and do not follow desire, lest it diverts you from the path of God. Indeed, 
those who stray off the path of God will have a severe retribution for forgetting the day of 
reckoning.”  243
 As Lewis comments, the term khalīfa has its root in Semitic languages, meaning to 
“pass on” or to “come instead of,” and it is found in pre-Islamic Arabia where it seems to be 
translated as viceroy or lieutenant acting for a sovereign elsewhere.  But the title khalīfat 244
Allāh for the figure of the caliph was used with reluctance during the formative period of 
Islam. First, when Abū Bakr succeeded the Prophet, he was called khalīfatu rasūl Allāh, the 
deputy of the prophet of God:  
ʿUmar was then addressed as khalīfat Allāh and ʿUmar cursed him, and said, “That is 
David.” Then the man called him khalīfat rasūl Allāh, and ʿUmar said, “But that was 
Abū Bakr and now he is dead. So the man addressed him as khalīfatu khalīfati rasūl 
Allāh, deputy of the deputy of the prophet of God, and ʿUmar said: “That is correct, 
but it will grow longer.” And the man said: “Then what shall we call you?” And 
ʿUmar said: “you are the believers and I am your commander, therefore call me 
“commander of the believers.”   245!
Ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddimah records how Abū Bakr refused to be called khalifa Allāh 
saying, “I am not the caliph of God, but the caliph [representative, successor] of the 
messenger of God.” Ibn Khaldūn continues, “Furthermore, one can have a caliph [understood 
as representative] of someone who is absent, but not of someone who is present (as God 
always is).”  246
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 ʿ Umar’s reluctance to be called God’s caliph is affirmed when he was given the oath 
of allegiance and he was called “Representative of the representative of the messenger of 
God.”  ʿUmar rejected the tile khalīfa Allāh, arguing that this title was only attributed to a 247
prophet such as David. The title was also disapproved of by scholars. For example, al-
Māwardī writes in his al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya:  
He (the Imām) is called khalīfa because he succeeded the prophet of God, the 
blessings and peace be upon him, in his community. It is permissible to address him 
as “O caliph of God.” Some permit it because of his exercise of [God’s] rights with 
regard to his creatures and because God said, “And it is [God] who has put you as his 
lieutenants (khalāʾif) on earth and has raised some of you over others in degree.”   248!
Nevertheless, the title of khalīfat Allāh is the one which predominated in the early period of 
the caliphate and not khalīfa rasūl Allāh or “successor of the messenger of God.” The 
attestations are present even in the coinage and public statements.  In fact, the National 249
Museum of Damascus holds a coin minted in Sassanian territories with the inscription 
“khalīfat Allāh” during the reign of second caliph ʿUmr b. al-Khaṭṭāb.  In addition, in the 250
drahma one finds other titles for the caliph, such as amīr al-muʾminīn written in Arabic script 
for the first time dating back to 694-695 in Damascus. But identifying the caliph as khalīfat 
Allāh represented a way to enhance the caliph’s claim to political and religious leadership.  251
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From the period of Muʿāwiya and ʿ Abd al-Malik, coinage also bears the effigy of the 
caliph.  Finally, the coinage describes the caliph al-Maʾmūn (833) as khalīfat Allāh, a 252
testimony to his claim not only to religious authority, but also to some divine authority akin 
to the monarchies and the Hellenistic-Christian idea of the basileus.  253
 The religious and sacred nature of the caliphate was stressed under the Umayyads, 
where a comparison between caliphate and prophethood took place establishing a particular 
relationship between God and caliphs.  The concept of a caliphal stage was developed as 254
following the prophetic stage as a way to make clear that the caliphate inherited 
prophethood.  Furthermore, this was a way to also indicate that it was God who made the 255
inheritance choice. Nevertheless, this inheritance is on the level of leadership, and the 
community is always called the “Prophet’s community” or ummatu nabuyyihī, and not the 
“caliph’s community.”  However, in the caliph’s correspondence, it seems that God created 256
the institution of the caliphate to take care of the affairs of the community.  Al-Qadi argues 257
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deputed His caliphs over the path of His prophethood when He took back His Prophet and sealed His 
revelation with him- for the implementation of His decrees (ḥukm), the establishment of His 
normative practice (Sunna), and restrictive status (ḥudūd), and for the observance of His ordinances 
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that this is the proof that the caliphate is actually called “wilayat ʿahd Allāh,” the tenure of 
the mandate (to rule) by God. The caliph thus rules with a direct mandate from God and not 
through God’s Prophet or the Prophet’s community.   258
 As we will see in the chapter devoted to justice, the figure of the Umayyad caliph was 
to establish God’s justice and for that reason absolute obedience was expected. The caliphate 
is not only an essential Islamic institution, but also the key for the ultimate salvation of 
believers. Nevertheless, although the caliphs could have said that they acted under the 
inspiration of God, they portrayed themselves as the upholders of the Muhammadan 
tradition.  This entailed a respect for the figure of the Prophet Muhammad and his political 259
and religious role in the formation and unity of the Muslim community, parallel with the 
caliph’s claim of his special political and soteriological roles. 
 An intimate relationship between God and the Umayyad caliph was assumed by the 
concept of inspiration or ilhām, given by God to handle the affairs of the community. We can 
compare this idea in Christianity, where the same direct communication between God and the 
ruler was assumed by Eusebius in the case of the emperor Constantine, to the extent that 
Eusebius was willing to learn the messages from heaven that the emperor was allowed to 
reveal. He suggested to Constantine: “to relate to us the abundant manifestations which your 
Savior has accorded you in his presence.” Eusebius is not hinting at the secret suggestions 
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that the emperor receives from God, but rather, “those principles he has instilled in your 
mind, and which are of general interests and benefit to the human race.”  260
 The recognition of the authority of the caliphate, and the submission to that authority 
constituted an act of religion under the Abbasids. Obedience to the caliph was a sign of 
adherence to Islam, and the recognition of the sovereignty of the caliph is a declaration of the 
Muslim faith.  The poet ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Muʿtazz (d. 908), in a panegyric to the Abbasid 261
caliph said that: “the religion of his subjects consists of submission to the caliph.” Another 
poet, addressing the caliph Qādir, said: “Is the mark (symbol) of the faith in one God (as an 
essential sign of Islam) that we obey you; if we apostatize, is it a sign that we rejected your 
authority.”  And the poet al-Buḥturī (d. 897) addressed the caliph al-Mutawakkil in these 262
terms: 
You are forever a sea of sustenance to the needy among us! 
How can this be, since you face us owning the world and all it holds? God granted it 
to you as a right of which he saw you worthy, 
And you by the right of God grant it to us.  263!
Thus, the authority of the caliph, as we have seen in the case of the Christian ruler, seems to 
be absolute. Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ presents the caliph as having such supreme authority that: 
“Were he to say to the mountains to move, they would do so.” This is followed by an Islamic 
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phrase: “were he to reverse the direction of prayer, he would affect his desire.”  But we can 264
say that as in the case of the Christian rulers, caliphal absolutism was restricted, given the 
limitation of the caliph in the definition of the law. Crone and Hinds agree with Zimmermann 
in that the ulema succeeded in limiting the absolute monarchy of the caliphate to a sort of 
constitutional regime.  This is true, particularly after the mihna or inquisition instituted by 265
the Abbasid caliph al-Maʾmūn (d. 833), and abolished by the caliph al-Mutawakkil around 
851.  
 Lewis also notes that in the traditional Muslim view, the state does not create the law 
since the law comes from God and is upheld and enforced by the ruler as his duty.  Thus in 266
both Christianity and Islam, the ruler’s absolute authority is limited by his own conscience, 
his virtue (in particular his justice), and the role of sacred law. And as happened in 
Christianity, the development of the institution of the ruler as an office took place in the 
writings of theologians and jurists when they made clear that the term to denote supreme 
authority is imāma, or “the office of the function of the imām.”  
!
The Ruler’s Virtues: Above Humanity 
 The transcendence of the figure of the king over his subjects has been seen as a 
reflection of God’s transcendence in relation to his creation. In Hellenistic political thought, 
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kings were already portrayed as being distinct and above other humans; thus men should 
imitate kings as kings themselves imitate gods.  In Christianity since the time of Cyril of 267
Jerusalem, the semi-divine nature of the imperial office was assumed, together with multiple 
associations of the figure of the emperor with God. For Cyril, the emperor is equipped with 
every virtue and he is resplendent with the great rewards of piety.  As we mentioned, for 268
Aquinas, the king’s sovereignty is deserved by virtue. Political virtue rules itself according to 
the hierarchy of social values, and it gives to those who possess it a legitimate sovereignty.  269
In his De regimine principum, Giles of Rome (1270) argues that the exemplum of the ruler, 
given that he exceeds his subjects in power and virtue, makes him a “demi-god.” The special 
virtues of the king inspire the community.  All Spanish political commentators of the 270
sixteenth century, from Mariana to Quevedo, agreed on the characteristics of the ideal ruler. 
The príncipe polītico cristiano possesses the cardinal virtues: temperance, fortitude, justice, 
and the foremost, prudence. Because he is able to rule over his passions, the king is an 
example for his subjects to emulate.  Pedro de Valencia (d. 1620) in his treatise “Tratado 271
Acerca de los Moriscos” (a plea to Philip III), conveys his vision of kingship as above 
humanity: “the divine origin of kingship, by anointment, spirit and validation, and the 
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personal virtues of the monarch are transformed by special divine gifts which set him apart 
from other men.”  272
 The epithets for the Muslim caliph began with those virtues celebrated in pre-Islamic 
Arabic poetry. The moral qualities ascribed to the Caliph in the poems correspond to a 
standardized set: ʿ azm, resolution, ṣabr, equanimity, karam, nobility, and jūd, generosity. 
They denote the ideal type for the figure of the caliph and the sanctity of religious 
leadership.  The special character of kings-caliphs was evident in the words of al-Ḥasan 273
after announcing the death of his father ʿAlī: “I am al-Ḥasan, the son of Muhammad. I am the 
son of the bringer of good tiding. . . . I am the shinning lamp. I am of the family of the 
Prophet from whom God has removed filth and whom he has purified.”  274
 In eighth century Syria, court poets celebrated the Umayyad caliph with imagery that 
included: God’s rope, sword, or refuge (ḥabl), the tent peg of the religion, the guide or light 
to salvation, and the mahdi or rightly guided imam.  In a letter of the Umayyad caliph al-275
Walīd II (d. 744) concerning the designation of his successor the caliph makes clear that:  
God has inspired his caliphs to make firm this covenant [of succession] and to pay 
due regard in it to the Muslims at times of crisis. . . . God has perfected for his caliphs 
and his pious party, to whom he has entrusted obedience to him, the good things to 
which he has accustomed them, and he has appointed for them part of his power to 
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strengthen and ennoble, elevate and consolidate so that they may accomplish their 
end.   276!
This claim of the Umayyad caliphs to be elected above other human beings was also asserted 
by the imāms of the Imāmīs and the Ismaīlīs: they were said to be pillars of religion, rain, the 
rope of God, refuge to God’s servants, and God’s trustees (amīn Allāh). They were also 
portrayed as superior to other people, ranking below the prophets only, and protected against 
error (maʿṣūm).  277
 Muslim scholars also included mythic powers in their depiction of the ruler’s 
distinctive character. For example, Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ in Risāla fī al-ṣaḥāba described Abbasid 
caliph al-Manṣūr (d. 775) as confirming the caliph’s legitimacy coming from the divine will. 
Also the qualities of the caliphate are attributed by God to the sovereign. We read in the 
Risāla that “God has gifted the commander of the faithful with such a nobility for disregard 
[wealth], and to content himself with what he has in order to satisfy his needs.”  Al-Ghaẓālī 278
in the second part of his Naṣīhat al-mulūk opened with the statement that “God on high chose 
two classes of men and endowed them with superiority over the rest, one of them being 
prophets, the other kings; since kingship and divine effulgence (farr-i izadi) has been granted 
by God they must be loved and obeyed by ‘everyone to whom God has given religion.’”  279
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For Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274), the king was the sustainer of existing things, the one who 
completes that which is incomplete. Since men (insān) by their nature were social beings and 
needed other men, it was necessary that an arrangement be made for the just working of their 
relationship. The individual who attained perfection through iʿtidāl and union with the 
Supreme Being was thus selected for kingship.  280
 The influence of the Eastern idea of the “circle of justice” also ascribed to the caliph 
the power to maintain the world’s order, secure justice, and restore fertility and prosperity.  281
Many poems describe in lavish imagery the caliph's generosity, which is compared to the 
“spring rains and the morning dew, and which revives society, making affluence and plenty 
abound.” Al-Mu'tasim's qualities are "like those of spring;” the joy over al-Wathiq's accession 
is like "the joy over a newborn child.” Both passages point to the resurgence of life brought 
to society by the monarch.  We can also say that all these ideas are also present in Christian 282
scripture as part of the Old Testament images of the ruler as a sustainer of God’s order on 
earth. 
 All these special attributes, assigned not only to the office but also to the person of 
the Christian ruler or the Muslim caliph, were developed into the theory of sacredness for the 
figure of the Christian or Muslim ruler. In the following section, we will see one of the 
extremes in the Islamic and Christian theory of kingship, which even as it shows the ruler in 
 #90
 Alam, The Languages of Political Islam, 46, 47.280
 Sperl, “Islamic Kingship and Arabic Panegyric Poetry,” 20-35281
 Ibid, 29.282
the apex of his capacity to reflect divinity, also stresses the ruler’s accountability, 
responsibility towards his subjects, and limitations of his authority.  
!
The Sacred Nature of Rulership 
 For two millennia, the idea of sacral kingship held the king or emperor as the son of 
heaven and the possessor of the mysterious “mandate of heaven” that bridged the gulf 
between heaven and earth.  The ruler was seen as the axis mundi upon whom the order of 283
the universe depended. This dependence derived from the ruler’s primordial duty to reflect 
the divine order, which was first divinely inspired and thus became sacred. The sacredness of 
the function then evolved into the person of the ruler. However, the key question for this 
research is to see how this sacredness faced the more modest and accountable origins for the 
model of religious and political leadership in the Christian and Islamic communities? In the 
case of the Muslim caliph, as we will see, the sacredness attributed to him is even more 
striking than in the case of the Christian monarchy, given the process of the early Muslim 
community’s formation. Although there are similarities in the early Christian community, the 
Old Testamentarian tradition for kingship accounts for the sacredness attributed to the person 
and the office of the ruler. In both cases the historical circumstances of the assimilation of 
Christianity and Islam into the politics of an empire, plus the Eastern (Persian, Hellenistic, 
and then Roman) traditions of sacred kingship affected the communitarian and more 
democratic notions of leadership. 
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  In the early Christian empire, despite the imposition of monotheism on the old pagan 
practices, the Roman-Hellenistic imperial cult was still assimilated into Christianity by 
Clement of Alexandria.  Thus the cult of the sovereign survived in the Christian Byzantine 284
empire, acknowledging the sacredness of the office of the sovereign. The Christian emperor, 
the Byzantine basileus, has a more sacred character than the Roman emperors. The difference 
depended on whose majesty they were reflecting. In the case of the Roman emperors, they 
identified themselves as gods, but they were merely part of the polytheist pantheon.  285
However, the Christian monarchs were reflecting the majesty of God himself. Later on in 
medieval Christianity, the sacred character of the king followed the model of the Old 
Testament: the king was anointed with holy oil on his back, and right shoulder and arm, so he 
could not be corrupted.  The king must have all virtues, since he is the lieutenant of God on 286
earth. These special and divinely imposed qualities of the king are enhanced by the metaphor 
of the body-state common in medieval times, where the king is also portrayed as the soul and 
heart of the Christian community. The sacral consecration of the monarch bestowed mystical 
virtues upon him, assimilating earthly and heavenly authority. Furthermore, the 
transcendence of the figure of the king was so established that the defenders of kingship 
declared that: “the name of the king was conceived at the beginning of the world itself.”  287
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Acknowledging the theory of the defenders of the divine right of kings, Shakespeare 
confirmed in the figure of Richard II: “Not all the water in the rough rude sea can wash the 
balm off from an anointed king.”  As we will see in the case of the Muslim caliph, the 288
divine right of kings attributed to the Christian ruler thaumaturgical wonders, among them 
healing powers. Even the last king of the ancien régime paraded through the suffering crowd 
with the belief that: “Le roi te touche, Dieu te guerisse.”  289
 In Islam the sacredness attributed to the ruler reached such a status that many 
believed “the person of the caliph was a support of the order of the universe. If he were killed 
the entire universe would lapse into disorder; the sun would hide its face, rain would cease, 
and plants would grow no more.”  During the Abbasid period, the caliphs’ religious 290
character also evolved into a sacred character. This can be seen by the fact that the caliphs are 
no longer called by their names, but by expressions that denote their sacred and saintly 
character. In a tenth-century document, even the imperial palace is qualified as sacred or 
hieros.  Writing to the caliph, Ṣalāh al-Dīn established the seat of the caliph as the place of 291
sanctity and purity. Addressing the caliph Muntanṣir, the poets of the time saw in the caliph 
“a kingdom of sanctity.” Similarly sacred is the caliph's title as imām, or chief of religion, 
and director of the prayer of the community assembled.  In nominating the sultans, the 292
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decisions of the caliphs are considered to be sacred, since they have a “saintly reflection.”  293
The caliph is even called “the Messiah of Islam.” The majesty of the caliph inspires a saintly 
majesty: “The face of the caliph shines as the moon;” “in his front shines the light of 
prophecy.”  Many sources mention that even contact with the caliph is a source of grace 294
and blessings (barakāt). During the reign of Nāṣir, recognized for his piety and his justice, 
the people made the trip to Bagdād to ensure the baraka of the caliph.   295
 Even though by the tenth century the real political power of the caliphate was 
disappearing, the sultans before a military expedition made the caliph appear with the 
religious and sacred insignia: the stick of the Prophet, a black veil and turban, a black mantle 
on top, and on top of that the famous burda or mantle of the Prophet. With the institution of 
the caliphate in decay, even a fleeing Abbasid caliph maintained his status and preeminence. 
In an act establishing peace between Sharaf al-Dawlat wa-Zayn al-Millat Abil Faw'aris and 
Samsam al-Dawlat wa-Shams al-Millat Abi Khalidjar (986-87), there is a testimony of the 
prestige of the prince of believers: “the Caliph has accepted to write an inscription a mark of 
his noble hand (al-yad al-karīmat), and the sacred seal (al-khātam al-sharīfat) of the 
Prophet.” The text concludes with this formula: “written by ʿAli b. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, in his 
legitimate presence (al-hadrat al-shariʾat) and with his high permission.”  It was also 296
believed that angering the caliph would inflict evil on the community, the sultan, and his 
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family.  There was thus a belief in the supernatural power of the caliph. Among these 297
powers were those of knowing hidden things and the power of intercession before God. 
According to the poets of the time, the caliph’s intercession “opens the doors of paradise.”   298
 Just as Christian kings were anointed as a sign of divine sanction following the model 
for rulers in the Old Testament, the caliphs in the Abbasid era were also following an ancient 
royal tradition dating back to Mesopotamia. Because the Sassanian king was also the high 
priest, the fusion of political and religious power took place through the symbols of caliphal 
authority inherited from the prophet. In fact, the burda and the qaḍīb (mantle and staff) of the 
Prophet symbolized sacred authority. Tradition has it that after the death of the Umayyad 
caliph Marwān (d. 750), one of his eunuchs revealed the objects which came to be revered as 
the heritage of the Prophet (mīrāth Rasūli’llāh): the mantle (burdat), the staff (qadhīb) and 
the stick (mikhṣarat) of the founder of Islam, which progressively provided a divine character 
to the dynasty in power.  The poet al-Buḥturī refers to the Abbasid caliph al-Muʿtazz (d. 299
869) as “the heir of the mantle, the staff and the authority of God” (wār al-burda wa-l-qaḍīb 
wa ḥakm Allāh). As it happened in Christianity with the political significance of religious 
relics, the Abbasid propaganda based its legitimacy not in personal merit, as was the case in 
the early Muslim community, but in sacred elements: first, their relationship to the family of 
the Prophet, and then the objects of the symbolic inheritance of the Prophet. Although these 
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objects were not cult objects, the burda, qadhīb and the mikhṣarat were revered as mīraāth 
Rasūl Allāh.  300
!
Other Symbols of Sacredness 
 Just as the image of the Byzantine emperor crowned by the patriarch was considered 
a sign of divine election, in Islam the crown was a metaphor of royal and divine power. Yet 
because of tensions regarding the scope of the ruler’s authority, wearing the crown was 
strongly resisted by Christian and Muslim rulers. Crowns were condemned by Tertullian (c. 
225) and other church fathers as a pagan practice. Lewis also affirms that the crown was of 
limited significance in Islamic symbolism and discourse.  Still, the crown was a powerful 301
symbol for the divine glory of rulers. The sacredness of this symbol in the case of the 
Sassanian kings was known as xwarrah. The royal crown of the Sassanians was so heavy that 
the king could not carry it on his head; it was therefore attached to a chain hanging from the 
ceiling. At the Umayyad palace at Khirbat Mafjar there was a vestige of this practice in the 
form of a hanging chain.  Furthermore, there is evidence that caliphs wore a crown. The 302
poet Ibn Qays al-Ruqayyat describes the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik as seated in his throne and 
wearing the crown in his head. Also in coinage the caliph appears in effigy with a crown on 
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his head.  Under the Abbasid caliphate, military commanders and conquerors were 303
crowned, but the crown was generally considered as inappropriate for the caliph.  304
 Other symbols of caliphal legitimacy that imbued him with sacral character were the 
throne, or sarīr, and the sikka (inscription of the caliph’s name in the coinage). As Ibn 
Khaldūn writes, “the legitimate caliph only has the right of the sarīr and the sikka.”  The 305
throne (sarīr- kursī) as a symbol of royal status can also be confirmed by the veneration 
accorded to the chair (kursī) of ʿAlī after his death.  The hijāb or veil has its precedent in 306
Hellenistic and Persian traditions of marking the sacredness of the sovereign. The Hellenistic 
vellum, originally Sassanian, consisted of a screen shielding the ruler, which was then 
adopted by the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Fatimids as a symbol of sacred presence.  307
Muʿāwiya was credited with the introduction of the ḥijāb as a curtain that separated the 
caliph from his audience.  308
 From the quasi-supernatural attributes of the caliph and the divine nature of his power 
we move into a more simple but very powerful image for God’s ruler, that of the “good 
shepherd.” This bucolic symbol of authority also claims divine origins as it mirrors the image 
of God himself as the shepherd of his people. But now the reflection has a limited scope, and 
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will stress the ruler’s duty towards God’s people rather than the divine character of the ruler 
himself. 
!
Part Two: The Counter Tradition: The Ruler’s Accountability and the Heavy Burden of 
Ruling: The King as a Shepherd 
 In the figure of the king as a shepherd, the nature of kingship seems to be divested of 
all pomp and glory, and attributed not to the office but to the persona of the ruler. As Magnier 
argues, the sources for the shepherd king are found in pre-Hellenic literature, where the motif 
of the shepherd king already appears in Homer’s work. In fact, in the Iliad the good king 
derives his authority from Zeus, “becoming a guide and a shepherd to his people.”  Plato 309
also uses the analogy of the good shepherd and his flock when speaking of the guardians of 
the city. In The Republic, Plato replies to the sophist Thrasymachus:  
Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he 
has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured 
whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just 
now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether 
in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; 
whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like 
being in authority.   310!
The royal title of “good shepherd” was then adopted by the Persian kings and applied to the 
Greek kings, Homeric and Hellenistic alike.  Even Cyrus of Persia is represented as a 311
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shepherd who cares for the people of Israel, allowing them to return to Jerusalem.  The 312313
topic of the good shepherd is found multiple times in the Bible since the Jewish people were 
mainly livestock tenders. In the Book of Samuel there are many references: “In the past, 
while Saul was king over us, you were the one who led Israel on their military campaigns. 
And the Lord said to you, ‘You will shepherd my people Israel, and you will become their 
ruler.”  And: “Wherever I have moved with all the Israelites, did I ever say to any of their 314
rulers whom I commanded to shepherd my people Israel, ‘Why have you not built me a 
house of cedar?”’  315
 It is interesting to note that the image of the ruler as a shepherd is a constant symbol 
in the Old Testament not only to denote the good ruler, but also to convey that the bad 
shepherd is a tyrant:  
As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign Lord, because my flock lacks a shepherd 
and so has been plundered and has become food for all the wild animals, and because 
my shepherds did not search for my flock but cared for themselves rather than for my 
flock, therefore, you shepherds, hear the word of the Lord: This is what the Sovereign 
Lord says: I am against the shepherds and will hold them accountable for my flock. I 
will remove them from tending the flock so that the shepherds can no longer feed 
themselves. I will rescue my flock from their mouths, and it will no longer be food for 
them.  316!
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In the Old Testament the shepherd king is also linked to the Messiah, as then Jesus is 
portrayed in the well-known image of the good shepherd. The image of the good shepherd 
thus has two sources in Christian thought: scriptural and classical.  
 Another possible source for the image of the good shepherd is Christian humanism, 
inspired by the work of Seneca and the utopian vision of the “gobierno pastoril.”  These 317
images for the king already appeared in the Carolingian period in early treatises of the genre 
Mirror for Princes. In them the king has a Christian duty to God in caring for the Christian 
people which God has committed to him.  In the Mirrors for Princes written by sixteenth-318
century Spanish authors such as Pedro de Valencia (d. 1620), the notion of kingship is 
equated with that of the “good shepherd” entrusted with the pastoral care of the subjects. The 
king will have to account for them to God, the head shepherd.  In Pedro de Valdes’ treatise, 319
King Polydorus, a tyrant who repented, realized that his role over his subjects was not that of 
a lord, but of a shepherd: “Be your true self again, Oh Polydorus! Do you know that you are 
a shepherd and not the lord and that you will give an account of these sheep to the Lord of 
the flock, who is God?”  Felipe de la Torre (1556) will also remind the king that his duty is 320
“to treat his subjects as companions, which he would do if he thinks he is a father and his 
shepherd and not a tyrant.” He adds: “If you want to be loved remember that you are a 
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shepherd of men and not a lord of sheep.”  As Truman argues, this is called the “utopia of 321
the rey pastor” and is found in other Spanish treatises on government. 
 In the Quran, references to the good shepherd do not occur as frequently as in the 
Bible. There is a passage where the verb raaʾ (to shepherd) is applied to the believers who 
are “those who guard their trusts and duties assigned to them, and their pledges, as a 
shepherd guards his flock.”  But there are no references to the ruler as a shepherd. 322
Nevertheless, the biblical pastoral image as found in medieval Christian authors when 
referring to politics was also found in classical Islamic writings.  In fact, in the introduction 323
of his book Kitāb al-kharāj, Abū Yūsuf developed the theme of the ruler as a shepherd while 
addressing the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd. Abū Yūsuf underlines the caliph’s duties as the 
shepherd to his flock saying:  
The rulers are responsible to their creator, as the shepherd to his master. Dispense 
justice, and be it only for an hour every day, in all matters entrusted and assigned to you 
by God. The happiest of the shepherds appearing on the Day of Resurrection before 
God will be the shepherd whose subjects were happy under his rule.  324
  
Also for Abū Yūsuf, those governed or subjects of the ruler are called raʿiyya or the ‘subjects 
of the ruler.’ He continues to stress the ruler’s responsibility in front of God: “For the 
shepherd who loses any of his flock is responsible for what has been lost through his fault, 
which, had been careful, he could, with Allāh’s help, have kept from perdition and returned 
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to life and safety.” Lastly, Abū Yusūf stresses: “The iniquity of the shepherd spells ruin for 
his flock.”  325
 From the image of the ruler as a shepherd, we move into another recurrent topic in 
Christian and Islamic theory of kingship, that of the relationship between the ruler and the 
law. We are ready to examine the extent to which this divine, natural, or positive law will 
stress the ruler’s absolute power, while at the same time setting limits on the ruler’s authority. 
Again, in this section we are moving towards the other side of the spectrum of possibilities 
for royal authority, trying to show that the mirror-image of the ruler encounters its limits. 
!
The Ruler and the Law: Embodying It, Facing It 
 This section, devoted to the relationship of the ruler and the law, also shows the 
tensions within Christianity and Islam, indicating to what extent the authority of the 
sovereign was considered absolute or limited. Between these two extremes we find a 
continuum of royal authority, ranging from the ruler as the incarnation of law, to the ruler as 
above the law, to the ruler as the servant of the law. The prince as the living law dates back to 
Greek historian Plutarch (d. 120 AD), who represented the king as the lex aniimata/nomos 
empsychos.  The famous four doctors of Bologna addressed Barbarossa at the Diet of 326
Roncaglia in 1158: “You, being the living law, can give, loosen and proclaim laws, dukes 
stand and fall, and kings rule while you are the judge; anything you wish, you carry on as the 
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animate law.”  Integrating law and justice, the catholic German bishop Albertus Magnus (d. 327
1280) portrayed the king as the “living justice,” placing him above the law since he is “the 
living form of law.”  In Mirrors for Princes dating from the thirteenth century and bearing 328
the oriental influence of the translation process from Arabic into Latin and into vernacular 
languages, the role of the law was primordial for the ruler’s kingdom. In Flores de filosofía, a 
collection of sentences of oriental inspiration composed for Alphonso X around the thirteenth 
century, the king must fulfill the law and support his kingdom in it. The three basic pillars are 
then the king, the law, and justice. Also in Libro de los cien capítulos (belonging to the 
thirteenth century and an adaption of the book Flores de la filosofía) the king found his 
support in the law (king legislator), and in justice (king judge).  329
 A counter tradition can be noticed already with John of Salisbury. As he affirms in 
chapter two of book four of his Policraticus: “the prince, although he is not bound by the ties 
of law, is yet law’s servant as well as that of Equity. . . . He is bound to venerate the law and 
equity-justice for the love of justice and not for the fear of punishment.”  We can also argue 330
that even for Aquinas the tension is manifest: on the one hand he confirms the character of 
the king as free from the bounds of the law or legibus solutus, while on the other hand he sets 
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the limits for the king in his innate sense of justice. We can also gather that since the king is 
selected by God and above other creatures, this sense of justice is presumed to be more acute 
than in normal mortals. Thus, whereas for Aquinas the prince is legibus solutos in relation to 
the coercive power of the positive law, on the other hand the prince is under the directive 
power of natural law, to which he should submit voluntarily.  The contemporary English 331
jurist Henry of Brancton (d. 1268) also sets the limits for the king in relation to the law: “The 
king himself must be, not under man, but under God and the law, because [it is ] the law what 
makes the king.”  332
 The topic of the force of the law in relation to justice and in politics played a central 
role in Spanish political thought.  As was the case in Aquinas, the king is bound in 333
conscience to respect the moral force of law he has enacted for the community. The 
Dominican priest Domingo  de Soto (d. 1560) set the limits of royal authority, reminding the 
ruler that: “by the very fact that a prince makes law, he becomes subject to it himself by the 
law of nature.”  For him and for Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546) the king is bound to the 334
law.  And although the problem of applying the law to a prince who breaks the law is 335
addressed but never resolved, it was clear that the position of the ruler towards the law set the 
boundaries between good and tyrannical government. The diplomat and writer Savedra 
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Fajardo (d. 1648) defines tyranny as: “nothing other than disregard for the law, in which 
princes attribute the law’s authority to themselves.” And for Calderon de la Barca (1681) 336
the fact that the king is gifted with a supernatural character makes him at the same time 
subject to the law: “the prince embodies all cardinal virtues. . . . He is subject to the law as 
well as his eminent upholder.”  337
 In Islam the tension between rulers’ different attitudes towards the law is also evident. 
Still, the predominant attitude is acknowledging the primacy of the law and the role of the   
ulama as its interpreters. As Crone affirms, law in Islam is always regarded as given by God, 
so there was not caliphal law, but administrative practice; caliphs were not a source of law.  338
This is evident in the traditions which show scholars refusing to implement caliphal law and 
invoking the Prophet’s variant ruling on the same topic. The figure of the munqabiḍūn or the 
scholars who separates themselves from power is a testimony of the ruler’s limits towards the 
law. In fact, not only did the munqabiḍūn act as mediators when a conflict occurred between 
the community and the ruler, but also in different sources they have an exemplary character, 
since the ruler is obliged to admit the justice of what is asked by the ʿālim. Thus the ruler is 
put in a position of inferiority.   339
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 Even though Muslim law has preeminence over the caliph, during the Umayyad 
period the head of the state has the prerogative of formulating law. The sources for caliphal 
law were the Quran, the Sunna, and raʾy. This Sunna was not originally that of the Prophet, 
but of prophets in general (as in the case of David and Salomon) and of caliphs in particular. 
However, as Crone affirms, the caliphs also followed the general example of the Prophet.  340
The law based on raʾy was considered a supernatural insight; the caliphs were mufahhamūn, 
made to understand by God on par with Salomon “the rightly king” or al-malik al-mahdī. 
The Umayyad rulers affirmed that the ultimate source of law was thus divine inspiration. 
Nevertheless, with the consolidation of the Prophetic Sunna, the authority of the caliph was 
undermined, since this prophetic tradition did not leave room for reinterpretation or 
allegorical meaning and because the scholars became the exponents of the Sunna.  The 341
ideal sovereign and the chief of the community of believers is the supreme monarch of 
Islamic society, who bears an aura of splendor, has refined manners, and is a competent 
politician and good administrator. However, he is not an interpreter or elaborator of the law 
or faith.  Nevertheless we can argue that the tension in the position of the ruler regarding 342
law is still present as is the case for Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ:  
The imām is the one who possesses all power, not only in administrative or political 
issues but in legislation where he can resort to his own opinion or raʾy. The caliph 
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can decide in military or administrative questions when a precedent does not exist, 
and has to base his decision on the Quran and the sunna.   343!
 However, the capacity of the caliph to rule on these matters was for Ibn al-Muqaffa' a 
shared activity with the ulama, whom he conceives of as functionaries of the caliph and part 
of the state apparatus, serving as the caliph's "companions" (sahaba).  Also for Abū Yūsuf, 344
the caliphs are "deputies on [God's] earth,” and they are endowed with a "light" whereby they 
clarify and resolve matters which are obscure to their subjects. However, being divinely 
endowed with the "light" does not have the same connotations that such enlightenment would 
have in the case of the Shiʿi imams. For Abu Yūsuf, the caliph’s light is manifest in his duty 
to enforce law, safeguard the rights of people, revive the Sunna, promote justice and, of 
course, explain obscure matters.  Still, this capacity to interpret the law does not affect the 345
primacy of the ulama's religious authority.  It was then well known that the heirs of the 346
prophets were the ulama, and a source of legal authority. So the figure of the qādī was 
considered as not only a deputy of the caliph, but also a deputy or nāʾib of the Prophet. As al-
Ghazāli affirms, “whereas the offices of the raʾīs and ʿāmīl belonged to the world, the dignity 
of prophethood pertained to that of the qādī.”  These parallel statements regarding the 347
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capacity of legal interpretation in the case of the caliph and the ulama reveal the tension 
between the parallel traditions of asserting absolute or limited power for the figure of the 
Muslim rulers.  
 Similar perplexities are present in the position of the ruler towards justice. As we will 
see in next chapter, these differences depend on the different notions of justice the ruler is 
facing. Justice can be seen as: mere equity, that which establishes and preserves the right 
order of the universe, that which is faithful to the imperative of commanding what is good 
and forbidding what is evil, or a reflection of the divine imperative of justice in the earthly 
community.  
!
The King and Justice: Embodying It, Facing It  
As we have seen in the case of the relationship of the ruler and the law, the connection of the 
ruler with justice bears the same sort of tensions. On the one hand, the sovereign’s main role 
is to mirror divine justice in his earthly kingdom, and being considered as the ruler’s main 
virtue or even the personification of such virtue. On the other hand, the duty of mirroring 
justice sets limits on the prince’s power, and reminds him of his duty towards his subjects. 
 John of Salisbury developed his doctrine of the Christian prince as rex imago 
aequitatis, or the metaphor of the king as an “image of equity” or “image of justice,” 
following the model of the relationship of the king towards law.  As we have seen, the 348
prince is subject to the law while he is at the same time above the law. Salisbury tried to 
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solve what seems to be a contradiction between a prince considered legibus solutos and at the 
same time legibus alligatus. The same contradiction takes place between a prince who is the 
image of justice and subject to justice. As we will see in the next chapter, the very condition 
for obedience is the justice of the king. The emperor Frederick II (d. 1250) also portrayed 
himself as Iustitia animate and “father and son of justice.” He declared that:  
The caesar, therefore, must be at once the father and son of justice, her lord and her 
minister: Father and lord in creating justice and protecting what has been created; and 
in like fashion he shall be in her veneration, the son of justice and, in ministering her 
plenty, her minister.  349!
The emperor himself was spoken of as Sol Iustitiae, the “Sun of Justice,” which was the 
prophetic title of Christ. For Aquinas in his Summa, a lack of justice was the reason the 
monarchy could degenerate into tyranny: “easily the best government, monarchy, degenerates 
into tyranny, if the prince is not gifted of a perfect virtue of justice.” If the king’s decrees 
violate distributive justice, which must preside over the administration of society, the regime 
is a tyranny.  Egidio Romano (d. 1316) following Aristotle also designated the prince as 350
“guardian of justice.” Referring to Aristotle’s Ethics to Nicomano where a judge represents a 
iustum animatum, Egidius adds: et multum magis ipse rex, meaning “even more the prince 
himself.” The syllogism was the same as in the case of the relationship of the prince and law: 
“The king or prince is a sort of law, and the law is a sort of king or prince. The law is like an 
inanimate prince; and the prince is, truly, an animated law. And to what the animated exceeds 
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the inanimate, the king or prince exceeds the law.”  Thus, we can argue that there were then 351
two medieval ideas that explain why the ruler is associated with justice. The first, asserts that 
justice is the mediator between God and the world; thus the prince holds a similar position in 
mediating between this world and the other, in this case mirroring justice itself.  The second 352
idea identifies God himself with justice: thus the vicar of God is also the vicar of justice. 
 In Islam the notion of justice was also a basic requirement for the ruler, seen not only 
as a virtue in his person but also as a concrete and essential prerequisite for the allegiance 
and obedience of subjects, together with securing their property. Niẓām al-Mulk emphasizes 
the role of justice as the basis of his theory of kingship: “The object of temporal rule was to 
fill the earth with justice.” And al-Ghazālī cites the tradition: “The harshest torment at the 
Day of Resurrection will be for the unjust ruler.”  353
 However, the idea that right religion and justice were both twins and the basis of 
Islamic government also entailed some tensions. As we will see in next the chapter, this 
conception of justice can be part of the more conservative notion of the “circle of justice,” an 
Eastern concept that established a place for each strata of society, from rulers to peasants, and 
thus maintained the right order in the cosmos. On the other hand, as we will also argue, 
justice bore the connotation of respect and enforcement of the sacred law as found in the 
Islamic principle of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa al-
nahya ‘an al-munkar). This last notion of justice sets limits on the ruler's absolute powers 
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and emphasizes his main duty towards his subjects. Ibn Khaldūn established the difference 
between the mulk and the caliphate in the observance of the principle of justice. He concludes 
that “the regime can be a mulk, but the matter and the meaning is that of the caliphate, given 
the pursuit of religion, the observation of the principles of justice, which are maintained.”  354
Across time and space, Calderón de la Barca (d. 1681), in his La Vida es Sueño also makes 
clear the basis of justice in a Christian kingdom. Through his character Segismundo, 
Calderón states, “in what is not just law the king should not be obeyed.”  Thus, in 355
Christianity and Islam the notion of the ruler as justice can elevate the figure of the ruler and 
stress his likeness to the divine nature or to the divine order. However, this very idea of 
divine justice holds the ruler accountable to God and his community, stating that obedience 
will be the counterpoint of justice. 
!
 #111
 Tyan, Caliphate and Sultanate, 287354
 Rupp, Allegories of Kingship, 46.355
Chapter Three 
Theological and Political Justice  
 After examining how justice is the theological mirror for the Christian and the 
Muslim ruler, this chapter comparatively explores the different implications of the term 
justice as used by Christian and Muslim authors, focusing on its theological and political 
sense. In the first part we cover the multiple meanings of justice and the various terms used 
for it in scripture. Then this chapter moves into the medieval notion of justice in Christianity 
and Islam. We intend to show, in both traditions, how key thinkers understood justice as a 
theological virtue and how this was translated into a more concrete notion of political justice. 
In doing so, we also trace the percolation process through Greek and Persian encounters 
across the formative period of Christian and Islamic political thought.  
  Justice is then addressed as a key element in the organization of the Christian and 
Muslim polity. We also explore the more conservative aspect of justice as it appears in the 
“circle of justice” in Islam. Finally, we move into the Muslim principle of “commanding 
good and forbidding evil” as a way to show how justice appeared in this theological 
imperative in Islam, a theological imperative also shared with Christianity.  
 Throughout this study on Christian and Islamic political theology, the comparisons do 
not address both traditions in the same depth. Instead, Islam is examined “holding the mirror 
of Christianity.” The discovering of the “other” through a reflected image allows a further 
comprehension of key concepts in the political theology of both religions. Given the lack of 
both comparative studies and studies covering the different meanings for the same concept 
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within a particular religious tradition, this chapter must be seen as a first attempt to use the 
metaphor of the mirror to illuminate the multiples faces of Christian and Islamic justice. 
  
Justice in the Christian Scriptures 
 One important idea that Islam shares with Christianity is that justice represents an 
essential quality of God. Only a religion that believes that God is just can play a social and a 
political role in the life of their communities. As we will see when the different types of 
justice are addressed, the principle of equality is presented as the essence of justice. 
In Christian Scriptures, particularly between the Old and the New Testaments, there 
are contradictory views of the concept of justice. Furthermore, there are not only 
contradictions as to the justice of concrete institutions within the Scriptures, but also an 
antagonism between two different principles of justice: that of retribution and that of love. 
The former is exemplified in the principle of ‘an eye for an eye’ (requiting evil with evil and 
good with good) and the latter in the rule of “love your enemy and requite evil with good.”  356
Yet, as Kelsen notices, this antagonism can also be explained if we take into account the 
different possible relations of law and justice.  Whereas in retributive justice, justice and 357
law are identical, in love, law and justice may conflict with one another. 
 In the Old Testament the notion of law has Yahweh as king and legislator to the 
Jewish people. The positive or human law of the Jewish people is identical with divine 
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justice as the consequence of the theocratic character of the Jewish political ideology.  As 358
king of Israel, Yahweh is the supreme legislator, judge and commander in chief: “Yahweh is 
our judge, Yahweh is our king; he will save us.”  God’s kingship is linked then with justice: 359
“The Lord reigns. . . .The King is mighty, he loves justice, you have established equity.”  360
Furthermore, Yahweh is a God of justice according to Isaiah 30:18.  361
 The very making of the Jewish nation is based in the justice of the Yahweh’s 
covenant:  
Now, Israel, hear the decrees and laws I am about to teach you. Follow them so that you 
may live and may go in and take possession of the land the Lord, the God of your 
ancestors, is giving you. Do not add to what I command you and do not subtract from it, 
but keep the commands of the Lord your God that I give you.  362!
Justice and righteousness are then equated, since God is the righteous God and the righteous 
judge: “Let the Lord judge the peoples. Vindicate me, Lord, according to my righteousness, 
according to my integrity, O Most High. Bring to an end the violence of the wicked and make 
the righteous secure you, the righteous God.”  Also in the Psalms, righteousness, justice 363
and kingship are interrelated: “Righteousness and justice are the foundation of your throne; 
love and faithfulness go before you. Blessed are those who have learned to acclaim you, who 
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walk in the light of your presence, Lord. They rejoice in your name all day long; they 
celebrate your righteousness.”  364
 So essential is this attribute of justice in God that He is sometimes identified with this 
quality.  To “seek justice” is to “seek God.”  In the kingdom of God to come the name of 365 366
its king will be “the Lord is our justice understood as righteousness”:  “The days are 
coming,” declares the Lord,  
when I will raise up for David a righteous branch, a King who will reign wisely and 
do what is just and right in the land. In his days Judah will be saved and Israel will 
live in safety. This is the name by which he will be called: The Lord Our Righteous 
Savior.   367!
Again, the perfect justice coming in the times of the Messiah is seen as righteousness: “And I 
came to the garden of righteousness and saw beyond those trees many other large ones 
growing there -- their fragrance sweet, large ones, with much elegance, and splendor.”  368
 As in Islam, justice requires knowledge of God and his commands; therefore to do 
justice is to know Yahweh, and to serve him requires one to be just: “To do what is right and 
just is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice.”  The figure of the “just believer” is 369
 #115
 Psalm 89: 14-18.364
Kelsen, What is Justice, 34. 365
Zephaniah 2:3.366
 Jeremiah, 23:5-6.367
 Enoch 32:3.368
Proverbs 21:3369
present throughout the Old Testament as he who longs for God and his justice. Thus, as we 
will see in the case of Islam, justice is presented as an attribute of God.   370
One finds an alternative Christian perspective on justice in the New Testament 
through the teaching of Jesus, who stresses communal justice through Christian love. 
According to Matthew 4:45, “God shows his grace to all as he makes the sun rise on both 
good and evil people and sends the rain to fall not only on the just but also on the unjust.”  371
God does not operate like Yahweh the punitive warrior-king, but as an active creator God 
who grants his people enlightenment and forgives them through repentance. Furthermore, the 
justice of Jesus goes beyond the rationalistic relation between law and justice as found in the 
Old Testament.  
 For Jesus, justice goes beyond a concrete social order and is based in the 
righteousness of the relationship among believers. Nevertheless, the teachings of Jesus 
challenged the social order of his time.  Jesus’ rejection of hierarchy was expressed in his 372
opposition to Roman rulers and denunciation of the hypocrisy of religious leaders allied to 
the system (the Herodian dynasty and the Jerusalem priestly aristocracy).  By affirming the 373
need for the last to become first and the humble to be exalted, Jesus defied not only temporal 
but also religious authority: “Sitting down, Jesus called the Twelve and said, ‘Anyone who 
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wants to be first must be the very last, and the servant of all;”  and “For all those who exalt 374
themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted.”  Thus, 375
Jesus’ message was based on an egalitarian view of the community, challenging the notion of 
justice as an exclusive privilege for some groups. Rather than the fatalism, or the apathy and 
resignation of a hierarchical view of society, Jesus presented a subversive notion of a 
communal life no longer based in submission to the law, but in absolute submission to God 
and love to neighbors. 
 According to Kelsen, Paul conformed to the positive institutions of his time by 
distinguishing between justice “based on the law” and justice “based on faith,” which “comes 
from God” and is taught by Jesus who is the “end of the law.”  But Paul emphasizes that 376
“God’s way of justice is disclosed through faith and for faith.”  Thus, it seems that Paul 377
conceived of a relative justice that coincides with positive law, and an absolute justice that is 
the secret of faith. This mythic idea of justice as absolute justice will also inspire medieval 
Christian authors like Augustine and later Aquinas. It will also be reflected in the writings of 
Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī when he evokes the mystery of divine justice as the “black flower of 
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justice.”  This incomprehensible character of absolute justice makes justice remain also as a 378
mystery of faith for both Christianity and Islam.  
 Paul’s concept of justice differs from Jesus’ in that Paul adopts more pessimistic 
anthropology and concentrates on human evil and sin.  Paul urged the people to obey the 379
temporal Roman political authorities as they were God’s agents for punishing the outlaw and 
promoting common good:  
Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except 
that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by 
God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God 
has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold 
no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free 
from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be 
commended.  380!
 Nevertheless, Paul’s epistles also challenge the powerful Roman coercive rule of 
authority for a less hierarchical, elitist, and fatalistic interpretation of justice.  For reasons 381
of prudency, he urged respect for political leaders since they were capable of offering some 
degree of order, however imperfect. Paul’s beliefs in the upcoming kingdom of God and the 
imminent collapse of the Roman Empire may explain his parsimony towards this world’s 
authority. Or, quite the contrary might be expected from him if we interpret such parsimony 
as part of a pessimistic outlook of human nature. This question, as we will see, arises as well 
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in the case of Augustine in Christianity and al-Ghazāli in Islam. As the first theologian of 
Christianity addressing justice, Paul therefore established a clear separation of the this-world-
authority and the authority in the spiritual community where justice is based on service 
towards neighbors. Thus, he conceived of a perfect divine justice that transcends the 
imperfection of human justice, particularly Roman law, which rested in violence and power. 
By contrast, divine justice arises from God’s love as a free gift from him. However, Paul’s 
conception of this-world-community in his letters still holds some ambivalence regarding 
hierarchical authority.  382
 The conflict between the two different orders/communities, secular vs. sacred, 
continued to shape theological interpretation after Paul’s death during the early 60s C.E. And 
as commented before, Augustine in the fourth century will resume Paul’s dichotomy and 
tension between the two communities or “cities” (the earthly city and the heavenly city). 
Both of them based this dichotomy on a pessimistic view of human nature. This mistrustful 
view of human nature will also affect al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who explained injustice of the 
world as due to the innate aggressive nature of men.  Nevertheless, like Paul, he found 383
some benefits in earthly political regimes. Despite the Pauline theological struggle regarding 
the temporal value of obedience and the absolute value of justice, Paul’s contestation of 
authority continued to affect the theological reflection on justice in the coming centuries. 
Even further, as Adrian pointed out, the more egalitarian and less hierarchical vision of Jesus 
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and Paul shaped Catholic Liberation theologians in the 1960’s, who expressed the need to 
fight against the political establishment in order to promote a community based on Christ’s 
justice.  384
  
Justice in the Quran 
 Justice as ʿadl has been treated abundantly, mainly as a topic of religious apologetic 
or religious combat. Modern authors treat it as a theological concept, as Sayyid al-Qutb does 
in his overview of the capitalist and Marxist systems. However, al-Qutb’s references present 
‘adl as a general idea inspired by quranic references and traditions.  385
 For justice, the Quran uses the words ʿadl, qisṭ, taswiyah, and birr.  The word ʿadl 
has more than six shades of meaning.  As a root used in the sense of justice, ʿadl figures 27 386
times in the Quran.  The Quran also uses the noun ʿadl, but relatively rarely (only fourteen 387
times in the sense of justice or equity) and in a much broader fashion.  388
 According to Edward William Lane, the term ‘adl entails equity justice or rectitude, 
and a thing that is established in the mind as being right.  It also alludes to the mean 389
between excess and falling short. Most importantly, ʿadl as justice is of two sorts. The first is 
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absolute, and we reach it through reason inferring its goodness. It also entails doing good 
deeds to the other as the other does it, and abstaining from harming he who abstains from 
harming us. This kind of justice will not be abrogated. The other type is ʿadl from the 
perspective of law and may be abrogated as seen in the Quran: “Verily God commandeth 
equality in recompensing, if good, with good, and if evil, with evil, and the requiting of good 
with more good, and of evil with less evil” (16:92). Thus God orders justice and good 
conduct. Lane further specifies that the terms mu’ādalah and ‘adālah each require the 
inference of equality, as in baṣat al-walī ʿadalhu [The governor or ruler, largely extended his 
equity or justice]. ‘Adl is also considered as a measure, as in ʿaṭāhu biʾl-ʿadl [He gave him by 
measure]. Presenting other possible translations, Lane records the use of ʿadl as one of the 
names of God, meaning “He whom desire does not cause to incline, or decline, so that he 
should deviate from the right course in judgment.” ‘Adl as a middle proportion is recorded in 
the lexicon as being the half of a load, such as one finds on either side of the camel’s saddle. 
In effect, the literal meaning of ʿadal as the equalization of burdens or the half load also 
bears the sense of judicial equity and rectitude.  Examples in the Quran include, “ʿadala 390
ʿala al-qawm,” meaning “he acted equitably towards the people,” and “tahamū bi-l-ʿadl,” 
meaning “You judge with justice.”  In the context of Arabic poetry, ʿatadāl al-shaʿr means 391
that the verse became measured.  
 Finally, ʿadl can take a completely opposite meaning to its common definition as 
justice or equality, being considered as “to turn away or deviating from the right path,” as in:  
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Bring forward your witnesses who could bear witness that God has forbidden [all] this! 
And if they bear witness [falsely], do not bear witness with them; and do not follow the 
errant views of those who have given the lie to our messages, nor of those who believe 
not in the life to come, and who regard other powers as their sustainer's equals 
(yaʿdilun)! (6:150) !ʿ
Adl as justice and righteousness, and ʿadl as deviating from the “right path” played a role in 
the writings of medieval Muslim thinkers as two forms of addressing those in power, 
supporting them or contesting their ruling.  392
 The second term used to express justice in the Quran is qisṭ, meaning, “he acted 
equitably or justly.” Qisṭā is a balance or an instrument for weighing. We see this meaning in 
the following verse: “Judge between them with equity. And if you judge, judge between them 
with justice. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly (al-muqsiṭin).”  Qisṭ is seen as 393
weighing the justice of acts: “Weigh, therefore, [your deeds] with equity, and cut not the 
measure short!” (Q. 55:6) In this case, ʿadl and qisṭ can be considered more or less 
synonymous.  
 Izutsu notes that qisṭ also refers to cases involving justice understood as equity, as 
when bearing witness. In the following passage, the Quran links qisṭ in the sense of bearing 
witnesses with ʾadl: 
O you who have attained faith! Be ever steadfast in your devotion to God, bearing 
witness to the truth in all equity (bil-qisṭ); and never let hatred of anyone lead into the 
sin of deviating from justice (taʾdilū). Be just (iʾdilū): this is the closest to being God 
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conscious (taqwa). And remain conscious of God, God is aware of all that you do. (Q.
5:8)  !
There is another passage where the two terms qisṭ and ʾadl confirm a close relationship:  
And if you have reason to fear you might not act equitably (tuqsiṭū) towards orphans, 
then marry from among other women such as are lawful to you —[even] two, or 
three, or four: but if you have a reason to fear that you might not be able to treat them 
with equal fairness (taʾdilū), then [only] one — or [from among] those whom you 
rightfully possess. This will make it more likely that you will not deviate from the 
right course.(Q. 4:3) 
  
Regarding justice as equality before the law, the interrelation between ʿadl and qisṭ appears 
in the same verse:  
To you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice (qisṭ), witnesses for 
God, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives. Whether one is rich or 
poor, God is more worthy of both. So follow not [personal] inclination, lest you not 
be just (taʾdilu).  394!
Finally, Izutsu provides an example of ʿ adl contrasting it with mayl, seen as partiality or 
favoritism, as in Quran 4:129: “And it will not be within your power to treat your wives with 
equal fairness (taʿdilu), however much you will desire it; and so, do not allow yourselves to 
incline towards (lā tamilū kull al -mayl) one to the exclusion of the other.”  
 Another term to convey the notion of quranic justice is birr. Itzutsu says that it is 
perhaps the most elusive of the quranic moral terms.  Many times birr is also translated as 395
‘righteousness,’ ‘kindness,’ or ‘piety,’ and thus differentiated with difficulty from ṣāliḥāt, or 
true īmān. In Quran 5:2, birr is rendered as righteousness: “And cooperate in righteousness 
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and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression.” Birr and qisṭ (equity and justice in 
conduct) are related, as in Quran 60:8:  
As for such [of the unbelievers] as do not fight against you on account of [your] faith, 
and neither drive you forth from your homelands, God does not forbid you to show 
them kindness (tabarru) and to behave towards them with full equity (tuqsiṭu): for, 
verily, God loves those who act equitably (muqsiṭīn). !
Here birr is more driven by the love and righteousness of the religious experience, whereas 
qisṭ is more limited in application, indicating justice or impartiality in dealing with others. In 
this sense, Itzutsu explains that qisṭ is then clearly opposed to ẓulm.  As we will see in the 396
case of Christianity, justice moderated by piety, and justice oriented by love are key elements 
in medieval Christian and Islamic theology. Justice as wasaṭ in faith as the reflection of a 
balanced life is close to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, which also informed the 
conception of justice in medieval Christianity. 
 Regarding justice as equality among believers, many verses in the Quran present all 
humans as equals, without distinctions or privileges, and created from one being. There are 
then other terms to express this equality, among them musāwāt, tawassuṭ or iʿtidāl 
moderation, amānah (trust), and solidarity or cooperation (taʾāwun).  Equality is stressed in 397
many passages where in God’s eyes all human beings are God’s creation from one being: “O, 
people! Be careful of (your duty to) your Lord, who created you from a single being-soul 
(nafs).”(Q. 7:189). Justice as moderation is seen as key in the preservation of a just society:  
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And thus have we willed you to be a community of the middle (wasaṭ) way, so that 
[with your lives] you might bear witness to the truth before all mankind, and that the 
Apostle might bear witness to it before you. !
Justice seen as moderation may imply a middle way to solve problems in a political 
community.  The maxim attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, “Khayr al-umur awṣaṭu-398
ha,” was interpreted as, "the middle of things is the best."   399
 The notion of justice goes beyond mere equality and it is founded upon religious 
merits (faḍl).  Furthermore, it is founded upon the idea that a human being has of God, of 400
how to serve him, and of the degree of sincerity and zeal that characterize his actions. As in 
Christianity, Muslim justice is tempered by piety. In fact, the idea of rewards and punishment 
in darajāt (levels according to the merits of the believer) is also moderated in Islam by a 
humanitarian and charitable treatment.  Thus, Qur’ān 16:90 talks about iḥsān (doing what 401
is good), being embraced by ʿadl:   402
Behold, God enjoins justice, and the doing of good, and generosity towards [one's] 
fellow-men; and he forbids all that is shameful and all that runs counter to reason, as 
well as envy; [and] he exhorts you [repeatedly] so that you might bear [all this] in 
mind. !
Repentance (tawba) also plays a moderate role in the application of justice informed by law. 
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 In order to attain a full meaning of the sense of justice in quranic terminology, it is 
necessary also to cover the references to injustice or ẓulm. Ẓulm can be translated as ‘wrong’, 
‘evil’, ‘injustice,’ and ‘tyranny”, and ẓālim as a ‘wrong-doer’. The root plays an exceedingly 
important role in the Qur’an.  In the opinion of authoritative lexicographers, ẓulm is to do 403
injustice by going beyond one’s own bounds. Ẓulm is committed against the ḥudūd Allāh or 
the rules of human conduct in society as established by God upon men. Thus, those who 
transgress these established norms are called ẓālimūn. In the sphere of human actions, ẓulm 
may go in two different directions: from man to God, and from man to man.  Ẓulm has then 404
also to do with unbelief and it is part of the notion of kafr, seen as transgressing or 
unbelieving. 
But first, ẓulm is understood as an attribute for an act which God will never commit, 
since he will not wrong (yazlim) anyone ‘even by the weight of an ant’, as in Quran 50:29: 
“The judgment passed by me shall not be altered; but never I do the least wrong unto my 
creatures.” Even when punishment occurs prior to the day of the Last Judgment, God’s 
punishment is never unjust (bi-ẓulm), as we see in Quran 11:117: “For, never thy Sustainer 
destroy a community wrongly (ẓulm) so long as its people behave righteously (muṣliḥūņ).” In 
the prior verse, justice as righteousness entails the term ṣalaḥ: “God has promised those who 
believe and do righteous deeds (ṣaliḥāt) [that] for them there is forgiveness and great 
reward.”  Similarly, we see: But those who attain faith and do righteous deeds (ṣaliḥāt) we 405
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shall bring into gardens through which running waters flow, therein to abide beyond the 
count of time; there shall they have spouses pure: and [thus] we shall bring them unto 
happiness abounding.”  406
 In sum, we find the following patterns in the scriptural treatment of justice in both 
Christianity and Islam: first, justice is seen as an attribute of God, or as the action of God par 
excellence. Second, it is also equated with God’s law or the order of his creation. This is clear 
in the treatment of injustice as not only a mere transgression, but also a transgression of the 
divine harmony as manifest in this world. Third, in both traditions, God’s justice is 
moderated with piety, as present in charitas in Christianity, and in taqwa or birr in Islam. 
Lastly, divine justice as absolute justice is acknowledged as a mystery of Christianity or 
Islam. 
!
Theological and Political Justice in Medieval Times 
 Medieval discussion of justice had to do with theological disputations on the nature of 
God and his attributes, as well as justice’s implications on the religious-political communities 
that were conceived to reflect such attributes. By talking about justice as righteousness, 
medieval authors addressed the issue of righteous and unrighteous government. The 
discussion also led to the question of obedience to the ruler versus the duty of disobedience 
to the unjust ruler.  407
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In Christianity and Islam, the notion of justice is close to the Aristotelian concept of 
justice. In his famous doctrine of the mesotes or the doctrine of the mean, Aristotle presented 
justice within a system of values where justice is the “chief of virtues” and the “perfect 
virtue.” Most importantly, the mean applied to a social order justified, in the Ethics of 
Aristotle, and then in medieval times, the transition from natural law to positive morality and 
positive law.  But in addition to Greek, and, as we will see, Persian, influences on the 408
concept of justice, Christian and Muslim authors developed more authentic ideas of justice 
(and justice applied to the social and political order), informed by their respective theologies. 
!
Medieval Christianity and Justice 
Medieval Christian authors experienced the tension between the longing for a justice based 
on the theological principles upon which the state is supposed to be founded, and the need for 
a basic order with which to regulate the basic functions of society. We can argue that this sort 
of “anxiety” for these two legitimate principles of social organization is also part of the 
tension between two ways to conceive of justice. The first kind of justice is called 
commutative or distributive justice and entails the notion of equality in exchange for 
compensation.  The concept of distributive justice has been commonly defined in Greek 409
and then medieval philosophical disquisition of justice as “rendering to each his own,” by 
which is also meant preserving each individual and the group as a whole. 
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  The second type is called absolute justice and is based on the absolute rights of the 
individual.  This equity conceived as aequitas makes clear that true justice cannot be 410
conceived in legal terms.  This kind of justice is discovered at the moment of action and in 411
the path of perfection; thus it is something more transcendent, aiming at the idea of justice as 
righteousness. These two notions of justice informed the disquisition on the idea of justice by 
the medieval authors we will consider in this discussion.  
 The use of the term iustitia in medieval times involved the encounter of three general 
meanings. The first one comes from Greek and Roman philosophy and considers justice as 
‘the habit of the soul or the virtue whereby one gives to each individual his due.’ The second 
meaning comes from the New Testament and Latin Patristic writers, and equates the virtue of 
justice with love due first to God and to one’s neighbor. The third comes from the Pauline 
notion of dikaiosune, the condition of the soul when it stands in a “right” relation with God, 
following the order in which it was created; in this sense of being, right justice can be 
considered as ‘righteousness.’  Dikaiosune as justice or righteousness comes from dike 412
conceived as “the just.” In this sense, it was used by the Greeks, and is also found in 2 Peter 
2:5.  Plato used dikaiosune as “adjustment to the law”, but it seems that the relation of 413
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righteousness to right also has an absolute claim that goes beyond law and aims at God’s 
attribute of justice.  
 The Platonism (or neo-Platonism) of Augustine’s concept of justice stemmed from his 
engagement with Cicero’s thought.  Augustine’s concern for a just society arises with his 414
objection to Cicero’s claim that Rome ceased to be a commonwealth when justice was 
abandoned.  In Book 2 of the City of God, Augustine resumes Cicero’s argument that there 415
can be no commonwealth without an agreement on what is right (consensus iuris), and thus 
justice (iustitia). Thus, when Augustine reflects on justice in the political realm, it is clear 
that he is pointing at a notion of absolute justice. He seems to denounce the value of 
commutative justice, understood as “giving to each his due.” Augustine says that this 
classical definition of justice is a deformation of the notion of a purer justice found in the 
New Testament, where the connection of justice with love of God is the justice of the city of 
God.  Furthermore, Augustine argues that the true justice exists alone in that city “whose 416
founder and ruler is Christ.”  Augustine concludes that where true justice (iustitia uera) 417
“does not exist, there can be no right (ius).  What it is right or righteousness itself has then 418
as its source justice, that is, God himself. Thus Augustine’s argument is based not on a 
cosmological or theological theory of reflection of the divine order, but on a separation of the 
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two orders, given the imperfect character of the human institutions. This imperfection arises 
from Augustine’s negative anthropology. It seems then that he was not very concerned about 
justice in political society, except to note the precarious character of justice in this-world’s 
polities.   419
 However, on the other hand, Augustine agreed with Cicero that a just society is a duty 
incumbent on its rulers, for they establish justice. What kind of justice can then be achieved 
in this world? Augustine “mediates” absolute justice into worldly justice, treating justice as a 
virtue by grace. Justice in this world has as its reference Christ himself, who mediates this 
virtue to the soul in establishing a just society.  
How then is the virtue of justice transferred to the political sphere? Justice can be part 
of this world through Augustine’s notion of order, particularly with the ‘order of love’ (ordo 
amoris), which establishes a hierarchy of goods as objects of love and desire. In this way 
Augustine harmonizes love, justice, and order as the created order of nature. Justice is then 
understood as “love serving God alone and thus ruling well those things subject to human 
beings,” Thus justice expresses a right relationship, which seems to be based on love, but is 
based on an order reflecting the hierarchical order of the universe.  420
 Who is then in charge of this society arranged by the principle of ordo amoris? 
Augustine thinks of the statesman (rector ciutatis dei) as the one who promotes justice.  421
But there is a certain tension in Augustine between the possibilities of justice in this world 
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through a ruler capable of promoting virtue, and Augustine’s pessimism on human nature. 
Even if he says that justice as a virtue is subordinate to piety (as we will see in the case of 
Islam where justice together with piety are the virtues expected for the ruler), human 
ignorance is the main defect that does not allow a thorough understanding of justice. As we 
will see, these ideas have parallels to Islam, where ignorance or jahiliyya is an obstacle not 
only for individual salvation, but also for the realization of a virtuous or righteous 
community of believers. Augustine then subordinates virtues, including justice in the earthly 
city, to piety. Thus, the role of the ruler in governing according to piety should be to assist his 
subjects in loving God in truth.  422
 But again it seems that Augustine’s reflections on the weakness of human nature 
affect the soul to the extent that in Augustine’s opinion, a just society needs more than a just 
and virtuous statesman. This just society needs a ruler whose example of virtue “heals the 
soul” of these defects.  A Just Christ (Christus totus iustus) is then the statesman of the city 423
of God, its founder (conditor), and ruler (rector), the locus for the revelation of justice.  It 424
is interesting that Augustine links “just” and “justifying,” as found in the Pauline 
expression.  Although Christ exemplifies perfect justice, Augustine also recognizes 425
examples of justice in the figures of prophets of the Old Testament, including a number of 
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pagans.  Augustine believed that just rulers had governed and would govern: "fear of God, 426
and uprightness, God's great gifts, are enough for the true happiness of the ruler, since this 
will enable them to spend this life well and thus win eternal life." But later he becomes 
pessimistic again regarding the chances that a just ruler would govern, marking the 
exceptional character of this event: “on this earth therefore, rule by good men is a blessing 
bestowed, not so much on themselves as upon mankind."  Also in the fifth book of the City 427
of God, Augustine states that:  
We call those Christian emperors happy who govern with justice, who are not puffed 
up by the tongues of flatterers or the service of sycophants, but remember that they 
are men. We call them happy when they think of sovereignty as a ministry of God and 
use it for the spread of true religion; when they fear and love and worship God; when 
they are in love with the kingdoms in which they need fear no fellow sharers; when 
they are slow to punish, quick to forgive; when they punish, not out of private 
revenge, but only when forced by the order and security of the republic, and when 
they pardon, not to encourage impunity, but with the hope of reform; when they 
temper with mercy and generosity the inevitable harshness of their decrees.  428!
 Another definition of the just prince, that of Isidore of Seville (c. 570-636), also 
proved influential in the medieval political notion of justice. Isidore explains:  
Kings are called kings by the function of their ruling. Just as a priest is the same by 
his sanctification, so a king is king through his ruling, and he does not rule if he does 
not rule correctly. If a king rules rightly he will then retain his name as king; if he 
does not he will lose it. Therefore it was a proverb among the ancients, "You will be 
king if you rule rightly, if you do not, you will not be.” There are two outstanding 
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regal virtues, piety and justice. Piety is more lauded in kings, for justice in itself is 
stern.   429!
 According to Isidore, the title rex was derived from regere, which he interpreted as 
“to rule rightly.” Again, the equivalences in concepts are set among the terms rex-regere-ius-
iustitia. The prince who did not rule rightly lost the qualities that distinguish him from a 
tyrant.  But despite the sharp distinction between the just ruler and the tyrant, the 430
conservative (quietistic) ingredient prevailed in Christian and early medieval political 
thought.  How did Isidore understand justice? The maintenance of justice for Isidore was 431
not only the strict observance of the divine and natural law, but also the prince’s obedience of 
his own statutes. In the maxims, he stated that kings and princes were instituted to restrain 
people from evil and directed them to good.   432
 What happens when justice is part of the imperative of the prince to mirror Christian 
virtues and ethics? For Jonas of Orleans (d. 841), piety, justice and mercy were the three 
principle virtues that distinguished the true ruler. He listed what he meant by justice:  
Is the justice of the king not to oppress those who could be oppressed by the abuse of 
power; to exercise the judicial authority impartially; to defend the widow, the orphan 
and the stranger; to punish the thief and the adulterer; not to favor inequities; not to 
aid the needs of actors and the immoral; not to tolerate the impieties in the kingdom; 
not to allow murderers and perjurers to live; to found the churches; to nourish the 
poor with alms; to entrust the charges of the kingdom to just men; to take as 
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counselors men of experience; wise and sober; not to give audiences to witches, to 
soothsayers and magicians, to superstitions; not to allow himself to become angry; to 
defend the country with justice and vigilance against the enemies; to live according to 
God; not to become haughty in prosperity; to withstand adversity truly; to live in the 
Catholic faith; not to allow his sons to behave in an impious manner; to devote 
himself to prayer at fixed hours; not to eat every time he is hungry.  433!
The bishop of Orleans also incorporates in his argument elements of the so-called circle of 
justice in order to link justice with the welfare of the kingdom:  
The justice of the king is the peace of the people, the defense of the country, the 
security of the lower classes; the protection of men; the recovery from sickness, the 
joy of men, the happiness of the times, the serenity of the sea, the fertility of the soil, 
the consolation of the poor, the assurance of inheritance for children, and fore the 
king himself the well-founded hope of the beatitude to come.  434!
A further discussion of the elements of the circle of justice in Christian political thought is 
overdue. After the translation of the Secrets of Secret, or Secreta secretorum, a piece of 
advice allegedly written by Aristotle to Alexander, the book was quoted by medieval 
Christian thinkers, and was part of their libraries, including the Franciscan friar Roger Bacon 
(d. 1294). As we will see later in this chapter, there is plenty of literature that abounds on the 
influence of the circle in Islamic political thought.  
 Aquinas’s classic statement on divine justice in the Summa Theologiae deserves to be 
quoted since he clearly expresses the two kinds of justice he conceives of:  
One consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds 
of intercourse and exchange. This the philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative 
justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to 
God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall 
be made him?" (Romans 11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called 
distributive justice, whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. 
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As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude 
evidences justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen 
both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must see that God is truly just, in seeing how 
he gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves 
the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.”  435!
In this passage it seems, at first, that Aquinas presents a hierarchical notion of theological 
justice as reflected in the order of the universe and conveyed to another kind of order, from 
the simple arrangement of the household to the more complex one of society. But although 
distributive justice as he mention is based on a hierarchical ranking of persons, Aquinas does 
not give a criterion for this hierarchical order, but says that this gradation differs from 
community to community.  Still, as a subject to the divine ruler, the individual is related to 436
God as a member of a community governed by law, a law that reflects the order of natural 
and divine law. Thus, human communities also reflect in their organization this perfect type, 
and the positive law of the community will be key for a this-world notion of justice. In fact, 
Aquinas addresses political justice, saying that “the philosopher says that ‘political justice is 
partly natural and partly legal,’” i.e. established by law. Thus, Aquinas answers:  
the “right” or the “just” is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some 
kind of equality . . . in two ways, by its nature . . . and this is called “natural right.” . . . 
Secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something 
should be deemed as though it were adjusted and conmensurated to another person, or 
when is it is decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and act as its stead, 
and this is called “positive right.”  437
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Aquinas is not then concerned with the concrete form of government, but with the relation 
between justice according to natural law and the positive law of that community. 
 From a theological and ethical viewpoint, Aquinas affirms that justice can belong to 
God’s essence even though it relates to an act, since what belongs to an essence may be also 
a principle of action.  It is relevant to notice that this principle of action by which God 438
operates with justice and at the same time with mercy makes justice a virtue of the will and 
not the passions, and it should be understood as a standing commitment to act in a certain 
way. As Porter concludes, the rational love of justice is not driven by passion, but by the 
intent to do what is just.  We can then ask which is the best of settings for the performance 439
of the just? Understanding the locus character of justice as a virtue helps to understand 
Aquinas’ rationale on the interpersonal and communitarian idea of justice.  
 Aquinas discusses justice as a “general virtue” and a “particular virtue” and affirms 
that justice differentiates itself from the other cardinal virtues (fortitude, temperance, and 
prudence), in that it is directed to other individuals, and the community as a whole. In this 
sense, justice always presents an interpersonal character. This general view of justice is taken 
from Aristotle, who conceived of general justice as having the common good of the 
community as its object.  By talking of general justice and justice directed to others, 440
Aquinas is basing justice on the Aristotelian notion of the doctrine of the mean, where justice 
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entails the notion of  “balance” as aequalitas. But Aquinas noticed the difficulty of applying 
the doctrine of the mean to ethics, and then to politics. What is the mean for justice, and 
furthermore, which are the two extremes between which justice as moderation might be 
placed?  
 The core of iustitia lies in ius, or the performance of what is right. Aquinas quotes 
Isidore, “a man is said to be just because he respects the right (ius) of others.”  Justice then 441
appears to have the character of an absolute value, where its absence becomes an absolute 
vice, that of injustice. The topic of injustice will be treated in Aquinas when obedience is 
discussed in the next chapter. Still, it is interesting to see the communitarian character of 
justice in Aquinas when compared with that of Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), who conceived of the 
virtue of justice as being in the Virtuous City, "founded upon wisdom, courage, temperance 
and justice.”  Ibn Rushd foresaw the Virtuous City as the place where the imperfect human 442
conception of justice will be in harmony with the divine and ideal justice. Al-Farabi, who 
described justice as the highest of human virtues, placed it (“locus”) in the Virtuous City as 
well. The ruler of the city (Imām, resembling the philosopher-king) will "hold the scale of 
justice" and supervise the sharing of the "good things" (security, wealth, honor, dignity) and 
the avoidance of the bad.   443
 Justice as the promotion of good and the avoidance of evil is a relevant point in a 
comparative study of justice in Christianity and Islam. Aquinas describes the integral notion 
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of justice as “to avoid evil and to do good” (declinare a malo et facere bonum). This can be 
equated with the Islamic principle of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (al-amr bi-l-
ma’ruf wa al-nahya ‘an al-munkar), also understood as a theological way to define the nature 
of justice in Islam. First, in both cases, justice is understood as a virtue of action directed to 
the welfare of the community; second, justice in this sense has its basis in the respective 
theologies of Christianity and Islam; last, this conception of justice in both traditions has 
political consequences in its capacity to contest power. Justice as an instrument to criticize 
this-world regimes will be discussed further in this chapter in the case of the circle of justice 
and in the section for “Commanding Good—Forbidding Evil.” 
 The avoidance of evil and the performance of good is then required by a perfect act of 
justice, according to how natural law was understood at Aquinas’s time.  The basic act of 444
justice is to recognize fellow humans as equals. Thus, committing injustice is committing 
evil against the community. Sins against justice are sins against love understood as 
charitas.  We can also say that sins against the common good are major forms of injustice. 445
 Finally, the relationship between justice and truth has a similar treatment in Aquinas 
and in Islam. As we have seen above when exploring all the possible quranic terms for 
justice, “truth or reality” (ḥaqq) may also be translated as “justice.”  In the Summa, Aquinas 446
affirms that God’s justice is rightly called truth, because it determines the order of things in 
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conformity with his wisdom, and thus this truth becomes law. He adds that we ourselves 
speak of the truth of justice in the same sense.  Medieval jurists worked on the necessary 447
conformity of the law to the abstract notion of aequitas, understood as an ideal concept 
defining what is legal.  Aquinas establishes the same relationship between truth and justice 448
through the concept of natural law. The justice-truth-law relationship will be also developed 
in slightly different terms by al-Māwardī, as we will further see. 
!
Medieval Islam and Justice 
 Abdel-Magid Turki says that neither European nor Arabic literature has explored the 
richness of the medieval Muslim documentation on justice.  The possibilities of exploring 449
justice in medieval Islam include its discussion in the ethical, theological, political and legal 
spheres. As in the case of Christianity, we focus on how the theological interpretation of 
justice affected Islamic ethics, and how this translated into Muslim political discussion of the 
polities of the time.  
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 In akhlāq  literature, which is aimed at the discipline of human dispositions through 450
qurʿanic verses and traditions of the Prophet, justice is discussed as part of the political 
norms.  Human perfection is to be achieved through admiration and adulation of divinity, 451
but also through a peaceful social organization. Qazi Ikhtiyar al-Din Hasan al-Husaini in his 
Akhlāq-i humayūnī (initially titled Dastūr al-wizārat in Persian, a manuscript that is not yet 
published), and written at the time of the sultan  Abu Saʿid Mirza (1459-69), describes this 
model:  
The affairs of living must be administered through cooperation (shirkat- muʿawanat) 
which [in turn] depends on justice (ʿadl). If ʿadl disappears, each man will pursue his 
own desires. Therefore there has to be an institute (dastūr) and a balancing agency 
(mizān) to ensure cooperation. The sharīʿa--the protectors of which have been the 
prophets (anbiyāʾ wa rusul)--serves this purpose. But the sharīʿa cannot work without 
being administered by a just king, whose principal duty is to keep people in control 
through affection and favors.  452!
ʿAdl emerges as the cornerstone of social organization as an artificial way (the natural one is 
maḥabba, or mutual love) attained only through the king’s exercise of power and coercion. 
As in the case of Christianity, love comes first as an organizational principle of a community, 
but justice has an artificial or utilitarian purpose. For these works of akhlāq, justice, although 
it has an ethical character, is not informed by the divine attribute of absolute justice, 
reflecting afterwards on the concrete positive political community. 
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 In another work of theory written by Naṣīr al-dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274) called Akhlāq-i 
nāṣirī, justice also has an artificial character. Justice here is rendered as inṣāf and not ‘adl. 
Also there is a Tusi work that was published in Persian in 1235 for the Ismaʿili prince Naṣīr 
al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahīm b. Abi Mansūr: 
Justice leads to artificial union, whereas love generates natural unity, and the artificial 
in relation to the natural is compulsive, like an imposition. The artificial comes after 
the natural, and thus it is obvious that the need for justice, which is the most 
accomplished human virtue, is because of the absence of love. If love were available, 
inṣāf [justice] would not have been needed. !
Inṣāf comes from naṣf [which means taking the half, reaching towards the middle]. The 
munṣif [the dispenser of justice] is called so because he divides the disputed object into two 
equal parts (munāṣafa); division into halves (tanṣīf) implies multiplicity whereas love creates 
oneness.  453
 In Islam, the Muʿtazilites stressed the justice (ʿadl) of God as their second doctrinal 
principle or usūl. They called themselves ahl al-tawhīd waʾl-ʿadl (the people of divine unity 
and justice) based on the theology they advocated. They proposed that God was constrained 
by his own attribute of justice, since he would not do anything that it was not the best for His 
creatures.  Their ethics were derived from their theology. The end of man is happiness, and 454
this results from the rewards of God at the Judgment. Since justice is an attribute of God, his 
rewards follow his known character; and, although it is theoretically within his power to 
reward evildoers, it is inconceivable that he would do so. Thus, since man also knows 
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rationally which acts are good or evil, justice and injustice are intelligible to him. This 
rationale is based upon God’s will and known to man through revelation.  Justice then for 455
the Muʿtazilites springs from God’s nature into human ethics. The Muʿtazilite theologian 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār  (d.1025) affirms that when God is described as justice (ʾadl), the use of the 
term is metaphorical. It is used to mean that he is the doer of just acts (ʿādil). Similarly God 
is described as peace (salām), hope (rajāʾ), helper (ghayyāth), and generous (jawwād), etc. 
What is important in all these descriptions is the action, and the description is applied 
because of the performance of the act.  This discussion of justice based on action is then 456
parallel to Aquinas’ explanation of how God’s essence translates into a principle of action by 
which God operates with justice.  
 The major trends of scholarship on political theory during the Middle Ages have 
stressed that justice in Islamic politics was a complex issue. Thus, the political turmoil of the 
time required a strong ruler rather than a just one. He was a legitimate ruler not because his 
acts were just, but because he was able to preserve the integrity of the Muslim community.  457
Most current scholarship stresses that order and stability became the primary concern; neither 
legitimacy nor justice mattered. For example, Lewis says that in the medieval centuries, 
 #143
 George F. Hourani, “Ghazālī on the Ethics of Action,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 455
96 (1976): 80.
 Mohammed Abdalla and ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī ʻAbd al-Jabbār, “The notion of good and evil in 456
the ethics of Abd al-Jabbār: a Philosophical Study with a Translation of the Determination of Justice 
and Injustice (al-Taʻdīl wa-al-tajwīr) sections 1-12” (PhD diss., university of Philadelphia, 1983), 
157.
 Rosenthal argued that the theoretical discussion on justice was for the most part irrelevant to 457
Muslim societies. He says that the ideal was seen to be too prevalent to require a systematic 
discussion. Franz Rosenthal, “Political Justice and the Just Ruler,” Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980): 
110. Ayoub also argues that the need for a strong government was prevalent. Ayoub, “The Islamic 
Concept of Justice,” 142.
legitimacy was reduced to power and Islam. Since the conditions of accession changed, the 
attention of jurists also turned from the manner of how rulership was acquired, to the manner 
of how it was exercised. But Lewis affirms that although legitimacy was negotiated in juristic 
terms, justice remains as the only requirement for acceptable government. Muslim jurists 
reluctantly accepted the necessity of a usurper, but they did not accept tyranny.  458
 A different direction in scholarship has been taken by Lambton, who argues that there 
was a common notion of justice and injustice, particularly in terms of righteous and 
unrighteous government. This common notion was due to the relative degree of cultural 
uniformity in the Islamic world in the eleventh and twelfth centuries during the rule of the 
Seljūq.  During this period, justice was closely connected with law, and was mainly 459
discussed in works of fiqh and Mirrors for Princes. The term for justice used in these 
writings was commonly ʾadl (ʾadālat and maʿdilat), as well as their opposites ẓulm and jawr. 
 The commonality in this period was to praise justice, perhaps as a call to return to an 
imaginary Golden Age, amidst arbitrary action and injustice.  The writers may have hoped 460
to moderate the injustices of their patrons by pointing to the ideal pattern for a just 
government.  Although neither jurists nor the authors of Mirrors for Princes were men of 461
conspicuous integrity, they may have had mixed motives for focusing on justice and 
righteous rulership. We can argue that they were drawn to the courts by the wealth, power, 
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and patronage the rulers could provide. But because the writers linked the righteousness of 
the ruler with the justice of a religious community, we can also argue that there was some 
agreement and commitment regarding the ideal Muslim polity, as well as a longing for an 
ideal past. 
  Also in this period, from the tenth century on, there is a striking tendency to stress 
justice, preferring a just ruler not adhering to faith than an unjust Muslim ruler, as Joseph 
Sadan points out. This tendency was reflected in the expression: “God allows kings to 
continue to reign in spite of injustice, as long as the foundations of religion are not 
damaged.”  Sadan says that the maxim became popular in Arabic literature. In effect, he 462
traces more than thirty occurrences of a maxim preferring a just infidel (kafir) than an unjust 
Muslim ruler. From the twelfth century, the maxim is even attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Lambton also notices that many writers quoted the adage that “kingship 463
might endure with unbelief but not with injustice,” as well as the saying attributed to the 
prophet that “the justice of one hour was better than the worship of sixty years.” This 
insistence on justice might reflect the contemporaneous government’s failure to practice 
justice. In sum, the historians argue that the coloring on the conception of justice reveals the 
relationship between the intellectual discourses and their historical context.   464
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Kambiz Ghanea Bassiri, “A Window on Islam in Buyid Society: Justice and its Epistemological 464
Foundations in the Religious Thought of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn al-Bāquillānī, and Miskawayh” (PhD 
diss., Harvard University, 2003).
 But we can say that the discussion of the notion of justice paired with religion and 
righteous rule was relevant enough to attribute it to the particular needs of the period, what 
this study will call the “historical imperative.” In fact, what we understand as the “theological 
imperative” can explain as well why the authors of the period stressed justice as a criterion 
for righteous government, which goes beyond what Lambton presents as simply longing for 
an ideal past. It is true that she warns us of the danger of reading too much into the actual 
wording of the texts, but she also says that there are reasons to assume that the writers knew 
what they were saying, that they chose their words carefully and meant for their readers to 
read between the lines.  This can also explain in many cases what we might call the 465
“schizophrenia” or “anxiety” of many of the authors of this period; they are torn between the 
need for a strong government and the need of a just government. 
 Given the contrast between the ideal notion of a righteous Muslim government and 
the concrete history of the Muslim community, Sunni jurists worked out the relationship 
between the caliph and those who usurped power. In fact, al-Māwardī, al-Juwaynī, and al-
Ghazālī conceived of the ruler of the community as possessing two essential qualities: ʾadāla 
(moral and religious probity) and ʿilm. al-Māwardī defines ʿadala, or the quality of ʿadl, as a 
state of moral and religious perfection.  In those cases, justice is linked to sacred law. He 466
says that when the Sunni theory of the imamate became divorced from the sacred law, it 
evolved into sheer absolutism. In order to show the religious connotation on the notion of 
justice as understood by al-Māwardī, it is also interesting to see the emphasis put on injustice 
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and tyranny as a rejection of justice. Al-Māwardī equated injustice (zulm_ with irreligion. 
Thus, the definition of injustice shows us his theological concern when writing on politics 
and giving advice to those in authority. Hanna Mikhail says that al-Māwardī’s attempt to 
provide a universal criterion for justice was a failure, given that for most medieval jurists, a 
ruler might be following the shariʿa and still be unjust.  But it seems that Mikhail is not 467
taking into consideration al-Māwardī acting as a theologian. Māwardī resorts to an extra-
legal criterion to judge the righteousness of government. This criterion is justice together 
with religion. 
 It is true that al-Māwardī also argues in Naṣīhat al-mulūk in favor of political 
expediency, as Gibbs has noticed as grounds for his own disappointment with the author’s 
political thought.  But he further stressed that “power, if it is not based on religion, will 468
never endure, nor will its days be ‘cloudless.’ He adds that “Religion creates a consensus so 
that people will consider obedience a religious duty and cooperation an obligation… power 
not based on religion is an oppressive and corrupting power.”  Also in his Naṣīḥat al-mulūk, 469
he reiterates his Shafi’I opinions that those who rebel against unjust rulers should not be 
fought.    470
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 Most scholarship has explained these inconsistencies as resulting from the political 
role played by al-Māwardī, the historical disintegration of the caliphal power, and the 
emergence of contesting powers. Although taken into consideration, these theses can be 
contested if we focus on the theological basis for al-Māwardī’s thought. In effect, to what 
extent do his Muʿtazilite leanings or his Ashʿarite orthodoxy contribute to his ambiguity? He 
held a rationalist theology and unlike the Ashʿarites, he saw the spheres of reason and 
revelation as overlapping and not separated. Following a rational criterion in the sphere of 
politics leads al-Māwardī to stress justice over the traditions. There is a whole discussion 
examining the extent to which he placed himself in the controversy between ‘aql and naql, 
between rational and literal methods of argumentation.   Furthermore, as an eminent jurist 471
of his time, a mujtahid rather than a muqallid, Māwardī included political arguments into the 
sharīʿa’s interpretation of government.  472
 Riduan Sayyid notes in his edition of al-Māwardī’s Tashīl al-naẓar that scholars have 
explained Māwardī’s contradiction as part of what they call an ‘intellectual evolution’ in his 
life. In effect, they argue that al-Ahkām al-sulṭāniyya represents a mature period in the 
intellectual life of al-Māwardī, whereas Nasīhat al-mulūk, tashīl al-naẓar, and Adab waʾl 
dunya wʾl-dīn represent “steps in his –intellectual- way.”  But we can understand 473
Māwardī’s thesis as part of a non-dogmatic theory. While Gibbs sees the “door open for 
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political expediency” in Māwardī’s legal treatise Aḥkām al-sulṭanīyya, justice is still the 
criterion to judge the new political arrangement after the seizure of power: “The acts of him 
who seizes control over the imam must be examined. If they are in accordance with the 
ordinances of religion and the requirements of justice it is permissible that the usurper be 
confirmed in his position.”   474
 Also in his Tashīl al-naẓar, al-Māwardī deals with the political aspects of usurpation, 
and states that rulership based on force could only become legitimate if the ruler is just with 
his flock.  In the same theologico-political work, al-Māwardī affirms that the just conduct 475
of a usurper towards his flock is equivalent to his receiving delegated authority in the non-
religious sphere, for he calls “rule by delegation” the just rule of a usurper.  What happens 476
when relative justice is the case in that community? We can say that Māwardī takes a 
“quietistic” position advising Muslims to conform and accept their situation in life: “Be 
devoted to your affairs, content with your fortune, at peace with your neighbors; conform to 
the custom of the time, accept the leadership of those above you, be sympathetic to those 
below you.”  But in the same work (Adab al-dunyā waʾl-dīn) he also reminds Muslims that 477
they are not obligated to obey a ruler who does not follow the requirements of religion and 
justice. When the ruler does not fulfill his duties, “his flock will harbor disobedience and 
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hatred against him; and to proclaim these, they will await opportunities and lie in expectation 
of a change in his fortune.”  
 In the case of Mikhail’s analysis of Māwardī, there is not a periodization or 
“evolution” in his thought, as proposed by Sayyid. The possible contradiction may be 
apparent only if we think of Māwardī as a non-dogmatic author, or if we think of his use of 
‘aql as a criteria for just government, due perhaps to his Muʿtazilite leanings. The thesis that 
attributes Māwardī’s (as well as other thinkers’) “inconsistencies” to the convulsive times of 
medieval Islamic history is left to historians. It is true that al-Māwardī was writing during a 
time where the institution of the caliphate was at peril. But his theological disquisition on 
law-justice-religion applied to politics has the consistency, if not of a theory, at least of a 
driving idea throughout his works. 
 Al-Ghazāli (d.1111), addresses the treatment of justice differently in his ethical 
writings compared to his political writings. In his Miẓān al-ʾamal, a treatise on ethics, he 
identifies justice as a cardinal virtue, together with wisdom, courage, and temperance.  The 478
Arabic terms selected to discuss justice in this book are ʾadl, wasaṭ (the just middle), and 
siddiq (the figure of the just). Justice is faith in that the mental faculties are placed according 
to a necessary hierarchy: “because of justice heavens and earth are held.”  He presents 479
justice as the condition of three faculties that manifest for their harmonious order due to a 
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necessary hierarchy in their relationships of domination and submission; it is an ensemble of 
virtues. In effect, just as a commendable hierarchy is established between the king, his 
subjects, and his army, a hierarchy is manifested through the faith that the king is dominant 
and clear-sighted, the army is powerful and obedient, and the subjects obedient and 
submissive. It is then when al-Ghazāli says “justice is established in that reign.”  As we will 480
see later in this chapter, al-Ghazālī is making a reference to the concept of harmony 
according to the notion of the circle of justice, which was a prevalent idea in Near Eastern 
politics.  481
 From ethics Ghazāli moves into politics, explaining that there is no justice if the 
described conditions are present in some, but not in all, of the parts. He makes an analogy 
with the human body in order to show how the justice of the characters of the soul operate. 
Furthermore, the justice of the characters of the soul entails justice in relations with others, 
which also translates into politics, one as the consequence of the other. Ghazālī explains that 
the word justice means a satisfactory equilibrium, be it in the characters of the soul, or in the 
relationships with others, or in the elements of the administration of a kingdom. 
 Justice in politics consists then of establishing a hierarchy among the elements of a 
community, a hierarchy analogous to the elements of the soul. In this way, the city’s 
solidarity, harmony among its elements, and cooperation of its parties make it capable of 
attaining its goal, that of forming an organic whole like the human soul. Thus, all is in its 
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place. The population is then divided into classes between those who serve and those who are 
served. 
Following the medieval discussion on virtues and vices, al-Ghazālī affirms that 
justice is opposed only to one vice: injustice, in the same way that the opposition is 
established between hierarchy and non-hierarchy. This hierarchical impulse works in 
Ghazālī’s philosophy to the extent that the whole universe is comparable to a human 
organism where the elements and the faculties are in harmony. This notion of hierarchy will 
be a constant in al-Ghazāli’s writings, as will be further seen. In sum, al-Ghazālī links justice, 
harmony, order and hierarchy in a chain of equivalencies. 
 But al-Ghazālī establishes an association between justice and equality as well. The 
ruler was admonished to treat his subjects as he would be treated himself. Al-Ghazālī states 
that justice requires complete impartiality: one must treat an unknown man and a famous 
man, or a rich man and a poor man, with complete equality when judging between them.  It 482
is a limited legal equality that implied equity, for that reason Lambton says inṣāf and ʿadl are 
used interchangeably.  In al-Ghazālī’s letter to Fakhr al-Mulk b. Niẓām al Mulk, Sanjar’s 483
vizier, after insisting on the practice of equity and justice, he asked him to reduce taxes 
(muʿun) imposed upon the people of Ṭūs, given that the city was ruined by tyranny and 
famine.   484
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 Justice as a primordial principle in ruling the political community is stressed in 
Ghazālī’s Nasīhat al-mulūk. Sadan notes that al-Ghazālī quotes the maxim that a just ruler 
not adhering to the faith of the community would be preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler.  485
Apparently he read it in Persian in Niẓām al-Mulk’s treatise and was influenced by it. 
Lambton discusses the use of this maxim as part of the Persian notion of justice in al-Ghazālī 
thought.. Al-Ghazālī letter to Sanjar in 1109 recalls the same adage that “one day of justice of 
a just sultan was better than the worship of 60 years”, and alleges that "the person most 
beloved of God is a just sultan and the most despised a tyrannical sultan.  This confirms 486
Lambton’s thesis of the state of affairs during al-Ghazālī’s time: “today affairs have reached 
such lengths that the justice of one hour is equal to the worship of one hundred years.”  But 487
also Ghazālī says, a “hundred years of injustice (ẓulm) are better than a day of chaos.”   488
  A relevant observation in the use of justice by all of these Muslim authors in their 
administrative treatises is to detect the purpose of justice.  Is justice conceived as a key 489
element for the ruler to keep his power, or is justice a virtue of the political regime only for 
the welfare of the community? Even if justice has a theological character and is seen as the 
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“reflection” of God’s attributes within “this-world-polity,” justice can have either a 
conservative or a revolutionary character.  
 What were the possible responses when facing an unjust ruler? As Mikhail says, at 
the time of al-Māwardī the answers ranged from absolute submission to revolution and 
tyrannicide.  Tyrannicide, insurrection and insurgency are not the main purpose of this 490
study. Khaled Abou El Fadl abundantly elaborated on this topic when surveying justice 
discourses.  But since the present research deals with theological discourses on justice and 491
obedience, we will touch upon responses to injustice as a “reflection” of the authors’ concern 
for the principle of justice.   492
 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1356) also tried to link political justice with the sharia:  
God, may he be praised, has made clear in the laws which he revealed that his aim is 
the establishment of justice among his worshipers and the fulfillment of equity by 
men. Any way that leads to justice and equity is part of and not contrary to religion. 
Therefore it may not be said that just siyāsa is incompatible with the stipulation of the 
sharia. On the contrary, just siyāsa is in harmony with the contents of the sharia, an 
integral part of it. Following your idiomatic usage we use the word ‘siyāsa’ which is 
in fact nothing but the justice of God and his messenger.   493!
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Ibn Qayyim outlines in detail the benefits to the Muslim nation of a correct implementation 
of justice and the indisputable efficiency of the philosophy of enjoining good and forbidding 
evil. He establishes the relationship between ḥisba (admonition) and justice, saying that the 
two concepts are inextricably bound because they are founded upon the principle of 
“commanding good, forbidding evil.” 
Ibn Qayyim writes that Islam recognizes that a state builds its power upon justice. As 
a result, ministers in the Islamic state [should] consider their roles as religious duties. He 
elaborates that the qualities that constitute a ‘good’ official include fairness, honesty, 
knowledge and a dedication to the following of Allah and his Messenger. Such persons are 
then deemed to be al-abrār al-ʿadīlīn, (dispensers of justice and righteousness). Conversely, 
those who leans towards ignorance and injustice are considered to be al-ẓālimīn al-muʿatdīn 
(wicked oppressors). The muḥtasib's work is to establish justice between people, the justice 
of Allah.  494
 Another form of establishing justice were the maẓalim courts, which present a more 
concrete notion of justice in the community. In effect, the office for the redress of wrongs 
was meant to restore justice; it enjoyed the highest authority to check irregularities and to 
audit tax collection and expenditure. The institution of the maẓalim courts was also stressed 
by al-Māwardī.  Just as these courts convey the idea of justice as hearing the claims of the 
people, Islamic justice can be seen in the relation between political and religious power. 
Justice is at the heart  of the theory of Abū Hilal al-Ḥasan ibn ʻAbd Allāh ʻAskarī (d. 1005), 
who proposes that the just sovereign must submit to the judgment of the judge or qadī and 
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accept what it imposes on him.  Al-ʿAskarī expounds on a theme of Persian origin and dear 495
to al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 868) in his Kitab al-tāj. According to the Sassanian tradition, the rulers, who 
had the supreme power to judge, also presented themselves before the great pontif and 
submitted to his judgment. In the Islamic early tradition, the ruler of the community had to 
submit to the justice of the ḥakam, an arbiter designated by the litigants. Similarly, the 
selection of al-ḥakam is encouraged under Islamic law and noted in the Quran: 
And if you have reason to fear that a breach might occur between a [married] couple, 
appoint an arbiter from among his people and an arbiter from among her people; if 
they both want to set things aright, God may bring about their reconciliation. Behold, 
God is indeed all-knowing, aware.  496!
The incorporation of this tradition of justice in Abū Hilāl’s Mirror for Princes is quite a 
novelty, having also a political purpose.  Even the Prophet Muhammad, in a conflict with 497
his favorite wife Aisha, submitted himself to the institution of the ḥakam. The rāshidūn 
caliphs also submitted themselves to arbiters for private litigations. Whereas the Umayyades 
are portrayed as impious and unjust rulers, the Abbasides are portrayed as the more 
prestigious and powerful dynasty; their caliphs are torn between the temptation to abuse their 
power and the duty to do what is right. Al-Ma’mūn (d. 833) appears thus as the judge of 
maẓālim, that higher court for the redressing of abuses, presided over by the caliph. Al-
Muhtadī (d. 870) embodies for al-ʿAskarī the model of rulership, given his exemplary 
performance at this institution. Al-ʿAskari’s message is that the humility of the caliph facing 
 #156
Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan ibn ʻAbd Allāh ʻAskarī, Le Livre des Califes qui s'en remirent au jugement d'un 495
cadi, tran. Mathieu Tillier (Le Caire: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 2011), 6-7.
Quran 4:35.496
 ʿAskari, Le Livre des Califes, 7.497
human justice is relevant for the truth of the Islamic faith and its propagation, as well as for 
the harmony and unity of the community. Thus for al-ʿAskari, the ruler’s submission to the 
institution of justice is a requirement for the exercise of justice by the ruler. The judge in al-
ʿAskari’s theory is not presented as a delegate of the caliph but as the “qadi of the 
Muslims.”   498
 Holding bi-weekly audiences in Mamluk Egypt (1249-1517) was also a part of the 
sultans’ propaganda as just rulers.  The historian and legist al-Ṣayrafī (d. 1495), who 499
attended these audiences during the reign of the sultan Qāytbāy (d. 1496), recounts the 
grateful accolade of the plaintiffs: “May God favor our lord the sultan, for he is paramount in 
justice.”  This more concrete and Islamic way to render justice to the Muslim community 500
coexisted with a more philosophical and foreign concept of justice as found in the Middle 
Eastern Circle of Justice. Despite the theoretical character of the Circle, it influenced  the 
way Muslim rulers legitimized their power, leaving little room for political contestation.   
!
Justice in the Middle Eastern Circle of Justice  
 As discussed, the idea of justice can bear different results in the spectrum of political 
attitudes towards power, even when its theological basis is taken into account. It can be the 
basis for sedition, revolution or activism, or it can be invoked to preserve the status quo, 
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what is called the quietistic position.  In a recent publication, Darling affirms that the 501
“Circle of Justice”, from ancient Mesopotamia up to the twentieth century, depicts how 
governments’ justice towards their people produces political power and good administration, 
military strength, and prosperity.  502
 The Circle of Justice is actually a mnemonic, a summarized description of the 
interrelation of Middle Eastern states and their societies, through the empires of the 
Babylonians and Assyrians, the Persians, and the Abbasids, Seljūks and Ottomans.  503
Although not exposed with the forcefulness of a circular set of adagios, the idea of the Circle 
of Justice can also be traced back to Greek thought, particularly in the way the Greeks 
conceived of society as reflecting the celestial order of the universe.  Jennifer London 504
analyzed the image of kingship in the sayings that invoke the ‘circle’, and shows how the 
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ideal king orders social groups to maintain stability and productivity, as he saves the world 
from disorder and binds the political world with the cosmological one.  505
 Darling explores the concept of the Circle of Justice as a study of social justice in the 
Middle East, but we can also trace elements of the Circle of Justice in medieval authors’ 
accounts of justice, particularly in the Islamic tradition, but also in Western traditions. Europe 
knew the Middle Eastern notion of the Circle of Justice through the translation of the advice 
work Secreta Secreturum, The Secrets of Secrets, or Sīr al-Asrār, in the eleventh century.  506
The term “Circle of Justice” comes from the sixteenth-century Ottoman writer Kinalizade, 
who wrote the concepts of the circle as follows: 
No power without troops, 
No troops without money, 
No money without prosperity, 
No prosperity without justice and good administration. !
 The oldest written records of the Circle of Justice go back to the Summerians (2600 
BCE). Persians applied the appealing logic of the Circle to the politics of their empire 
building techniques. Justice in the Sassanian political ideology was a component of the 
ruler’s public image. The “Testament of Ardashir” declares that there was “no way for the 
sovereign to be honored but by the justice of his policy.”  By the time of the Islamic 507
empire, a group of old Persian works was put together by a Zoroastrian, around the ninth 
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century. This text, called Denkard, mentions that a king’s incapacity to provide justice to his 
subjects disqualifies him to rule and is a reason to be overthrown.  But study of how this 508
text influenced Islamic visions of justice by Muslim theologians is pending.  
 Darling also argues that the quranic notion of social justice presents elements of the 
Circle.  As an example, she mentions the arguments against the third caliph ʿ Uthman 509
(644-656) over his incapacity to provide justice to the Muslim community. But we can argue 
that the controversy over his failure to comply with the expectation of justice was not 
necessarily informed by the rigid terms of the Circle. Furthermore, components of the Circle 
of Justice can be seen in any theory of power where a relation of rights and duties is 
established. For example, one finds elements of the Circle at the time of the Umayyads, 
where the titles for rulers included “shepherd of God on earth”, “protector of faith”, and “the 
vice-regent of God, from whom we expect rain.”  Nevertheless, multiple factors are at play 510
in these examples, such as Biblical notions of kingship, and the Near East political economy, 
a land of shepherds, honey and milk. 
 The political culture of the Abbasid regime (750-945) was imbued with the spirit of 
Persian notions of politics, and thus with elements of the Circle of Justice. As a courtier of 
the Abbasids, Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ translated Persian political works into Arabic, including 
“Sayings of Ardashir,” Book of the Crown, Kalila wa Dimna (Indian fables on political 
advice), Letter of Tansar, Testament of Ardashir, and Abū Yūsuf’s (d.798) Book of Taxation 
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(dedicated to the caliph Harun al-Rashid). According to Ibn Qutayba (d. 885) in Kitāb ʿuyūn 
al-akhbār: 
There can be no government without men, 
No men without money, 
No money without prosperity, 
And no prosperity without justice and good government  511!
Justice is then the cohesive element that maintains some kind of social order, although the 
provision of justice was emphasized in order to attain legitimacy in light of the corruption of 
the Umayyads. 
 The anonymous Book of the Crown provides a definition of justice as hearing the 
claim of the people, which contrasts with a more conservative notion of justice as preserving 
the status quo, expressed as “the king giving to each his proper status and to each class its 
due.” These contradictory notions of justice are noted not only by Darling, but also by 
Lambton and Marlow.  Is this contradiction due to the encounter between the more 512
democratic impulse of the Islamic ideal of a community of equals and a more hierarchical 
notion based on the Near Eastern political culture of preserving power? Darling argues that 
this contradiction was part of daily life in a monarchical system.  513
 The Buyid amirs were a continuation of the Abbasid ideas on kingship, with Shiʿite 
impulses that explain the use of titles for rulers such as the “shield and shadow of God on 
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earth.”  The translation of the Secrets of Secrets provided an eight-line statement of the 514
Circle of Justice. In some of its different variations, this statement was even written in a 
circle or octagon: 
The world is a garden/foundation/dynasty/dominion/state 
Sovereignty is lordship, preserved/ sheltered/veiled by law 
Law is administration/guidance/governing/governed by the king/imam 
The king is a shepherd/crown/ mustering the army 
The army are soldiers/helpers fed by money/ property/wealth 
Money is revenue/ food/ livelihood gathered by the people 
The people are servants, subjected/enthralled by justice 
Justice is happiness/ harmony, the establishment/ prosperity/ well-being/ repair of the 
world.  515!
 It is in this period that al-Māwardī acted as a qadī and representative of the caliph to 
the Buyids. Trying to revitalize the institution of the caliphate threatened by the amirs, al-
Māwardī not only experienced the tension between egalitarianism and the hierarchical 
impulse that helps to preserve order and stability, but also emphasized justice at a time during 
which he supposedly opened the “door for political expedience,” as Gibbs claims.   
Darling argues that al-Māwardī’s dependence on the ideas of the Circle of Justice and 
the Near Eastern idea of kingship is quite evident, as in his Mirror for Princes, Tashīl al-
naẓar wa-taʿjīl al-afar fī akhlāq al-malik wa-siyāsat al-mulk, where he enumerates the king’s 
helpers as they care for the flock, army, money, and production.  Although indeed we can 516
find elements of the Circle in al-Māwardī’s thought, his theology does not have its rigidity. 
First, he is not a dogmatic thinker. Second, despite his possible contradictions, al-Māwardī 
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was deeply concerned for the preservation of justice as a principle. More to the point, he 
stresses the preservation of justice to such an extent that the preservation of order seems 
secondary; later on al- Ghazālī will invert the priorities when facing sectarian challenges.  
Al-Māwardī also agrees with the Socratic philosophers that a just polity is possible 
only in a society of just individuals, who should receive education and enjoy a minimum 
level of economic well being.  Furthermore, al-Māwardī embraces a limited social mobility 517
of careers based on talent, definitely a challenge to rigidity, and an idea that goes beyond the 
Circle’s conformist and fatalist view of society:  
It is known that the Persian rulers...forbade their subjects to advance from one rank to 
another higher one. Such an attitude results in preventing many good qualities from 
achieving equitable distribution. It incapacitates noble souls and discourages them, so 
they do not aspire to high rank.  518!
 The political theory of Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 1092) is full of elements of the Circle. For 
him justice rather than religion became the basis for good government, since “Justice is the 
glory of the faith and the power of the government, in it lies the prosperity of nobility and 
commons.”  Justice is also one of the qualities of the ruler, in addition to knowledge. 519
Justice, in Niẓām al-Mulk's opinion, was of equal or even greater importance than right 
religion. "Kingship", he states, "remains with unbelief but not with injustice." When a king 
was just, the time would be good. In support of this view he quotes a tradition of the Prophet 
to the effect that "justice is the glory of the world and the power of the sultan [i.e. the 
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temporal government], and in it lies the well-being of the common people (‘amma) and the 
elite, the army and the subjects.” He is also concerned with oppression, stating that, “A 
kingdom will last while there is irreligion, but it will not endure when there is oppression.” 
Niẓām al-Mulk followed the Sassanian model of a just ruler as found in Anushirvan, and he 
linked justice and kingship by following the doctrine of the ‘mean.’  It is quite evident that 520
Niẓām is stressing a limited notion of justice; he is concerned first with the preservation of 
power.  
 Despite justice’s many definitions, studies on the Circle of Justice focus on justice as 
the maintenance of a social balance, the provision of whatever was necessary to maintain 
taxpayers’ productivity and their ability and willingness to support the state.  Darling 521
acknowledges that the comparison of the Circle’s definition with other concepts of justice is 
outside her book’s scope. This is the concern of the present chapter. As seen when the terms 
for justice in medieval authors were surveyed, the idea of justice as conveyed by the Circle is 
incomplete. In effect, the theology of Christianity and Islam incorporated other dimensions of 
justice with more egalitarian elements that also collided with the more hierarchical-static 
spirit of the Circle.  There are also other meanings of justice that convey the same notion of 
hierarchy, as Izutsu notes. In effect, qist rendered as justice entails a “full measure and full 
weight”, which is extended to the heavenly balance or the ‘just’ balance of the universe.  522
 #164
 Lambton, Justice in Medieval Persian, 91-111.520
 Ibid, 5.521
 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts, 210.522
Also, a theological view of hierarchy is found in justice based upon religious merit, which 
Turki argues perfectly reflects the strongly hierarchical Islamic society of the Middle Ages.  523
 As we have shown in the case of Christian authors, Greek philosophy affected the 
definition of what justice meant in Christian polities, incorporating elements of the Circle. 
The notion of the ‘just mean’ and epikeya provided a conformist tone in Christian theologians 
and philosophers. In effect, justice was seen as the maintenance of the “just 
middle” (maintenance of order), and injustice as its transgression. Again, through the 
concepts of the Circle of Justice and its concern for a just financial administration of the 
state, the tension between preservation of order-power, and the theological imperative for the 
earthly community to reflect divine justice is made more acute.  
 Concerned with social balance, the Circle of Justice apparently describes a condition 
of “exploitation” in which the wealth of the subjects supported the military and the 
government. In doing so the Circle functions as a hegemonic idea to preserve the present 
order of things; any possibility of social mobility, or capacity for contesting power is 
eliminated. However, as Darling argues, this exploitation was not absolute, and the ruler had 
obligations to meet to his subjects. Moreover, it could be inverted and used to legitimize 
resistance on the basis of injustice. This was done mainly through petitioning, where the 
weak ask for justice and can appeal directly to the king in order to complain about their lords, 
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the king’s officials, and the king himself. Unfortunately, there are no examples of these 
procedures to allow us to see the Circle operating as an instrument to contest power. But 
perhaps we can find this capacity for the concept of justice through the theological principle 
of commanding good and forbidding evil. 
!
Enjoining the Right, Forbidding the Wrong as Part of Islamic Political Justice  
 As we have seen, prior scholarship’s treatment of justice in Christian and Islamic 
political literature has revolved around Greek and Persian influences, mostly centered on 
notions of order, harmony and the search of stability, especially as exemplified by the Circle 
of Justice. The discussion now focuses on what we initially called the theological imperative 
of the religious notion of justice understood as righteousness. In fact, as we have seen in the 
case of Ibn Qayyim and his treatment of ḥisba and justice, these two terms are founded upon 
the theological principle of “commanding good and forbidding the wrong ” (al-amr biʾl-
maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-munkar). Maʿrūf and munkar are rendered in the Quran as: “Those, 
who, when we establish them in the land, establish the prayer, pay the zakāh, enjoin good and 
forbid evil.”  Al-amr biʾl-maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-munkar is one of the Mu’tazilite 524
principles par excellence, but we can also find a parallel discussion in Aquinas’ scholastic 
exposition of law and justice in his Summa, where the tension between philosophical and 
theological interpretations of justice as a moral or religious virtue is prominent.  525
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 How do we now understand maʿrūf and munkar theologically? They are always part 
of a compound structure, where one term, particularly maʿrūf, defines the other. Izutsu 
provides the quranic context, explaining that maʿruf is often understood as “what is 
acknowledged and approved by divine law.”  These terms have an origin beyond Islamic 526
law and refer to the older tribal type of morality. The literal meaning as ‘known’ refers to 
what is familiar and thus approved, in contraposition to the foreign and unfamiliar. In quranic 
terms, maʿrūf seems to refer to what is due, or ‘in due form’. Munkar is inseparable from 
maʿrūf and they both stand for a very general idea of religious good and evil.   527
 How do we link maʿrūf and munkar with justice as righteousness? Michael Cook 
provides an example that shows how embedded righteousness as maʿrūf was at all levels of 
the Muslim community: A goldsmith from Marw (in Khurāsan), known for his devotion to 
commanding good and for his piety, consulted with the great Abu Hanifa (d. 767) regarding 
how to respond to an unjust ruler, and specifically to the policies of the Abbasid caliph Abu 
Muslim (d. 755). As the stories go, the goldsmith suggested that Abu Hanifa lead a rebellion 
and overthrow the caliph. The scholar declined on the grounds of prudence, suggesting that 
such an effort was likely to fail and in this way bring about more harm than good. The 
goldsmith persisted, however; our story ends when he confronted Abu Muslim personally, 
saying “I see nothing more meritorious I can undertake on God’s behalf than to wage holy 
war against you. Since I lack the strength to do it with my hand, I will do it with my tongue. 
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But God will see me, and in him I hate you.” Not surprisingly, Abu Muslim had the 
goldsmith killed.  528
 Muslim sources are replete with stories of such determined souls, who prefer to risk 
their lives rather than to compromise their sense of obligation.  As Cook explains it, “an 529
executive power of God is vested in each and every Muslim. Under this conception the 
individual believer as such has not only the right, but also the duty, to issue orders pursuant 
to God’s law, and to do what he can to see that they are obeyed.”   530
Abu Hanifa’s prudence indicates another parallel concern in medieval Islamic 
political thought, a fear shared with Christianity, and one that lies in the other extreme of 
absolute justice. This is fear of unrest, sedition, chaos, fitna, and any kind of action capable 
of breaking the harmony and order reflected from the celestial-heavenly order. 
 Kelsay offers a story to illustrate another case of a serious commitment to 
commanding good. The caliph is accused of supporting corruption in the army. The Muslim 
who accuses him appears “shrouded and perfumed,” as prepared for burial, showing no fear 
in what he considers his duty. It seems that the ruler al-Maʾmun had a convincing response 
for every allegation advanced. So then the caliph challenges the man, asking how he would 
handle a particular case, that of a young couple talking amorously with one another in an 
isolated setting, distant from major centers of population: 
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The Zealot: I would ask them who they were. 
The Caliph: You’d ask the man, and he’d tell you she was his wife. And you’d ask the 
woman, and she’d say he was her husband. So what would you do with them? 
The Zealot: I’d separate them and imprison them. 
The Caliph: Till when? 
The Zealot: Till I asked about them. 
The Caliph: And whom would you ask? 
The Zealot: [First] I’d ask where they were from. 
The Caliph: Fine. You’ve asked the man where he’s from, and he says he’s from 
Asfijab [n.b.: a far away place]. The woman too says she’s from Asfijab-- that they 
are cousins, they got married, and came here. Well, are you going to keep them in 
prison on the basis of your vile suspicion and false imaginings until your messenger 
comes back from Asfijab? Say the messenger dies, or they die before he gets back? 
The Zealot: I would ask here in your camp. 
The Caliph: What if you could find one or two people from Asfijab in my camp, and 
they told you they did not know them? Is that what you’ve put on your shroud for? !
Kelsay concludes that this fascinating story shows that one should possess knowledge as well 
as zeal. As we will see in the case of Christian authors, committing to commanding good and 
forbidding evil also entails the discussion of the conditions by which proper and improper 
instances of commanding can be distinguished.  In the same line, when the jurist Ibn 531
Ḥazam (d. 1063) was asked about the possibility of insurgence against an unjust imam as part 
of the duty of forbidding what is wrong, he agreed that all Muslims must order what it is 
good and forbid what is wrong (al-amr biʾl-maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar), but he differed 
from other jurists in the way to apply this command.  532
 There are multiple traditions that refer to the Prophet saying, “The finest form of holy 
war is speaking out in the presence of an unjust ruler and getting killed for it.”  By ma‘rūf 533
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is meant what is desirable in the Sharia, not in intellect and custom.  The Qur’ān and the 534
Sunnah are the main criteria for judging ma‘rūf from munkar.  
 There are multiple Muslim traditions that emphasize the need for the ruler to avoid 
munkar, as well as for rulers to be obeyed only as long as they command ma‘rūf. Here we 
will examine only a few, to see how other sources treat justice in the theological principle of 
al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar. We will return to use the eloquence of Muslim 
traditions in the next chapter, when obedience is explored. 
According to a hadith, Ali said, 
The Prophet, peace and blessings of God be on him, said 
"Obedience is due only in that which is good.” !
 According to another hadith (Bukhari 64: 60), when Khālid, who was appointed 
commander of a small force, ordered certain prisoners of war to be put to death, Ibn ʿUmar 
and others refused to kill as the order was against the clear teachings of the Qur'ān; the 
Prophet approved of their action. So an order should be disobeyed when it is against the clear 
precepts of the law.  Also Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849) has recorded in his Musannaf, a 535
narrative on the authority of ‘Ibādah: [The Prophet said], “Soon you will be ruled by rulers 
who will command you to do ma‘rūf while they themselves will indulge in committing 
munkar. You are not obliged to follow such rulers.”  The letter of ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar to 536
one of the caliphs of his time reads: 
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In the name of God, the compassionate the merciful. ‘Abd al-Mālik, chief of the 
believers! Peace be upon you! I express my thanks to God, besides whom there is no 
God. I vow to listen to and obey your commands to the best of my ability as long as 
you follow the path of God and the Messenger.  537!
 As shown, Muslim traditions follow the ethical and the political discussion of justice, 
this time translated in the theological principle of “commanding good and forbidding evil.” 
As seen in Christianity, Islam bears traditions when justice can enforce order, and traditions 
which open the doors to contest it. But most importantly is to notice that, when justice is 
understood as righteousness, the limits of authority are set. In the next chapter we will try to 
show how the theological imperative of obedience as expected for medieval political 
organizations was contested by a parallel impulse to stress the justice of the ruler as a 
condition to such obedience. Thus, we will explore how the duty of obeying “those in 
authority" still leaves room to other options for the Christian and the Muslim believer 
striving for righteousness. 
!
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Chapter Four  
Theological and Political Obedience 
!
!!
 This chapter on obedience has a specular character in that it mirrors what we have 
said on the theologico-political concept of justice. In effect, for Christianity and Islam, both 
justice and obedience are considered elements of a political relationship informed by their 
theologies. Therefore, the divine command of justice has a dual nature as it is seen as a gift 
and as a demand.  For those medieval authors concerned with the notion of justice and its 538
connection to righteousness, justice and obedience were seen as two interconnected rights.  539
In fact, when addressing these concepts as political elements of the community (mainly in 
theological treatises and in works of advice), the relation between the rulers and the ruled 
A ruler who oppresses the poor is like a 
driving rain that leaves no crops. 
Salomon in Proverbs 28:3.
When the king degrades and oppresses, 
We will not accept humiliation.  
The sixth-century poet ʿAmr bin 
Kulthoum.
Let everyone be subject to the 
governing authorities, for there is no 
authority except that which God has 
established. The authorities that exist 
have been established by God. 
Consequently, whoever rebels against 
the authority is rebelling against what 
God has instituted, and those who do 
so will bring judgment on themselves. 
Romans 13:2.
O you who have attained to faith! Pay 
heed unto God, and pay heed unto the 
Apostle and unto those from among 
you who have been entrusted with 
authority; and if you are at variance 
over any matter, refer it unto God and 
the Apostle, if you [truly] believe in 
God and the Last Day. This is the best 
[for you], and best in the end.  
Quran 4:59
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reflects a relation between the concepts of justice and obedience: obedience is understood as 
the right of the ruler to be obeyed, a right that depends upon the right of the ruled to be 
governed with justice. 
 A psycholinguistic approach to Muslim ethics makes evident the correlation between 
concepts when applied to politics. As Arkoun notes, the disciplines practiced under the name 
of religious sciences in Islam are a semantic expansion of opposite correlatives that express 
the religious conduct in the Qur’an, such as obedience versus rebellion (ṭāʿa vs fitna) or 
authority versus power (amr, qadā’ vs sulta, hukuma).  In the spectrum of political values 540
representing stances in relation to one another, we tend to think in terms of a linear 
continuum or axis with justice on one end and injustice on the other. The same is expected in 
the relation of obedience and rebellion, both placed on the extreme of the axis: 
                Justice   ----------------------- Injustice of governments 
     Obedience  ------------------  Rebellion as a possible attitude of the governed  
Thus, the axiological antithesis is between justice and injustice, and obedience and 
rebellion.   541
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best” (khayr al-umūr awṣaṭu-ha).
 But in Christian and Islamic political theology, these political-religious relationships 
also include an axis representing obedience on one extreme and justice on the other, as terms 
of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. This opposition is grounded in similar 
religious principles in both Christianity and Islam. What is significant is that in Christian and 
Islamic theologies, rebellion is also represented as a form of injustice, and obedience as the 
expected attitude of the ruled in a just order of the polity. The “political goods” for the 
Christian and Muslim communities are obedience and justice representing the political 
relationship between rulers and ruled.  
  This chapter will explore the spectrum of religious and political attitudes of 
obedience to rulers. In particular, we will identify several attitudes that are present in both 
religious traditions, including: 
1. The imperative of obeying the ruler because God imposes an evil ruler as a punishment to 
the community. 
2. The need to obey the ruler, even if he commits injustice, and leave to God his due 
punishment. 
3. The refusal to obey an unjust ruler and the option to “escape” that polity through exile or 
martyrdom. 
4. The exhortation of the ruler to return to the right path or, ultimately, his removal. 
  It is important to note that this study identifies the option of removing the ruler, and 
not the mechanism to attain this goal (we are aware that the notion of removing the ruler is 
rarely found in medieval thinkers, and it is a difficult process even in modern times). We are 
mainly concerned with the possibilities of contesting power as a way to contest the prevailing 
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static theories of power and authority in Christianity and Islam. As such this chapter will 
delve on obedience and on contested obedience. 
!!
The Theological Tension-Anxiety-Inconsistency-Anguish in  
Commanding Political Obedience !
 Both Christian and Islamic scholarship on medieval political thought emphasizes the 
concern with order and stability. The commended political attitudes were those of patience 
and obedience to rulers, which were contrasted with the evils of sedition. The teaching of the 
Church insisted upon obedience to civil power most of the time as part of a negative 
anthropology, which saw the Fall as the cause of political authority. Man belongs to the two 
orders: that of nature and that of grace. As a member of the order of nature, he looks to the 
rule and authority of the temporal sovereign, whose function and duty is to provide him with 
the means necessary for the consecution of his natural end, and ultimately, his salvation. But 
obedience was based upon religion, and for that reason could not be absolute. Even 
Augustine, regardless of his emphasis on obedience to secular rulers, acknowledges that the 
Christian church has grown because of the pia libertas, the pious independence of martyrs 
who refused to obey. Despite the common notion that Augustine saw politics as static and 
authoritarian, his principles allow for the possibilities of political contestation. In effect, 
beyond the distinction between the two cities or two orders, civil society should also be an 
efficient instrument to promote citizens to the heavenly city. This means that changing 
society in the direction of justice is a possibility and that total acquiescence to authority is not 
a principle, but an attitude of conditional prudence. Those who do a closer reading of 
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Augustine’s principles are right: resignation to the perpetuation of civil wrong is an 
impossible ethical luxury.  Preceding Augustine, as will be seen, there is a tradition of 542
church fathers who note the tension between the need to obey authority and the possibilities 
of contesting power. 
 The circumstances prevailing in the Islamic world were such that Islam appreciated 
order and commended obedience. This had two consequences: first, it led the theorists in 
general to emphasize the need for the ruler's power to be effective and the jurists, in 
particular, to justify obedience to an unjust ruler.  Fakhr ad-Din Razī (d. 1209) among many 543
other Muslim theologians, accepts this view and regards the rule of an unrighteous ruler as 
preferable to the rule of a virtuous ruler, if the interests of peace so demand it. The 
maintenance of stability and the status quo became one of the primary concerns of political 
thinkers.  The discussion also led to the question of obedience to the ruler versus the duty 544
of disobedience to the unjust ruler.  Particularly when, as we will see, the duty to contest 545
power is also seen as part of the theological principle of forbidding wrong and enjoining evil 
(al-amr biʾl-maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar). 
 The tension between justice and obedience lies in the very metaphor of the 
“reflection,” or “mirroring” of the heavenly order. If obeying the earthly authority reflects the 
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obedience due to God, the justice of the rulers should also reflect God’s justice. We will 
compare Christian and Islamic reflections on this “reflection” in the coming sections. This 
study is particularly needed since we have not found a previous systematic study of the 
opposite attitudes towards power (obedience versus disobedience or revolting against unjust 
ruling) in both traditions. The main commonality in Christian and Islamic political theology 
is that obedience is not only a political, but also a religious duty. For that very reason, the 
Muslim and Christian reflection on the duty of obedience found its own limits: obedience is 
not absolute and it is linked to other religious duties: first, obedience to God, and second, the 
religious obligation to promote a righteous (just) society that will help believers to eventually 
attain salvation. 
 Despite the emphasis that Islamic scholarship has put on the medieval Islamic need to 
assure order, stability and security, modern scholars of Islam have simply noted that the 
tensions exist, without fully exploring the inconsistencies. The first is the case of Al-Azmeh 
who affirms that, ultimately, the inconsistency between the absolute duty of obedience to the 
ruler and to God is never resolved. The theoretical disobedience to the ruler is theoretically 
suggested, but with ambiguity.  Muslim jurists and theologians were functioning according 546
to the historical absolutist imperative.  Mikhail notes the tension between the ideal and the 547
real. He affirms that accepting injustice as a punishment (to the people), or leaving the due 
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punishment (of the unjust ruler) only to God in the last day does not agree with the plea for 
justice by the oppressed.  The author continues to state that:  548
The tension between the ideal of Muslim government based on justice not only as a 
political but as a theological principle and the reality of Muslim polities is also 
illustrated in the tradition when the Prophet Muhammad is asked: “O Prophet of God, 
if rulers come to power over us who demand what is their due and withhold that 
which is our due, what would command us?” The Prophet turns his back to the 
questioner. The question is posed again. The Prophet again evades it. But the 
questioner persists and asked for a third time. Even then the Prophet has to be pulled 
by his shoulder by one of his companions before he gives his reluctant answer 
demanding obedience.  549!
Lambton links justice and obedience, affirming that the existence of the unjust ruler raises the 
question of the duty of disobedience. The tension becomes more evident when Muslim 
authors of works of advice addressed justice evoking an ideal past. The question of injustice 
arose for Sunni jurists clarifying whether or not the imām acted contrary to the shariaa or 
not. But Lambton makes it clear that there was no way to remove an unjust imām from 
power. Thus, the contradiction was set by the eighth century in these terms: although ʾadala 
was a quality required for the imām, the obligation to obey the imām was not limited to a just 
imām.  Lambton concludes that later writers reach the same conclusion that rebellion 550
against an unjust ruler is not justified. 
 El Fadl says that there was a propensity to stress order, given the nature of law and 
the preponderance of the jurists. But he notes that at the same time, discourses on the 
possibility to disobey unjust rule existed, even to the point that he who can be considered a 
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rebel was the ruler himself and not he who contested his power.  The negotiation between 551
the need for order and the need for justice is explored by El Fadl only in the genre of juristic 
discourses. While resolving the conflicts of the Muslim polity, jurists insisted on the idea that 
disorder was worse than injustice. Obeying the ruler was part of obeying God. El Fadl argues 
that they created “legal fictions,” as one sees in al-Māwardī. Under certain conditions, al-
Māwardī recognizes the legitimacy of a usurper if he pledges allegiance to the caliph. By 
doing so, he is creating a legal fiction. But the possible inconsistencies in legal discourses 
can be explained by the jurists' legal training, and the technicalities of their discourses. As we 
have stated before, the tension between the need for order and the need for a just order 
remains. Or, reformulating the issue on the part of those ruled: we find a tension between the 
need to obey and the need to object to unjust ruling by contesting power. 
 As we have argued before, there is then a certain degree of pessimism in those who 
deal with Islamic political thought, regarding the possibilities of contesting power. For 
instance, Gibb’s view is well-known: he insists that al-Māwardī opened the door for political 
expediency over legal order. Gibb also argues that Muslim political theory became an after-
the-fact rationalization of actual historical practices, ignoring the moral imperatives and 
focusing only on power.  Enayat agrees with Gibb: “acknowledging the necessity of strong 552
government is one thing; justifying tyranny in the name of religion is another. The price of 
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medieval flexibility was to sanctify the latter position, which soon became the ruling political 
doctrine among the majority of Muslims of all sects.”  El Fadl disagrees, saying that this 553
view of the history of Islamic political thought is not entirely convincing to him. But he does 
not further explore the topic, since it is not the purpose of his study on the right of rebellion 
in Islamic jurisprudence. 
 Lastly, Lewis notes that although Muslim jurists accepted with reluctance the 
necessity of obedience to the ruler, there were also limits, as part of an old tradition of 
“activism” that confronts passive attitudes toward government.  As Lewis states, “It was 554
not easy for the jurist to accept this doctrine of submission to tyranny, and the terms in which 
they express their acceptance often indicate great anguish.”  As we will see later, Lewis 555
quotes Ibn Baṭṭa and al-Ghazālī who express their reluctance to state the necessity of obeying 
an unjust imām.  
 So, the question of whether one can live a moral life in an unjust society, as Christian 
and Muslim authors might have expressed it, remains unexplored. 
!
Traditions on Obedience !
 In the first centuries of Christianity, from the persecutions to the advent of a Christian 
empire, Christians were reminded of their duty to be submissive and obedient to rulers. Paul 
exhorts Titus to remind the people to be subject to rulers and authorities, to be obedient, and 
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to be ready to do whatever is good.  Christians considered the emperor as elected and 556
established by God, following Paul who saw emperors as God’s ministers for the common 
good.  In effect, Paul considered the emperor as a human institution, but of divine origin.  557 558
In the well-known passage of Romans, chapter 13, he affirms, 
Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except 
that which God has established. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is 
rebelling against who he God himself has instituted, and those who do so will bring 
judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for 
those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then 
do what is right and you will be commended. For the one in authority is God’s servant 
for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no 
reason. They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the 
wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of 
possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience.  559!
This Pauline notion of obedience has to do with his conception of law linked with justice, as 
found in the Old Testament. Justice was defined by obedience to God’s laws; thus, the core of 
injustice is disobedience to the law.  The problem here seems to us to revolve around the 560
assimilation of God’s law to the positive law of the empire, as future Christian authors will 
notice. Nevertheless, and despite Jesus’ contestation of the powers and the establishment of 
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his time, Paul’s attitude of political and religious prudence towards the emperor was 
preponderant among the church fathers in the fourth century.  561
 To understand these attitudes, we must consider how pagan ritual and practices 
influenced ideas on the emperor’s authority. A parallelism is found between the contemporary 
Christian and imperial-cult language. Both Christ and the emperor were referred to as theos, 
kyrios, basileus, and soter, since Christians in the West called Christ Imperator.  In the 562
fourth century, the parallel between Christ and the emperor reached its highest point in 
literary and artistic expressions. For example, Theophilus of Antioch (d. 185) considered that 
the authority of the emperor possessed the sanction of God, and for that reason Christians 
were bound to obey the emperor.  Nevertheless, contestation of these practices and 563
limitation of the emperor’s authority had its exponents, as we will see in the case of Polycarp 
of Smyrna (d. 155), a martyr who refused to call the emperor his lord, since that would 
blaspheme the true Emperor (basileus) in heaven.  
 Praying for the emperor and imperial authorities was another striking Christian 
attitude taken from pagan rituals, which also go in the direction of compliance with authority. 
In his correspondence with Timothy, Paul affirms: “I urge, then, first of all, that petitions, 
prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for all people. For kings and all those in 
authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness.”  In the 564
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fourth century, Optatus, bishop of Milevis in Numidia, exhorted Christians to pray for the 
emperor even if he is a pagan.  This mirrors the Muslim attitude, “He who has pledged 565
allegiance to a leader (imām), giving him his hand and the fruit of his heart, shall obey 
him.”   566
 Despite his dispute with the emperor Theodosius the Great, Ambrose (d. 397) says 
that Christians owe obedience to the emperor, since this authority has been ordained by God. 
Therefore, no one must take it upon himself to nullify the command of the earthly sovereign 
(constitutio regis terreni).  In his work on the king David (dedicated to Theodosius), 567
Ambrose declares that a kingdom should not be seized from the Lord’s anointed, even if it be 
due; he to whom the kingdom is due should wait until the time that it shall be delivered to 
him.  568
 Like Ambrose, Augustine subscribes to the view that all power has been ordained by 
God. Even having bad rulers does not compromise God's justice: God "gives the earthly city 
to both believers and unbelievers alike. According to his will which can never be unjust."  569
In book XIV of the City of God, Augustine affirms:  
Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the earthly by love of self 
extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love of God extending to 
contempt of self. . . .The one seeks glory from men, the other in the Lord. . . . In the 
 #183
 Setton, Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor, 55.565
 Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Berkeley: University of 566
California Press, 1961), 76.
 Setton, Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor, 139.567
 Ibid, 140.568
 Augustine, The City of God, Books I–VII, The Fathers of the Church, Volume 8 (New York, Cima, 569
1947), 291. 
earthly city, princes are as much mastered by the lust of mastery as the nations which 
they subdue are by them; in the heavenly, all serve one another in charity, rulers by 
their counsel and subject by their obedience. 
  
Disobedience for Augustine entails the disruption of a given order. Thus, disobedience to the 
word of God is the primal injustice (iniustitia) since it violates God’s order.  The 570
subversion of the divine social order results in the establishment of new terms for a just 
social order, based on measured calculation or shared utility (utilitas communis), and 
according to the classic definition of justice as “giving to each his due.” Augustine says that 
this classical definition of justice is a deformation of the purer justice found in the New 
Testament.   571
 Nevertheless, Augustine commends obedience to the incomplete order because at 
least it establishes some degree of order and harmony that allows the system to exist. In book 
XIX, chapter 12 of the City of God, Augustine deals with the tension between true justice and 
the relative benefits of obedience in an unjust order:  
He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is well-ordered to what 
is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not worthy to be called peace in 
comparison with the peace of the just. And yet even what is perverted must of 
necessity be in harmony with, and in dependence on, and in some part of the order of 
things, for otherwise it would have no existence at all.  572!
The anguish of Augustine is more manifest in chapter 13:  
And hence, though the miserables, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy 
peace, but are severed from that tranquility of order in which there is no disturbance, 
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nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their 
very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, 
but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. And though they are disquieted, 
their circumstances are notwithstanding adjusted to them, and consequently they have 
some tranquility of order, and therefore some peace. But they are wretched because, 
although not wholly miserable, they are not in that place where any mixture of misery 
is impossible. They would, however, be more wretched if they had not that peace 
which arises from being in harmony with the natural order of things. When they 
suffer, their peace is in so far disturbed; but their peace continues in so far as they do 
not suffer, and in so far as their nature continues to exist.  573
  
The “tranquility of order” is indeed presented as a common good, though only temporally 
until real justice is installed in the City of God. 
 Similarly, Aquinas links obedience with justice: “Just as in virtue of the divinely 
established order the lower natural thing need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so 
too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to 
obey their superiors.”  In this sense obedience is a virtue and disobedience a sin. Thus, 574
obedience and disobedience seem to be the two poles of an axiological continuum. Also for 
Aquinas the essence of civil authority is order and not mere coercive power as in the case of 
Augustine, given the natural tendency of man.  As we have seen before, order is linked with 575
justice and thus, “the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors. Otherwise, 
the stability of human affairs could not be preserved.”   576
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 In Islam there was also a tendency to stress order given the nature of law and the 
consensus of the jurists.  Also both Christianity and Islam considered the preservation of 577
order as a theological and political value for their concrete medieval polities. A good 
reflection on the notion of order and the importance that it had in medieval Islamic and 
Christian theories is proposed by Watson in his book The Nature of Law: “First, what effect 
will disobedience have upon order? Second, if order will be affected by disobedience, is 
order in this particular instance a good thing, or does it have such moral or social worth that 
its preservation outweighs the harm committed by the immoral act?”  This question seems 578
to be present in Muslim and Christian thinkers during their reflections. The reasons may be 
subsumed in two plausible theories: first, as the major trend in scholarship argues, obedience 
to the current order was stressed because of the convulsive times that these authors were 
witnessing and their fear for the possible harm of sedition; second, leaving history aside, the 
preference for order may be explained by the influence of classic (Greek) thinking that the 
order of the city reflects the divine order. 
 Islamic traditions stressing the duty of obedience go back as early as the seventh 
century, but they became more popular around the ninth century.  A comparison is due 579
regarding the popularity of the maxims or traditions stressing obedience vis-á-vis the maxims 
preferring a just infidel (kāfir) to an unjust Muslim ruler, also popular around the tenth 
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century.  Sadan argues that these maxims stressing justice rather than obeying unjust ruling 580
were popular in literature, up to the twelfth century where the maxim was even attributed to 
the Prophet.  A good point in these counterpoints between traditions on obedience and 581
justice is El-Fadl’s observation that traditions are raw material and that they were 
reconstructed according to the historical needs, as we will see later on in the case of the 
Umayyads making obedience a religious duty when facing the multiple rebellions.  582
Strikingly, traditions were also used to create discourses contesting obedience, as we will 
further see.  
 One of the oldest hadith reports goes back to the Prophet’s companion Abū Dharr (d.
653), who was sleeping at the mosque of Medina when the Prophet woke him up, and said,  
‘Why do I see you asleep here?’ Abū Dharr said: “Oh Prophet, I was overcome by 
sleep.” The Prophet asked: “What would you do if you were forced out of it [the 
mosque of Medina]?” Abū Dharr said: “I would accept the holy blessed land of 
Shām.” The Prophet then inquired: “What would you do if you were forced out of it?” 
Abū Dharr then puzzled: “What should I do? Should I take my sword and go out 
striking with it?” The Prophet said: “Shall I tell you what is better and nearer to piety? 
[The Prophet repeated the phrase twice] You listen and obey, and go whichever way 
they lead you.”   583!
As we can see here, although stressing obedience, the report conveys the idea that there is 
some reluctance in obeying when the reason to do it does not bear some sort of 
righteousness. The same idea of reluctant obedience is conveyed in the report where the 
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Prophet was asked what should be done if a ruler in power demands from the Muslim 
community what is his due and withholds that which is due to the community. The Prophet 
refused twice to answer, and only the third time he reluctantly said: “obey.”   584
 Multiple other traditions were “constructed” in a way to assure that obedience is a 
common good for Muslim society. A very common hadith stressing obedience, although with 
different variants, is the report where the Prophet Muhammad commanded, “listen and obey 
even if a black man is appointed as a ruler over you.”  Or "hear and obey though a black 585
man  whose head is like a raisin is appointed [to rule over you]."  Obedience is then a 586
paramount value for the incipient community. The Prophet himself appears to exhort 
believers and show them the relevance of obeying:  
A man said: apostle of God! It seems as if it were a farewell exhortation, so what 
injunction do you give us? He then said: I enjoin you to fear God, and to hear and 
obey even if it be an Abyssinian slave, for those of you who live after me will see 
great disagreement. You must then follow my sunnah and that of the rightly-guided 
caliphs. Hold to it and stick fast to it. Avoid novelties, for every novelty is an 
innovation, and every innovation is an error.  587!
Obedience to authority was also stressed in the sayings of the Prophet to the point that 
obedience to the imām was linked to obedience to God through the figure of the Prophet:  
The Prophet added, ‘He who obeys me, obeys God, and he who disobeys me, 
disobeys God. He who obeys the chief, obeys me, and he who disobeys the chief, 
disobeys me. The imām is like a shelter for whose safety the Muslims should fight 
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and where they should seek protection. If the imām orders people with righteousness 
and rules justly, then he will be rewarded for that, and if he does the opposite, he will 
be responsible for that.  588
  
Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) cites a variant of this tradition: “If the imam is just, the reward is due to 
him and gratitude from you. If he is tyrannical, then the burden of sin is his, and it is yours to 
be patient.”  Aquinas mirrors this tradition: “When the ruler acts with equity, he will get his 589
reward, and you should be grateful; if he is a tyrant, upon him are his sins and you have to 
submit.”  It is then clear that the community has no responsibility for the injustice of the 590
ruler and it is left to God to punish and remove him.  
 An unjust ruler seems to be accepted even if he commits injustice. Ummi Salamah 
narrates,  
The messenger of God said: ‘Soon there will be rulers who, you will find, will have 
some virtues and vices. Whoever treated the vice as vice will have his excuse with 
God, whoever objected to it will be safe. However, the one who followed such vices 
will be ruined.’ The companions asked: ‘Are not we obliged to fight such rulers?’ The 
Prophet said: ‘No, as long as they persist in the prayer.’  591!
 Obedience is commanded not only for the sake of the community, but also for the 
reasons of personal salvation. Abū Dharr narrates that the Prophet said: “The one who 
separates himself from the collectivity an inch indeed takes off the yoke of Islam from his 
neck.”  As obedience to the ruler was part of obeying God’s prophet and ultimately, God 592
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himself, disobedience to the ruler entails separation from God’s community and ultimately, 
dying in the state of ignorance or jahiliyya. Ibn ‘Abbās narrates that the Prophet said: 
“Whoever finds something detestable with his rulers, he should observe patience. For 
whoever detaches himself from the state system an inch and dies in this state, indeed dies a 
death of the age of ignorance.”  In addition: “Whoever dies while he is free of allegiance to 593
the rulers, dies a death of the age of ignorance.”  Lastly, obedience together with the 594
practice of right religion is the key to paradise: “Offer your five obligatory prayers, observe 
the fast of your month, pay the zakāh on your assets and obey your rulers, you will enter the 
paradise of your Lord.”   595
  One more time we can pose the question on the authenticity of these traditions on 
obedience. Nevertheless, they clearly show a general belief that considered security, order, 
and the need of authority a primordial religious and political value, to the point that even 
injustice did not compromise the nature of the Muslim community. Yet, as we will see 
further, other traditions emphasize that the injustice of the civic order in fact compromises 
salvation.  
 Having these traditions as a background, medieval authors, particularly theologians, 
jurists and those involved in the disciplines of adab, gave not only a religious, but also a 
philosophical twist to the duty of obedience. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib (d. 750) was one of the 
authors writing for the office of dīwān al-rasāʾil, the State Chancery, which is reported to 
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have existed as early as the reign of the first Umayyad caliph.  His letter number 17, On 596
Obedience, shows how the Umayyads founded their political power on a religious 
foundation. In effect, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd makes obedience to the caliph a religious requirement, 
establishing a comparison between caliphate and prophethood.  Playing with opposites, the 597
author connects obedience with God and disobedience with the devil. Obedience as a 
religious and political value occupies the place of justice itself, being the criterion or niẓām 
for the community and having a cosmic dimension:  
God has made obedience the basic order (niẓām) of the religion he chose for himself. 
He prescribed for those whom he honored of his creatures, and he was satisfied with 
the delivery of his revelation from his angels, and the communication of his messages 
from his prophets to his servants, its backbone (qiwām), and its bond (ʿiṣma).   598!
As a counterpoint between obedience and disobedience ʿ Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib calls the 
people of obedience awliyā Allāh, ḥ izb Allāh, ahl al-ḥaqq, ahl al-ṭāʿa, whereas the people 
who disobey are called ahl al-ḍalāla, ahl al-bidʿa, awliyā al-shayṭān.  The cycle of 599
disobedience is portrayed as follows:  
The devil begins by [prompting people to] discredit the people in charge (al-ṭaʿn ʿalā 
l-wulāt), then he stretches further into [arousing] their complaint, discontent and 
anger [at them] (thumma yatańmā ilā l-shakhāti waʾl-sakhṭati wa l-ghaḍab), and after 
that he embellishes fighting [the people in charge] for them, thereby making them 
reach the greatest destruction and the biggest evil possible.  600!
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Gradual disobedience to the rulers is linked with the worst of evil, civil discord, and 
ultimately fitna. It is worthwhile quoting how the author portrays the ruin of the Muslim 
community due to the evil of disobedience:  
With disobedience and dissension, blood continues to be spilled unjustly; a child from 
among the sons of the Muslims is orphaned of his father; prosperity is abandoned, 
desolation occurs; rancors cling to the hearts, feuds emerge; vengeances are 
sustained; enmity abides in the souls, fears ascends, a road is intercepted; a woman is 
widowed; a girl is orphaned; thriving lands are laid waste; numbers are decreased, 
catastrophes are prevalent and all-embracing; an enemy rejoices; a hypocrite raises 
his head to what he has contemplated; an enemy of the polytheists is filled with 
aspiration; he has become powerful after having been weak, and honorable after 
having been lowly: a citizenry is lost; an announcer of death howls; a close friend 
kills his intimate friend; love turns into enmity; and the convergence of bents turns 
into dispersion.   601!
Philosophical reasons for obedience are provided by al-Jāhiz, who made use of Persian 
political traditions. In the Book of the Crown (ascribed to him), he asserts:  
A number of reasons led us to write this book of ours, among which is that, when the 
Almighty favored kings with his grace, and endowed them with his sovereignty, and 
supported them in the lands and afforded them sway over the people, he imposed on 
the learned the duty of dignifying and revering them, supporting and praising them. 
He also imposed the duty of OBEYING, fearing them and submitting to them . . .. 
Another reason is that the felicity of the commons lies in their revering and obeying 
their kings. Ardashir ibn Babek said: ‘The felicity of subjects lies in their obedience 
to their kings. . . . Kings are the foundation, the subjects the structure. . . . What has 
no foundation will fall.’   602!
But as we will see later in the traditions of counter-obedience, al-Jāhiz also argues for the 
possibility of contesting and criticizing power. 
 So, there was an extended agreement on not only the necessity of authority through 
the figure of the imām, but also the need of obedience to him. For example, as expressed by 
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the second caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab: “There is no Islam with no community, and there is 
no community with no ruler, and there is no ruler with no obedience.”  Ibn al-Khaldūn, 603
writing on the necessity of the caliphate, stated the necessity of an “obeyed imām.”  And al-604
Ghazālī affirmed that “[there is] no system of religion without secular order, and the latter 
cannot be accomplished without an imām who commands obedience.” However, al-Ghazālī 
attempted to justify his emphasis on obedience; in his book al-Iqtiṣād fiʾl-iʻtiqād, he 
affirmed:  
The concessions which we hereby make are not voluntary, but necessity may render 
lawful even that which is forbidden. We know that it is forbidden to eat carrion, but it 
would be worse to die of hunger. If anyone does not consent to this, and holds the 
opinion that the imamate is dead in our time, because the necessary qualifications are 
lacking, and he persists in this opinion but he is not able to replace the imamate, not 
having at hand anyone who posses the necessary qualifications, then we would ask 
him: Which is the better part, to declare that the qadis are revoked, that all 
authorizations are invalid, that marriages cannot be legally contracted, that all acts of 
government everywhere are null and void, and thus to allow that the entire population 
is living in sin –or is better to recognize that the imamate exists in fact, and therefore 
the transactions and administrative actions are invalid, given the actual circumstances 
and the necessities of these times?  605
   
As we will see in the chapter devoted to the maxims on obedience and justice, these 
arguments stressing obedience were summarized in the aphorism “tyranny is better than 
anarchy,” present in the hadith traditions.  Religious justifications for obedience were 606
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constructed in both Christian and Islamic traditions, much of the time by referencing the 
same theological arguments. 
!
Rulers As a Punishment !
A possible explanation to justify obedience is that God sent bad rulers to punish the 
community. The apologist Irenaeus (d. 202) affirmed that men can attain some degree of 
justice under the restraint of human law. For that reason God imposed upon them the fear of 
government. Rulers thus have been established by God for their benefits, but sometimes they 
are an instrument of divine punishment. The emperor rules by the authority of God and thus 
he should be obeyed.  607
 Augustine considers bad rulers more a test than a punishment. In Book IV of the City 
of God Augustine affirms that:  
The dominion of bad men is hurtful chiefly to themselves who rule, for they destroy 
their own souls by greater license in wickedness; while those who are put under them 
in service are not hurt except by their own iniquity. For to the just all the evils 
imposed on them by unjust rulers are not the punishment of crime, but the test of 
virtue. Therefore the good man, although he is a slave, is free; but the bad man, even 
if he reigns, is a slave, and that not of one man, but, what is far more grievous, of as 
many masters as he has vices; of which vices when the divine Scripture treats, it says, 
‘For of whom any man is overcome, to the same he is also the bond-slave.’  608!
 Isidore of Seville (d. 636) affirmed: “to good and faithful people were given a just 
and righteous prince, but a tyrant was God's punishment to a sinful people.”  While people 609
 #194
 Setton, Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor, 25.607
 2 Peter, 2:19.608
 Harry Randall Dosher, “The Concept of the Ideal Prince in French Political Thought,609
800-1760” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1969), 53. 
could resist unchristian decrees and commandments of an unjust prince, they had to endure 
the affliction of tyranny.  
 In his Sentences, Peter Lombard (d. 1160) affirms that the power for evil comes from 
God: “Through me kings reign, and through me rulers possess the earth.”  And as it is 610
found in the Book of Job: “He makes the hypocrite to reign on account of the sins of the 
people.”  Lombard affirms that rulers are punishment for the sinful nature of the people of 611
Israel since God said “I will give them a king on my anger.”  Commenting on the second 612
book of Lombard’s The Sentences, Bonaventure (d. 1274) makes first clear that the power of 
ruling is in man only with regard to the state of fallen nature, for it exists for him as a 
punishment for sin and not as a natural institution: “Civil power can be natural [institution] to 
men according to the inferior creatures, but not in respect to other men. It was introduced in 
punishment for sin, as Ambrose said, ‘servitude was introduced through the sin of 
drunkenness.’”  And he agrees with Augustine regarding the infirmity of human nature: 613
“Because of the propensity towards evil . . . they are in need of leadership for an earthly 
king.”   614
 Divine providence and man’s sin was Aquinas’ explanation for a wicked ruler. 
Obedience is then the only possible political and religious attitude towards injustice. 
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Aquinas’ pessimism considers, nevertheless, only one possible escape: being delivered from 
tyranny by the recourse of God:  
To secure this benefit from God, the people must desist from sin, for it is by divine 
permission that wicked men received power to rule as a punishment for sin, as the Lord 
says by the Prophet Osee: “I will give thee a king in my wrath,” and it is said in Job that 
“he maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people.” Sin must 
therefore be done away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease.  615!
Considering the possibility of slaying the tyrant, Aquinas recalls that this attitude was preset 
in multiple examples in the Old Testament, but “this is not in accord with apostolic teaching. 
For Peter admonishes us to be reverently subject to our masters, not only to the good and 
gentle but also the forward: “For if one who suffers unjustly bears his trouble for 
conscience’s sake, this is grace.’”  616
 Nevertheless Aquinas identifies two instances when Christians and not bound to obey 
secular princes. The first one is when the command is contrary to obedience to a higher 
authority, and when the subject is not subordinated to the authority who issues the command. 
When can this actually happen? In the case of a usurper or tyrant. Still, in his Summa contra 
gentiles Aquinas recommends endurance since the rule of an usurper is not excluded by 
divine providence.  And also in his Summa theologiae Aquinas affirms that tyrannical law, 617
even if it is considered a perversion of law, partakes in the essence of law. So what are the 
Christian attitudes when facing tyranny? Aquinas recommends that one bear it with patience. 
And again, showing some notes of anxiety or tension between the need of obedience and the 
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need of justice in the earthly polity Aquinas affirms that if the ruler does not carry kinship 
with responsibility, in the end it is the subject’s problem.  Is then Aquinas leaving the 618
possibility of revolting against unjust open to the believer’s conscience? As we will see 
further, Aquinas will invoke the example of Christian martyrs to such an effect.   
 Sins affect then the quality of the ruler and thus operate also as a punishment for the 
community. Quran 2:258 not only provides the archetype of the just ruler, but also conveys 
the idea that guidance is not given to wicked people:  
Are you not aware of that [king] who argued with Abraham about his Sustainer, 
[simply] because God had granted him kingship? Lo! Abraham said: "My Sustainer is 
he who grants life and deals death." [The king] replied: "I [too] grant life and deal 
death!" Said Abraham: "Verily, God causes the sun to rise in the east; cause it, then, to 
rise in the west!" Thereupon he who was bent on denying the truth remained 
dumbfounded: for God does not guide people who [deliberately] do wrong [unjust].  619
  
 The topic of the ruler as punishment is also addressed by the Ḥanafī judge Abū Yūsuf 
(d. 798) who explains that unjust rulers must be accepted because God in his wisdom 
intended them as a punishment: “For they are only a punishment that God inflicts on 
whomsoever he wills. Do not receive the punishment of God with anger and indignation, but 
receive it with humility and resignation.”  In his Kitāb al-Kharāj, Abū Yūsuf cites the 620
following tradition:  
Ismāʾil b. Ibrāhīm b. Muhājir-W.aʾil b. Abī Bakr: I heard al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī saying that 
the Prophet said: Do not curse your rulers. For if they rule justly they will rewarded 
and you should be thankful. However, if they misbehave the responsibility and sin will 
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be only theirs and you should be patient. Rulers are a scourge through whom God 
punishes those he decides to punish. So do not meet God’s scourge with hot temper 
and anger but with humility and submission.   621!
Among many traditions, Abū Yūsuf includes a tradition attributed to the Prophet that 
commands that one should obey every ruler and pray behind him without distinction.  622
 Muhammad ibn Walid al-Ṭurṭūshī (Spain, 1123), called Ibn al-Rundakah, and in 
Spanish Abubéquer De Tortosa, says that the unjust ruler was the punishment sent by God to 
the people for their disobedience and had to be endured since there was not a way for him to 
be removed by force. In chapter VII of his Lámpara de los Príncipes, or Sirāj al-mulūk, al-
Ṭurtūshī affirms that authority is a proof of God’s existence, as a consequence of his negative 
anthropology.  And he continues, “If we can put in a scale how much weighs tyranny over 623
people for a year, we can see that an hour of revolts weighs more than the tyranny of a sultan 
for a year.”  Expounding on the possible reasons for the wickedness of the ruler, Ṭurṭūshī 624
says: “When the affairs that depend on the sultan go well for you, praise and thanks God for 
that; but if conversely, you are suffering tribulations due to the iniquity of the sultan, find a 
explanation of your own sins, since you deserved it.”  Similar to the previously cited 625
passage of the Quran, which mentions that no guidance is given to wicked people or rulers, 
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Ṭurṭūshī cites Quran 6:129: “And in this manner do we cause evildoers to seduce one another 
by means of their [evil] doings.” Then he adds: “according to your deeds you will be 
ruled!”  Later on Ṭurtūshī also suggests that the suffering caused by tyrannical ruling may 626
also be part of God’s providence, as Aquinas affirms, and that there is not much to do but to 
pray for deliverance: “Servant of God! Do not curse against who makes you a victim of 
tyranny, but trust God.”  Later, however, the little expectations upon the good character of 627
human nature makes Ṭurtūshī cite another tradition stressing the punishment of evil people:  
ʿAli was asked: “How is it, Prince of the Believers, that when Abu Bakr and ʿOmar 
were caliphs all subjects paid obedience to them, and, however limited were their 
resources, they were multiplied; and then when you and ʿ Uthman became caliphs, 
people do not obey you and no matter how abundant are your resources they become 
scarce?” “Well,” answered ʿAlī, “because the subjects of Abu Bakr and ʿUmar were 
like me and ʿUthman, and the subjects I have now are like you and others like you.”  628!
The Fear of Fitna 
 In Islam obedience was also commended in contraposition to the consequences of 
civil strife in the Muslim community caused by fitna. The use of the world fitna carries a 
negative connotation, since it evokes a bitter recollection of the struggle in the community 
after the death of the Prophet. The conflict was never fully resolved, so its memory left Sunni 
Muslims with the idea that best stance is not to get involved, since contesting authority has 
always involved some kind of strife, disorder, and chaos. From the thirteenth century on, 
theological works declared that between injustice and rebellion, Muslims must chose the 
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lesser evil, injustice. Mikhail explains this theological trend because of a different balance in 
the movements within Islam: first, the rapid growth of Sufism, second, Twelver Shiʿism, and 
third, Sunni traditionalists; the commonality is that all of them tended towards quietism.   629
 Another possible explanation for a passive political attitude is provided by Gibb, who 
affirms that the threat posed by the Khawariji (literally “those who wen out”, assuming a 
radical position in early Islam), and their fanatic political posture forced the jurists to 
condemn rebellion against an unjust imām.  But besides the fear of sedition in early Islam, 630
it is also true that the concept of fitna has been blocking contemporary efforts to redress 
political and social inequities. Sunnis in particular have resisted reform efforts that would 
include conflict, a dilemma Sivan has called the ‘trauma’ of Sunni political theory.  631
 Abdulkader Tayoob discusses how fitna represents a key term in the perceptual-
symbolic system of Islamic culture. Fitna maps a conservative religious approach to political 
or social issues.  The political reserve that resulted from the fear of fitna has led Muslim 632
political theorists to legally prohibit all forms of revolutionary reform in the form of hadiths 
of the Prophet to declare that government may not be displaced except on clear evidence of 
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disbelief (kufr bawwah).  This political reserve was also expressed in theological tracts and 633
creeds, as in Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali b. Isma’il al-Ashʿari’s al-Ibana ‘an usul al-diyana (The 
Elucidation of Islam’s Foundation): “And we regard that it is an error on anybody’s part to 
approve ‘going out’ against them when they have clearly abandoned rectitude; and we 
believe in abstinence from ‘going out’ against them with a sword, and abstinence from 
fighting in civil commotions (fitna).”  The expression “going out” is analyzed by Lewis 634
when addressing the earliest movement or rebellion against the existing order, the Khawārij, 
“those who go out.” Their movement of rebelling was expressed as horizontal and outward, 
not vertical or inward.   635
 These spatial metaphors work also with the social and political use of the terms 
jamaʿa, “to gather or join,” which is considered good, and faraq, “to separate or divide,” 
which is condemned as a form of disunity. Again, we can argue that spatial categories serve 
to show the tension between theological and political values. We must note that whereas in 
the West, the tension usually appears as a linear continuum, in Islam the values in question 
are arranged in a center-periphery relationship. As we commented at the beginning of this 
chapter, a possible chain of equivalencies with terms like activism-justice-revolution-radical-
going out versus quietist-obedience-order-authoritarian may work as the two poles of a 
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continuum in Christianity, or as moving outwardly from a pivotal center where mainly order 
and obedience to this order are the exalted political virtues of the Muslim city. In our case of 
discussing how obedience or justice are stressed, it all depends on how the different authors 
paired them with the practice of right religion. In fact, in his analysis of al-Ṭabarī, Tayoob 
notes that he established a clear juxtaposition between fitna and dīn.  For al-Ṭabarī, dīn is 636
‘worship and obedience’ (‘ibada wa ta’a), and fitna is diametrically opposite. There is then 
an association between fitna and shirk (idolatry). This association between din and ta’a, 
religion and obedience, is similar to the one undertaken by Māwardī in his Tashīl al-naẓar, 
although the main contention is the relationship between ‘aql (reason) and dīn (religion). 
 Despite this trend in Islamic political thought that used fitna as a way to limit any 
attempt to revolt against the established order, there are other possible meanings for fitna that 
could have been used as key theological concepts to contest unjust authority. In Ibn Manzur’s 
Arabic lexicon, fitna is the “act of placing metal in the fire in order to purify it,” as appears in 
Quran 20:41: “but we did save thee from all grief, although we tried thee with various trials.” 
Also: “We purified thee with a [thorough or an effectual] purifying [like that of gold, or 
silver, by means of fire].”  637
Fitna as a noun is also the “melting of gold and of silver in order to separate, or 
distinguish, the bad from the good.”  Analyzing al-Ṭabarī’s exegesis of Qur’an 10:85, 638
Tayob finds that fitna for the believers can be a testing ground for their moral excellence, as 
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fitna appears as feared tyranny. Thus, the etymology of fitna also stresses the sense of 
‘test’ (ikhtibār), trial (ibtilā’), and sometimes as ‘purification’ (tanhīs). We must examine the 
exegesis in different authors to see how the negative judgment of fitna as anarchy, disorder 
and chaos leads to the failure of human morality. But the etymological meaning of fitna leads 
us to think that the test of fitna is unavoidable, even necessary, for the moral value of the 
individual and the community.  In this study we argue that the same etymological and 639
exegetical analysis takes place for the concept of justice and obedience in Islamic and 
Christian political and theological treatises. 
 Al-Jāhiz (d. 869) criticizes those who claimed that cursing unjust rulers regardless of 
their injustice entails fitnah. In his al-Risāla fīʾl-Nābitah, he explains: “This group (nābatah) 
said not to curse rulers (as in the case of the Umayyad caliph Muʿāwiya) because he is 
among the companions, and to curse him would be considered as bidʿa, and he who detest 
him is outside the Sunna.”  Then al-Jāḥiz poses the question, “and they consider [to be part] 640
of the Sunna he who commits shirk or negate the Sunna!?”  And later on he continues:  641
The fāsiq or he who commits sin is the abominable and he who refrains from cursing 
the abominable. . . . And the Nābatah considered bidaʿh to curse the evil ruler and 
consider it fithanh, and to curse the tyrant bidaʿh, . . . and they fear rulers, and they do 
not care about the community . . . and the most misguided is he who desists cursing 
them [rulers].  642!
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 Nevertheless, we can argue that the pessimistic tone of the notion of fitna seems to 
prevail, mainly in hadith literature, discouraging the possibility of acting against injustice. 
The fear of civil strife was also associated with the propensity of Muslims to fight over 
leadership.  In Bukhārī’s Kitāb al-fitan, Ibn ʿUmar said that he heard the Prophet say: “I do 643
not know anything greater in deceit than one who pays allegiance to a man in the name of 
God and his Messenger and then starts a war against him. Whoever among you who deserts 
[the leader] nor pays allegiance in this matter, will find a separation between me and him.”  644
Fitna as civil disruption is associated in the ḥadith with unjust rule and the last hour (ashrāt). 
The progressive states of injustice are linked to increasing instances of fitna among the 
community of Muslims.  In conclusion, the overall use of fitna calls on citizens to 645
acquiesce to the political situation; the other possibilities are fleeing society or even death. 
Injustice must be hated, but there are no options to change this situation.  
!
Contested Obedience 
 Since government is for Aquinas a natural institution, he connects the duty of 
obedience to power to the source of authority. In his sentential commentary he affirms:  
Obedience looks to the obligation of observing in the command which is served. 
However the duty is caused by the order of a sovereignty which possesses 
constraining force (temporally and spiritually). Insofar as the sovereignty comes from 
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God the Christian is required to obey such people, but not insofar as a sovereignty 
which is not from God.  646!
Also in his commentary on Lombard’s second book of The Sentences, Aquinas says there is 
no obligation to obey if sovereignty does not come from God: “There are two ways of 
considering sovereignty: first, as the mode of acquiring sovereignty, or as the abuse of 
sovereignty. So in the second case he who usurps civic power through violence does not truly 
become a sovereign or master.”  In his commentary of Lombard, Aquinas goes as far as to 647
say that if the opportunity offers itself,  
anyone can cast off that civil power. . . . There can be an abuse of sovereignty in two 
ways: first, what is commanded by a sovereign is contrary to what for which the 
sovereignty is established, as if it commands an act of sin contrary to virtue. In that 
case, one is not only no required to obey, one is even required not to obey as the holy 
martyrs suffered death rather than obeying the impious commands of the absolute 
rulers.   648!
 Also from the University of Paris, Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) considered that harmony 
between ruler and subject may break. Even though obedience is commended as a virtue, 
obedience is also conditional upon the superior capacity of securing the good good for the 
community, the communis utilitas.  Disobedience can be justified only when the command 649
is contrary to God, divine law or natural law. But then he also adds “or the common good.”   650
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 In Islam, there are certain conditions on the duty of obedience. To obey the ruler is a 
requirement of being a citizen of the Muslim community, but conditions are also present and 
they operate as a link to the parallel tradition on contested obedience. Ubādah ibn Sāmit said,  
The Prophet invited us so we swore allegiance to him; and among the conditions 
which he laid down on us to follow was this that he had a promise from us to hear and 
obey, whether we liked or disliked [an order], and whether we were in adversity or 
ease, even if our rights were not granted; and that we should not dispute the authority 
of those entrusted with it, unless you see [an act of] open disbelief in which you have a 
clear argument from God.   651!
From “open disbelief” as a ground to hold the duty to obey, we move into an “act of 
disobedience to God”:  !
The Prophet said, "It is obligatory for one to listen to and obey [the ruler's orders] 
unless these orders involve one’s disobedience [to God]; but if an act of disobedience 
[to God] is imposed, he should not listen to or obey it."   652!
Furthermore, allegiance to the ruler or bayʿa is conditional to just ruling according to God’s 
law. This was the case of al-Kindī denying the oath of allegiance to Muʿāwiya. Al-Kindī 
promised to give allegiance to Muʿāwiya on the condition that he complied with the Quran 
and the Sunna of the Prophet (ʿalā kitāb ā llāh ʿ azza wa-jalla wa-sunnat rasūl Allāh). 
Muʿāwiya did not accept the conditions (lā sharṭ laka). Al-Kindī replied he would not give 
allegiance (wa-anta lā bayʿat laka).  However, what are the options when the believer takes 653
the risk of not obeying due to the injustice of the ruler? 
!
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Escaping-Exiling-Martyrdom  
 Escaping or exiling were two possible options for those in disagreement not only with 
the ruler, but also with the burden of injustice impose by him upon the religious community. 
The Christian classic traditions were struggling with the Platonic tension. Although Plato’s 
view of justice is absent from the social and political world, he affirmed that those who lack 
justice will not attain excellence in virtue and not be able to understand this incapacity 
correctly. Unjust polities, whether plutocratic oligarchies, democracies, or tyrannies came to 
ruin because of their injustice, particularly the injustice of their rulers. For that reason justice 
and virtue still are needed in the social and political order.  As we will see, despite the 654
panegyrics and prayers suggested by the preeminent figures of the Christian church for the 
figure of the emperor, Christians leaders were aware of the tension between the respect due 
to God’s authority, and the respect due to God’s justice. As Setton presents it, when the 
bishops Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 341), Lucifer of Calaris (d. 371), and others addressed the 
emperor Constantius and accused him of confusing temporal and spiritual authority, they 
were threatened, and they withdrew into proud and righteous exile.  Furthermore, when 655
fiercely correcting the emperor, Lucifer of Cagliari complained that Constantius was denying 
him the glory of martyrdom.   656
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 One of the most significant cases was the Martyrum sancti Polyarpi, the martyrdom 
of Saint Polycarp (d. 155), the Christian bishop of Smyrna. At 86 years old he was 
summoned by the consul of the city to swear upon Caesar’s fortune:  
“Swear, retract yourself and proclaim: down with the impious!” Polycarp, after 
looking at the people and pagans gathered, raised his hands and eyes to heavens 
exclaiming “Down the impious!” The proconsul said: “Swear and I will absolve you, 
curse the Christ.” Polycarp responded, “After eighty-six years I have been under his 
service, and he was never unjust to me; how then could I curse the King to him I give 
my oath?” The consul goes further on his pressure on Polycarp and says, “Swear for 
Caesar’s fortune.” The bishop responds, “If you are looking for vain glory by making 
me swear upon Caesar’s fortune, as you say, you have the arrogance of ignoring who 
I am. I will make you understand in public: I am Christian. If you want to learn the 
Christians’ doctrine listen to me for one day.” The proconsul added, “Then persuade 
the people.” Polycarp responded, “I have considered you subject to receive an 
explanation, as we have been instructed to bear witness, and to give due honor to 
princes and the authorities established by God, if they do not harm our souls. As for 
the pagans here I do not consider them subject of further explanation.” The proconsul 
threatened him with beasts and fire. Polycarp responded “You threatened me with 
fire? Do you ignore the eternal punishment for the impious? But what we are waiting 
for? Pronounce the verdict you consider.”  657!
 A “mirror” story in Islam is the one of the goldsmith from Marw (in Khurāsan). 
Convinced of his duty of enjoining what is good and, knowing he will be killed for that, the 
goldsmith confronted the caliph personally, saying, “I see nothing more meritorious I can 
undertake on God’s behalf than to wage holy war against you. Since I lack the strength to do 
it with my hand, I will do it with my tongue. But God will see me, and in him I hate you.”  658
This story shows how the counter-tradition on obedience was present at all levels in the 
Muslim community. What the goldsmith argues actualizes the tradition of the Prophet 
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Muhammad who says: “Whosoever sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand; and 
if he is not able to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his 
heart. And this is the weakest of faith.”  The story of the goldsmith also shows that 659
contesting the duty of obedience is a form of the duty of jihad as al-Tirmidhī expresses it: 
“The best form of jihad (just struggle) is a word of truth spoken before an unjust ruler 
(‘innamā min ‘a’zami al-jihādi kalimatu ‘adlin ‘inda sulṭānin jā’ir).”  660
 Augustine affirmed that one must submit to political authorities out of love. 
Nevertheless, Christians cannot get involved in injustices since this could even compromise 
their spiritual salvation. How then can they resist? Only by martyrdom: “Whether the 
authority approves your good deeds or persecutes you, ‘You will have praise of him’, either 
when you win it by your allegiance to God, or when you earn the crown of martyrdom by 
persecution.”  Augustine is not then advocating political withdrawal or acquiescence to 661
injustice, but affirming the merit and the ability of martyrdom to reform politics: “by 
confessing, embracing, and proclaiming their faith, and for its sake to enduring all things 
with faith and fortitude, and by dying with godly assurance, they shamed the laws by which it 
was forbidden, and caused them to be changed.”  In his Sermon on the Feast of a Martyr, 662
Augustine confirms this conviction on the power of martyrdom: “Give me a lover of 
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goodness, in the words of the apostle Peter, ‘And who will be able to harm you if you are 
lovers of goodness?’”    663
 In Islam Al-Hasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728) was assertive regarding what should be done 
when facing oppression: “The best of my nation’s martyrs is a man who confronted an 
oppressive ruler, ordered him to do good, enjoined him against wrongdoing, and was killed 
for this reason. He is indeed a true martyr, and his place in heaven is between Hamza and 
Jaʿfar [uncles of the Prophet who were killed in the cause of religion.”  Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 664
756), presented a more pessimistic and hierarchical view of society where unqualified people 
had no say. Thus, the only possibility when facing an unjust ruler was death or flight:  
if you have the misfortune to be associated with a ruler who does not desire the well-
being of his flock you are faced with two choices that are equally bad. Either you side 
with the ruler against the flock, which would be the ruin of religion. Or you side with 
the flock against the ruler, which will be the ruin of the world. You have no way out 
except death or flight.    665!
 Al-Fārābī in the tenth century, like Augustine in the fourth century, was skeptical 
about the possibilities of attaining a just and a virtuous city. He thought that he who can 
judge the justice of the ruler, when facing injustice has only two options: death or flight. He 
wrote: “a virtuous man is prohibited from staying in an iniquitous polity and is obligated to 
migrate to virtuous polities, if these polities actually exist at his time. But if they are not 
existent, the virtuous man would be a stranger in the world, his life abominable, and death 
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better for him than life.”  Aquinas stood in the Platonic tradition in the West that criticized 666
societies while projecting an alternative view of justice in the form of republics, kingdoms or 
heavenly cities.  But Aquinas also stood with the Christian tradition of world renunciation 667
and tended to talk about the person as a micro-cosmos or micro-polis. Since the kingdom of 
God was not yet present, temporal participation was only possible though the interior 
communication of the spirit. Man’s outwardly life was then relegated to Caesar.  Was this a 668
way of exiling from the unjust polities of his time? As we will see in the case of Aquinas, as 
well as in other Christian and Muslim thinkers, there are theological reasons that do not allow 
the believer and the community of believers to remain impassive and not condemn injustice. 
In the case of the Old Testament, as in the early history of Islam, failure to be critical of he 
who leads the community would raise serious questions about the credibility of the most 
honored figures in both traditions.  
!
Enjoining the Right, Forbidding the Wrong As Part of Islamic Contested Obedience 
 This section is specular to the one devoted to political justice understood as part of 
the Islamic theological principle of “commanding good and forbidding the wrong” (al-ʿamr 
biʾl-ma’rūf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-munkar). In effect, contesting obedience by not obeying unjust 
rulers and their policies is also part of the same theological duty. Thus, again justice and 
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obedience are linked, by being part of theological and political relationship, being expressed 
as a tension between two poles of a continuum, or of a center-periphery spectrum of values. 
 The Muʿtazilite position was that ideally an unjust ruler must be removed as part of 
the principle of commanding good and forbidding evil. Ibn Haẓm, a contemporary of al-
Māwardī, affirmed in his al-Fiṣal fīʾl-milal wa al-niḥal that besides the Kharajites, certain 
segments of Sunni Muslims were even considering the use of force to remove an unjust 
ruler.  Different hadith traditions state that the ruler should not be obeyed if he commands 669
sin (lā ṭaʿata fi maʿsiya), or that he should be obeyed only insofar as he commands what is 
good and just (‘innama al-ta’tu fi al-ma’rūf).  We consider these traditions more than 670
relevant first, in that they linked obedience to the duty of commanding good, and second, in 
that they seem to be aware that obedience to unjust ruling can affect the life of the 
community as a whole. As narrated by Abū Dāʿūd, on the authority of ʿ Abd Allāh ibn 
Masʿūd: “Nay, by God, you must enjoin right and forbid wrong, and you must stay the hand 
of the wrongdoer, bend him to conformity with justice (al-ḥaqq) and force him to do justice, 
or else God will set the hearts of you all against one another.”   671
 Augustine also considered that obedience to unjust rule may lead Christian believers 
to be involved in the injustice of society and, ultimately, jeopardized their relationship with 
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God.  Although Augustine commends the virtue of forbearance, he also believed that our 672
capacity to discern the right and the good, allows us to act in political life with a different 
logic of that of the general principles. Though perfect righteousness cannot be attained given 
the nature of the orders of love, some sort of political virtue leads members of the community 
to a rather “inferior righteousness” (iustitia minor). This iustitia is not perfect, but is still 
justice because it rejects sin and is based on the love of God.  The key question for the 673
Christian as well as the Muslim believer is the same: can a moral life be conducted amidst an 
unjust society? 
 In Islam the believer can also argue that moral inability is a reason not to obey: “No 
obedience (ṭāʾa) is due in sinful matters: behold, obedience is due only in the way of 
righteousness [fiʾl-maʿrūf].”  Other traditions go in same direction of making clear when 674
obedience is an expected attitude for the Muslim believer, and on what basis refusing to obey 
those in authority is also allowed:  
Alī narrates that once the Prophet sent a battalion of soldiers on some military 
expedition and appointed an Ansārī Muslim over them. He commanded the soldiers to 
obey their commander. People disobeyed him in some issue. [This enraged him]. He 
commanded them to gather wood. People collected some wood. Then he commanded 
them to light a fire. People then put the wood on fire. Then the commander asked 
them whether the Prophet had not commanded them to obey him. All chorused that he 
had, indeed. Then he commanded them to jump into the fire. The people were 
confounded, gazing at each other. They exclaimed, “We have escaped nothing but the 
fire when we clung to the Prophet. [How can now we jump into it?] They remained in 
this state of uncertainly for a while till he recomposed himself and the fire was out. 
The soldiers narrated the whole incident to the Prophet when they returned. The 
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Prophet explained to them that if they had jumped into the fire, they would never 
have been able to get out of it. He further explained that the rulers may not be obeyed 
when what they command involves disobeying God. This obligation only pertains to 
the ma’rūf.  675!
 Tabarānī (d. 970) has reported the following prophetic tradition on the authority of 
‘Ibādah: “You will find rulers after me who will declare things as ma‘rūf which you think are 
munkar. They will consider things you believe to be ma‘rūf as munkar. [So beware] none 
who disobeys God should be followed.”  676
 Still the tension between the duty to obey and the right to resist injustice remains as a 
constant in Christian and Islamic thought. In the case of Islam the tension was attempted to 
be resolved by making the jurists the final arbiters, as in the case of Ibn Qayyim, who 
insisted upon obedience to rulers if they command what is good and just (maʿrūf):  
Properly speaking, the rulers (al-ʾumarāʾ) are obeyed to the extent that their 
commands are consistent with the [articulations] of the religious sciences (al-ʿilm). 
Hence, the duty to obey the rulers derives from the duty to obey the jurists. 
Obedience is due only to what is good (maʿrūf), and what is required by the religious 
sciences. Since the duty to obey the jurists is derived from the duty to obey the 
Prophet, then the duty to obey the rulers is derived from the duty to obey the jurists. 
Furthermore, since Islam is protected and upheld by the rulers and the jurists alike, 
this means that the laity must follow [and obey] these two [i.e. the rulers and the 
jurists].  677!
But Ibn Qayim does not say specify how an eventual tension between a ruler and a jurist 
would be resolved. In other words, the tension between injustice and refusal to obey and 
submit to it persists.  
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No Obedience to Injustice...Up to Rebellion? 
 Although so far the traditions on obedience and disobedience seem to follow a 
parallel trajectory, they are both present in Christian and Islamic reflection on authority, and 
on the relation between the ruler and his community. And despite the multiple efforts to stress 
obedience in times when order was a paramount political good, the consequences of unjust 
rule were present in the rumination of Christian and Muslim authors. Reflecting Patristic 
thought, Irenaeus (d. circa 202) affirmed that rulers should be aware of the justice in their 
laws, since “God will not interrogate them about the just and how they conformed to the law, 
but all what they have done against justice will become for them in cause of perdition.”  In 678
Islam al-Tirmidhī also recorded:  
The one most favored by God on the Day of Resurrection, and the nearest to him, is the 
just ruler. The one most hateful to him, and the farthest from him, is the unjust ruler. . . . 
The Prophet said: “Three people will not have their supplications rejected: a fasting 
person until he breaks his fast, a just ruler, and an oppressed person."   679!
Here Tirmidhī does not link justice to obedience, but justice and oppression are the two 
concepts at odds. 
 Although this study does not focus on the right to revolt against unjust rule, it will 
detect that, even authors who support and stress the duty of obedience were also considering, 
at least theoretically, the possibility of contesting authority and even rebellion. For Tertullian 
(d. 225), Christians consider the emperor as elected and established by God, following Paul 
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who saw emperors as God’s ministers for the common good. But he also held that unjust 
laws are void: “Legis injustae honor nulllus.”  Augustine, despite the sinful nature of man 680
and the consequences of the Fall, affirmed that civilization is susceptible to moral 
improvement. This can happen by the force of the Christian example (as we have seen in the 
case of Christian martyrdom), or by the innate impulses towards the principles of natural law. 
There is then moral permission to intend to reform or even attempt revolting against an 
unjust system, or at least permission not to give perfect acceptance to the status quo.  A 681
young Augustine, before becoming a bishop, defended the right to revolt to correct civil 
injustice.  Augustine was keenly aware of the precarious nature of human authority and the 682
need of justice, as reflected in the passage where the pirate addressed Alexander the Great on 
the nature of his power: “But what are kingdoms without justice but gangs? . . . What 
differentiates Alexander from a pirate?”   683
 Despite the fact that it seems that martyrdom is the only way to affect political rule, 
Augustine saw other forms of rebellion.  In the City of God he says: “For, as far as this life 684
of mortals is concerned, which is spent and ended in a few days, what does it matter under 
 #216
 Arquillière, L'augustinisme politique, 100.680
 Burnell, “The Problem of Service,” 181.681
 Ibid, 182.682
 Augustine, City of God, Book 4, Chapter 4: “Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms 683
but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made 
up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the 
booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to 
such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it 
assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on 
it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity.”
 Von Heyking, Augustine and Politics as Longing, 110.684
whose government a dying man lives, if they who govern do not force him to impiety and 
iniquity?”  The argument is that this passage lays the grounds for resistance against unjust 685
rulers.  Augustine thus justified rebellion when the tyrant is destroying the political and 686
social life of the community. What are the conditions for rebellion? First, resistance should 
be a general attitude and second, “evidence of the ever-present divine aid,” a case of God 
intervening in the life of the community as it was the case of Israel in Egypt.  687
 Furthermore, Aquinas, despite his emphasis on the notion of political order as derived 
from the divine order and the order reflected in the universe, evaluates a situation of injustice 
as unsustainable according to Christian and even contractual principles:  
To provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust 
that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, 
becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such 
multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously 
subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the 
covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did 
not act faithfully as the office of a king demands.  688!
Also in his commentary on Lombard’s second book of The Sentences, Aquinas affirms that 
those who attain authority through violence are not true rulers, and even goes to the point of 
considering Cicero’s justification of the killing of Julius Caesar, because like an absolute 
ruler he had usurped the right of the empire: “Marcos Tullius Cicero speaks to the case when 
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someone usurps civil power through violence. . . . For then he who kills the absolute ruler for 
the liberation of the country is praised and obtain reward.”  689
 Also from the University of Paris, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines  (d. 
1309) affirmed that commands that go against the common good should not longer be 
obeyed. Which were the mechanisms to disobey and revolt against such unjust commands? 
Henry of Ghent insists that the bad statute should be obeyed as long as the superior is 
tolerated in office. But if correcting the ruler does not work, actions should be taken by 
removing the bad ruler. There should be clear evidence of a bad statute to set deposition in 
motion as it was in the case of Aquinas to set the mechanism of private denunciation of 
superiors.  690
 Godfrey of Fontaines, as Aquinas and Ghent, also followed Aristotle in considering 
that the government of a good ruler has to be ordered to the common good of that particular 
community.  When the ruler fails to do so, subjects can legitimately resist “if they are able 691
to do so,” and they should wait until the situation is discussed by prudent and wise men. The 
first is like Augustine looking for the material conditions to revolt as a sign of the 
Providence. But what it is striking is that Godfrey notes that if the subjects do not take any 
action, the kingdom will degenerate into tyranny, to the point of talking about the cowardice 
and unfaithfulness of those who not compromise and do something against unjust ruling.   692
 #218
 Malloy, Civil Authority in Medieval Philosophy, 164.689
 Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought, 195690
 Ibid, 253691
 Ibid, 255.692
 As a jurist, Ibn Ḥazam agrees that the imām has to order what it is good and forbid 
what is wrong (al-amr biʾl-maʿrūf waʾl-nahy ʿan al-munkar). When he refused to do that, the 
imām should be sermoned or removed by the force of the sword. But, first, believers should 
refrain from fighting against him as long as the imām does not commit an evident act of 
impiety and meets his duty of praying. As we have seen, the tradition in Islam strongly 
recommends this as part of the resignation that Muslims have to practice when facing 
injustice.  Ibn Ḥazm rejects such resignation and cites the qur’ānic verses as well as the 693
traditions: if the imām goes back to the right path, there is no need to depose him, but if he 
insists on his impiety and does not listen to the advice given to him, he should be deposed. 
On the other hand, Ibn Ḥazam also states that if the imām is known for his sense of justice 
and if he is challenged by insurrection, it is the duty of the believers to use the sword to fight 
on his behalf.  Here we should also remember what Māwardī wrote in his Naṣīḥat al-mulūk 694
regarding the criteria of justice to decide fighting for or against the imām. Quoting the 
tradition of ʿ Alī, al-Māwardī says: “If a Khawarīj rebel revolts against a just ruler, then 
Muslims should fight them, but if it is the case of an unjust ruler, Muslims should not fight 
the rebels since he may have a legitimate cause for revolting.”  695
 Al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) went on to say in his Uṣūl al-dīn that the possibility of 
dismissing the imām exists based on the subordinate character of the imām in relation to the 
community of believers:  
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When the imām acts in outward agreement with the law, his authority in the imāmate 
is in order. When he deviates from this, the community must choose either to make 
him turn away from his error and follow that which is correct or to turn away from 
him, pledging allegiance to another. The community’s role in relation to him is the 
same as his role in relation to his subordinates, judges, officers and couriers; should 
they deviate from his directions, he either corrects or dismisses them.  696!
Al-Juwaynī (d.1085) stated that the right of resistance is more than a theoretical possibility, 
even specifying the people responsible to admonish or depose the evil ruler: “When the ruler 
of the time becomes oppressive and his injustice and repression become evident, then those 
who loosen and bind have the right, if words fail to turn him away from his evil deeds, to plot 
his removal even if this involves the use of force and the waging of war.”   697
 How can we then understand this possibility of revolting against unjust rule in 
relation to the command of “subjecting to the governing authorities,” as Paul exhorts 
Christians, and as according to the quranic principle of “obeying those with authority”? The 
Muʿatizilite al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144) understands “those in authority” to refers only to just 
rulers, since only they can be paired with God and his messenger. The Rashīdī caliph would 
say: “Obey me so long as I am just in my dealings with you; when I deviate, then I have no 
claim on your obedience.”  Al-Zamakhsharī also elaborates on the same duty to obedience 698
as linked with justice:  
How can it be mandatory to obey unjust rulers, when God has enjoined, in such clear 
terms, obedience on those in charge, commanding them to return the trust to where it 
is due, to be just in their ruling, and finally, to refer to the Book and the sunna in 
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questionable cases? Unjust rulers do not return the trust, do not rule justly, and do not 
refer to the Book or to the sunna. They rather follow their own whims; therefore they 
do not enjoy the qualities of those regarded as ‘charged with authority’ by God and 
his Messenger. It would be more fitting to call them ‘marauding thieves.’   699!
These ‘thieves” are the same that Augustine is referring to when talking about kingdoms 
without justice: “Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?”  700
 As we have seen previously, since the Patristic era, Christianity considered rulers as 
appointed by God’s Providence. For that very reason, the injustice they may commit is seen 
as a punishment or a time of trial for the community. Nevertheless, the perpetuation of 
injustice is an impossible ethical and theological luxury for a Christian as it is for a Muslim. 
As we have tried also to show, obedience to injustice compromises the salvation of the 
believer, and sometimes the salvation of the community as a whole. We are aware that in 
both traditions it has been argued that obedience is also a requirement for salvation. But it 
seems that the theological principles that lead the believer to consistently strive for justice 
weigh ultimately more than the command to obey authority. There is thus a preeminence of 
the theological principles of justice and obedience to what is just, over the needs of political 
expediency, and even over the basic political principles of the relation between rulers and 
ruled. This preeminence of the theological dimension over the political one is more explicit 
in the case of Islam, as we discussed in the case of the etymology of fitna, and on the 
religious duty of “commanding good and forbidding the wrong” (al-ʿamr biʾl-ma’rūf waʾl-
nahy ‘an al-munkar). 
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Chapter Five 
The Speculum of Divine Justice and Obedience in Christian and Islamic  
Mirrors for Princes 
 After working separately with the concepts of justice and obedience in both 
traditions, in this chapter we will recapitulate how the tension between both ideas is present 
in Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes. We will also restate how justice and obedience 
are both present in the metaphor of the mirror, as they show how the reflection of the divine 
has its image in Islamic and Christian politics. Thus, this chapter attempts to show in Islamic 
and Christian Mirrors what the prior two chapters on justice and obedience have shown: that 
there is a tension between the duty of justice on the part of the ruler, and the duty of 
obedience on the part of the ruled. Both justice and obedience are political goods, but mainly 
they are “theological goods,” or “theological imperatives,” particularly in the case of justice.  
 As we stated in the first chapter devoted to Mirrors for Princes, we are aware of the 
limitations of the genre of Mirrors. This genre escapes precise boundaries of definition; even 
the different types or formats within each tradition would make our comparison 
impossible.  Nevertheless, they all share a major concern: to provide advice to the person 701
who rules, and to base this advice on the principles of Christian and Islamic theologies. Thus, 
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justice and obedience have religious implications, as they are both expected attitudes for the 
ruler and the ruled, which should mirror the divine order.  
We are keenly aware also of the methodological problems that the comparison 
between Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes entails: first, the fact that not all of them 
were written by religious figures, and second, as we stated in the methodological discussion 
of this research, the limitations of transhistorical analysis. How can we compare a Mirror 
written in the eighth century in Islam with a sixteenth-century Christian Mirror? But as we 
stated in the introduction, our methodology is not historical, but thematic and cross-cultural. 
Indeed, it is a very daring comparison; however, a comparison across traditions benefits from 
a thematic approach. It is true that a historical comparison between representatives of each 
tradition is due, but this is a topic for future research.  
 Methodologically, the tension or anxiety between justice and obedience is shown in 
three different ways: first, within an author’s singular work; second, within the author’s 
production (different works); and third, within the tradition (different authors, different 
books). We are not concerned with political practicalities such as whether the authors were 
clear on how to contest the authority of those who rule unjustly, or the ways subjects could 
show disobedience, or the possibility of tyrannicide. Instead we are principally concerned 
with analyzing the contradiction caused by the need to stress order (and thus obedience), and 
the need for justice, a shared concern in both Christian and Islamic political theologies. Thus, 
the metaphor of the mirror goes beyond reflecting the divine; in this case, the mirror is the 
“other.” 
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 After comparing Christian and Islamic Mirrors, we present what we call the 
“sequence of best ruling,” or the preferences for rulers, namely: the just believer, the just 
unbeliever, and the tyrant who preserves order. This sequence of rulers shows the extent to 
which the duty of obedience was linked to the need for order and security; at the same time it 
shows the dilemma with the duty of just ruling for this-world polities. This last sequence 
lends itself in particular to further development in both traditions, since we have worked 
primarily with Islamic sources.  
!
Reasons for the Tension Between Justice and Obedience 
 Several theories have attempted to explain why the authors experience this tension 
between justice and obedience: first, the contradictions among Persian-Greek (Eastern) and 
Christian and Islamic traditions of government, particularly their effect on the way kingship 
was conceived; second, the possible different audiences that the authors were addressing; 
third, the different historical contexts, particularly the times of political crisis or religious 
dissension which led authors to emphasize the principle of justice or the duty of obedience; 
and lastly, the authors’ own intellectual development which may explain why they focused on 
one or the other principle in different works of their production. 
 As the Christian and Islamic polities became more institutionalized, the concern of 
scholars in both traditions shifted into the acceptance of obedience for fear of the great evils 
of sedition and anarchy. The shift did not present any difficulty to political writers or those 
with an administrative background. But for jurists and theologians it seemed to cause anxiety, 
 #225
given the inconsistency between the emphases on obedience on one hand, and the religious 
imperative for that polity and its ruler to ‘mirror’ divine justice on the other. 
 In both traditions we found that obedience depends heavily on the definition of 
justice. Furthermore, in both Christian and Islamic political theologies, obedience and justice 
arise out of a religious rather than a political obligation. Thus, we can locate the different 
emphases on political justice and political obedience in the tension within Christian and 
Islamic theologies. In fact, Christianity bears the tension of the contradiction between the Old 
Testamentarian theories of kingship, and the more egalitarian principles of the primitive 
Christian community. As we have seen in the chapter which surveys the notion of Christian 
kingship, and as we will discuss further in this chapter, the idea of kingship in the Old 
Testament will be also a basis for contesting royal authority or at least limiting it, as in the 
very figure of king Saul which presents such tensions.  In Islam the assimilation between 702
the Persian heritage of kingship and the Islamic values of government was not a smooth 
process. As Lambton said, the old Persian tradition of monarchy, with its independent ethical 
standard based on force and opportunism perpetuated the inner disharmony which was the 
principal weakness of Islam as a political organism.  703
!
Problems Comparing Mirrors for Princes 
 As we stated in the first chapter devoted to the genre Mirror for Princes, the plurality 
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of formats that the genre admits leaves the researcher with the problem of fitting the 
manuscripts into the tradition of advice literature. As Irwin commented, political treatises are 
not the only possible expressions of political thought. The whole The Thousand and One 
Nights can be considered to be an overblown and out of control example of the literary genre 
Mirror for Princes.  And how can we not consider chapter four of Augustine’s City of God 704
a Mirror for Princes? On the Islamic side, the Risala fīʾl Ṣaḥāba  of Ibn al Muqaffaʾ is not 
always considered a Mirror for Princes.  Thus, there is lack of uniformity in the genre 705
together with the author’s intention of an in-temporality and ubiquity. However, this ubiquity 
also constitutes a dimension for the constitution of the genre and its permanence. Of course 
this intemporality may cause frustration for historians who look for facts and context.  But 706
we can say that the basis for comparing different Mirrors for Princes across time and space is 
the idea that Christian and Islamic Mirrors are political literature founded on the exigency of 
the monarch’s justice, but also on concerns about preserving political stability. 
  For our comparison, we have chosen what we consider key representatives in each 
tradition who share the same anguish-tension-concern-contradiction. Consequently, the 
question: why do we find the same author in the same work, in different works, or authors in 
the same tradition concurrently emphasizing the need for justice and the need for obedience 
or compliance with the regime, persists. 
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Christian Mirrors 
 Medieval Christian political thinkers’ and theologians’ concern with justice has its 
precedent in Augustine’s famous dictum that “kingdoms without justice are but bands of 
robbers.” Jonas of Orleans (d. 841), a follower of the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, 
paraphrases Isidore, making justice a prerequisite for the title of king, saying, “if the king 
governs with piety, justice, and mercy [he] has the right to be called a king. Contrary, if these 
duties are missing the king loses his title, and joins the majority of the rulers of the ancient 
pagan times, who qualify as tyrants.”  The key role of justice even becomes a metaphor in 707
John of Salisbury’s Policratus (1159), where we find the expression rex imago aequitates, 
the king as the image of justice. 
 At the same time, a parallel tradition for kingship is found in the medieval speculum 
with the interpretation of I Sam 8, where kingship is no longer the image of divine justice, 
but the punishment of tyranny due to the peoples’ sin. This tyrannical notion of kingship is 
close to the exegesis of Aquinas in his Summa theologiae and the use of the expression 
“usurpatio regum.” Aquinas considers the “bonum commune” as the only justification for 
ruling, and he refers to the natural tendency of a monarchy to degenerate into a tyranny: 
“regnum de facili convertitur in tyrannidem.”  Aquinas remembers in his De regimen 708
principum how the omnipotent king of Rome was kicked out because of his tyrannic ruling: 
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“regium vel potius tyrannicum.”  In fact, explaining why the royal dignity is rendered 709
hateful to the subjects, Aquinas states: “A clear example of this is found in the Roman 
Republic. When the kings had been driven out by the Roman people, because they could not 
bear the royal, or rather tyrannical, arrogance.”  710
 In addition to these contrasting ideas of kingship as both a mirror for justice and a 
potential justification of tyranny, one also encounters in the Christian Mirrors a concern for 
stability and order. For example, although Aquinas wrote against tyranny, we can see him 
also struggling with some degree of anxiety regarding whether to favor expediency or follow 
the theological imperative of justice. In his Mirror for Princes he writes: “the problem is 
whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, especially tyrants. The procedure is in 
discussion. It seems that they are not bound to obey. It is legitimate for someone to retake 
what it has been taken away unjustly.”  As we will see later, this is a work of contested 711
authorship, but Aquinas pursued his focus on justice in his De legibus in the Summa 
Theologica; in De obedientia, we find, “if the command is unjust, a subject is NOT obliged 
to obey.” How then do we reconcile the two concerns? How do authors struggle with the 
imperatives of justice and obedience? 
 We begin with John of Salisbury (d. 1180) whose Policraticus is written in the Mirror 
for Princes genre. It is based on the method of the exempla, resorting to stories to illustrate a 
 #229
 Ibid, 230.709
 Thomas Aquinas, De regno ad regem Cypri/On Kingship to the King of Cyprus, trans. Gerald B. 710
Phelan, revised by I.Th. Eschmann, O.P. (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1982), 19.
 Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus, trans. I. T. Eschmann (Amsterdam: 711
Academische Pers, 1967), 104-105.
lesson, in the same way many Muslim authors resort to Sassanian stories or traditions of the 
Prophet. Salisbury presented the situation when the tyrant commands the Christian subject to 
perform an act that is contrary to divine law:  
Loyal shoulders should sustain the power of the ruler so long as it is exercised in 
subjection to God and follows his ordinances; but if it resists and opposes the divine 
commandments, and wishes to make me share in its war against God, then with 
unrestrained voice, I answer back that God must be preferred before any man on 
earth.   712!
 When injustice persists, Salisbury suggests first rebuking the injustice of the ruler. 
However, there may come a time when active resistance is necessary: "Better would it be by 
far were the diadem torn from the head of the prince than that the good order of the chief and 
best part of the commonwealth, which is the part concerned with religion, should be 
destroyed at his pleasure.” In book VIII, Salisbury goes further, suggesting the possibility of 
tyrannicide if the injustice of the ruler persists: "Malice is always punished by God; but 
sometimes it is his own, at others it is a human, hand which he employs to administer 
punishment to the unrighteous." In chapter XX of the same book he continues: “it is just for 
public tyrants to be killed and the people set free for the service of God. . . . Even priests of 
God repute the killing of tyrants as piety, and if it should appear to wear the semblance of 
treachery, they say that it is consecrated to God by a sacred mystery."  713
 For Salisbury the definition of good government requires justice first, and then 
obedience. In Book IV, chapter I, he clarifies that justice must be based on the laws: “For the 
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authority of the prince depends upon the authority of justice and law; and truly it is a greater 
thing than imperial power for the prince to place his government under the laws.”  In 714
chapter II he uses the exempla of the leader of Athens to emphasize the formula justice first, 
obedience second: “Likewise Ligurious in his reign established decrees which confirmed the 
people in obedience to their princes, and their princes in just principles of government.” For 
Salisbury, a just ruler is a prerequisite for expecting subjects’ obedience.  
 After all this concern about justice, Salisbury shows his concern with the need for 
obedience and the perils of removing the ruler. In book VI, chapter XXI Salisbury prioritizes 
obedience to ensure security:  
Even if the ruler is more remiss than he should be in the virtues which pertain to his 
duty, he is nevertheless to be cherished; and as the bees raise their king aloft upon 
their shoulder, so should subjects. . . . As long as his vices are not absolutely ruinous, 
we owe him obedience in every way. For although he labors under the disadvantages 
of vices, yet he is to be borne with as one in whom stands the hope of safety and the 
well-being of the provincials. !
We can see then that Salisbury’s tone is different, and that his impulse against bad 
government is mitigated by his concern for security and stability. He continues, explaining 
that he is at a great distance  
from the crime of lèse majesté, and that no one may accuse me falsely of having 
presumed in aught against the authority of the prince. It is a common saying that it is 
not easy to remove the pith from the cork-tree without hurting the nails; but much 
more just and speedy is the hurt of him who seeks to sever the obedience of the 
members from the head! May the excellence of the head ever flourish because therein 
consists the safety of the whole body. !
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It is evident that in this passage Salisbury is experiencing the tension between the two 
political and social goods of justice and obedience for earthly government.  
 In the case of Aquinas (d. 1274), as we have briefly presented supra, we find a 
struggle between the scriptural maxim of obedience to the authorities, and the theological 
imperative of justice for earthly kingdoms. In his unfinished Mirror for Princes, On 
Kingship, to the King of Cyprus (De regno De regimine principum, ad regem Cypri), written 
around 1267 and finished by his friend and disciple, Tolomeo da Lucca, Aquinas resorts to a 
contractual argument to create the basis for revolting against a tyrant:  
If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not 
unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, 
becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a 
multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously 
subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the 
covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did 
not act faithfully as the office of a king demands.  715
  
This passage finds its “mirror” in an author of the “other” tradition, al-Juwaynī (d.1085), 
who, despite being a jurist in the more conservative line of Ashʿarism, also stated the right of 
resistance in his theological treatise Kitāb al-irshād: “when the ruler of the time becomes 
oppressive and his injustice and repression become evident, then those who loosen and bind 
have the right, if words fail to turn him away from his evil deeds, to plot his removal even if 
this involves the use of force and the waging of war.”  Similarly, denouncing the hindrances 716
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of a tyrannical government, Aquinas goes to the point of citing historical examples of 
tyrannicide:  
Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out 
from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set 
up in their place a lesser power, namely, the consular power. Similarly Domitian, who 
had succeeded those most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his father, and Titus, his 
brother, was slain by the Roman senate when he exercised tyranny, and all his wicked 
deeds were justly, and profitably declared null and void by a decree of the senate.  717!
However, struggling with the tension of radical justice and the need for obedience that leads 
to stability and security, Aquinas remembers that, although this attitude was present in 
multiple examples in the Old Testament, “this is not in accord with apostolic teaching. For 
Peter admonishes us to be reverently subject to our masters, not only to the good and gentle 
but also the forward: ‘For if one who suffers unjustly bears his trouble for conscience’s sake, 
this is grace.’”  718
 It is worth noting that for Aquinas, unlike for many of the medieval authors, security 
is not attached to obedience, but to justice. He argues that under tyrannical rule there is no 
safety: “Everything is uncertain when there is a departure from justice. Nobody will be able 
firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of another, not to 
say upon his caprice.”  The tyrant oppresses his subjects in the earthly realm, but also and 719
more importantly in the spiritual realm, preventing all progress, and denying excellence due 
to their natural mistrust of what they cannot control and subdue.  
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 It is also worthwhile contrasting what Aquinas wrote on justice and obedience in his 
Mirror with what he said about these concepts in his commentary to the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard. This work was written around 1255-1256 when he was still a student at the 
University of Paris. Here he breaks the Pauline dictum of obedience to authority in general as 
ordained by God.  Aquinas is clear that the origin of authority is what sets the limits of such 720
obligation:  
Obedience, by keeping a commandment, has for its [formal] object the obligation, 
involved in the commandment, that it be kept. Now this obligation originates in that 
the commanding authority has the power to impose an obligation binding not only to 
external but also to internal and spiritual obedience—“for conscience sake”, as the 
Apostle says (Rom. xiii, 5.) For power [authority] comes from God, as the Apostle 
implies in the same place. Hence, Christians are bound to obey the authorities 
inasmuch as they are from God; and they are not bound to obey inasmuch as the 
authority is not from God.   721!
 In the same work Aquinas delineates a hierarchy of ways a government could be 
“from God:” first, if authority is acquired legitimately, and second, if the use made of 
authority is worthy. And here it is clear when obedience is due: If the origin of authority is 
legitimate, but the person is not worthy, Aquinas says that such authority is always from God 
and obedience is due, “Unworthy as they may be.”  In contrast, if the ruler’s command is an 722
act of sin contrary to virtue, “we not only are not obliged to obey but we are also obliged not 
to obey, according to the example of the holy martyrs who preferred death to obeying those 
ungodly tyrants.”   723
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 However, if authority has been acquired through violence, Aquinas condemns it as 
illegitimate power through usurpation, and repels the authority unless the usurper later 
becomes a true ruler by his subjects’ consent. In that case: “the subjects being unwilling or 
even forced to accept it and there being no recourse open to a superior who might pronounce 
judgment upon the usurper. In this case he that kills the tyrant for the liberation of the country 
is praised and rewarded.”  Here the Islamic “mirror” for Aquinas is Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), who 724
stresses that caliphs and kings possess the cardinal virtue of justice (ḥusn tadbīr). Ibn Sīna 
also condemns usurpation and demands the death of a tyrant (mutaghallib) and the 
punishment of those who fail to kill the tyrant if they have the ways to do so. As Rosenthal 
says, “these statements extend far beyond the orthodox theory which only demands removal 
form office, not death, if the people have sufficient power to force the caliph’s abdication.”  725
A good example is the striking statement of Ibn Sīnā: “next to the belief in the Prophet, 
tyrannicide is the most pleasing to God and draws man near to him.” However, later he says 
that a weak authority exercised by a pious ruler can be challenged by a worthy rebel. This 
seems inconsistent with the denunciation of tyranny and again aligns Ibn Sīnā with 
expediency. But in the text it is clear that Ibn Sīnā, like Aquinas, is condemning tyranny 
through usurpation. In fact, in his Kitāb al-shifāʼ he says that people should kill the usurper 
(mutaghallib). Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between the usurper who lays a claim to the caliphate 
by virtue of power and wealth, and the rebel (kharījī) who lays a claim based on his superior 
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intellect and excellence in political management. In the latter case, citizens should go along 
with him.  726
 Another author to mention in the Christian tradition of Mirrors for Princes is Thomas 
Hoccleve (d. 1426), an English poet and clerk who wrote his Mirror in the form of a poem 
called the Regiment of Princes. He addressed this work to Henry, Prince of Wales, who 
became King Henry V in March 1413. The novelty in Hoccleve’s Mirror is the idea of the 
duty of the people regarding justice.  Hoccleve modeled his work on a collection of 727
exempla written by the Dominican Jacobus de Cessolis, Libellus de moribus hominum et de 
offices nobelium super ludo scaccorum. Cessolis’s work was very popular and translated into 
several vernaculars. In De ludo scaccorum, Cessolis reminds the king of the duty of justice 
and says that a kingdom based on violence will not last long:  
O Lord my king! I wish your life to be glorious, something that I cannot see bless, 
outstanding in justice and good habits you are loved by the people. I pray you 
therefore to take a different rule, so that first of all you may govern yourself, who 
does not govern other by law but by violence. For it is unjust that you should wish to 
rule other when you cannot rule yourself, and remember: violent regimes cannot last 
long.   728!
 But Hoccleve goes further and resolves the tension between subjects’ duty of 
obedience and justice, deciding in favor of the latter. To do so he alters the exempla in De 
ludo, adding public dialogues that show a discourse with the ruler. One example is the case of 
Theodorus Cyrenaicus, who used the Christian notion of justice to contest the power of 
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tyranny and its imposition of silence. Displaying a climax of Christian martyrdom, 
Theodorus is crucified for criticizing the king, while other councilors keep quiet. Here justice 
is more important than obedience, as Hoccleve explains: “He wished to say how little he was 
scared about death itself and the manner of death, since he was to die innocently and for 
justice.”  729
 The last author we have selected in the vast production of medieval Christian Mirrors 
is the Jesuit priest Juan de Mariana (d. 1624), one of brightest authors of the Spanish Golden 
Age. His Mirror for Princes, De regis et Regis institutione was dedicated to Philip III. 
Although his book earned the king’s favor in Spain, it was censured by the Sorbonne and 
burned in a public ceremony in Paris.   730
Mariana preferred monarchy of all forms of government, but thought it should be 
limited not only by moral principles, but also by the people, through the institution of the 
Cortes. He stressed that even if the virtue of justice is present in the person of the king, still 
the consent of the people plays a role:   
Our elders, based in prudence, . . . contained the kings in terms of moderation and 
justice. . . . They took care that the prince could not decide in the most important 
issues without the consent of the people and the nobility. The Cortes ought to be 
summoned with representatives of all social classes. This custom is still observed in 
Aragon and other kingdoms, and I wish it would be reestablished also by our 
princes.  731
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 Mariana presents a mixed character for the figure of the king, acknowledging his 
sacredness, but also encouraging some limitation to his authority. This is a new turn for the 
theories that emphasized the sacredness of the figure of the king, which ended up in royal 
absolutism. On this point, Mariana seems to start from the divine right of kings and then to 
go to the other pole of the spectrum and question the origin of authority. Mariana affirms that 
the prince is sacred as long as he obeys the laws of the land. Then in a different chapter of De 
rege, he reminds us that “the prince lives under the law on a level with others.”  Thus, a 732
temporal order that transgresses divine law must not be obeyed. Rebellion is a hard option to 
accept, but resistance is a legal possibility retained by the people. Mariana makes clear that if 
the ruler becomes a tyrant and is admonished by the people but perseveres in tyranny, the 
nation can declare war on him, and even kill him, arguing legitimate defense.  733
 Mariana’s departing point stressing the need of justice is Augustine’s well-known 
maxim that earthly kingdoms without justice are gangs of criminals on a large scale. In this 
sense he writes: “The most flourishing empires, what unless great robber bands are they, 
when set up by force an injustice. . . . but when the empire was founded, laws were 
promulgated by which they protect in peace what they had taken by armed brigandage.”  734
He affirms that under a just and temperate king, the citizens consider themselves happy and 
abounding in all good things. But, if the king violates the laws of the realm, with respect to 
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religion, succession, or taxes, or forbids the meeting of the Cortes, he is a tyrant, and once the 
people make an implicit or explicit decision, they could get rid of him, and if necessary, kill 
him.  More to the point, Mariana argues first, that the community does not transfer all the 735
right to rule onto the figure of the prince, and second, that there is historical, and even 
scriptural, support for the killing of a tyrant: “Besides, we reflect, in all history, that whoever 
took the lead in killing tyrants was held in great honor.”  Mariana warns the ruler on the 736
power of the historical precedents: “Many examples, both ancient and modern, are available 
to demonstrate how great is the strength of a multitude’s anger with hatred for a ruler, and 
that ill will of the people results in the destruction of the king.”  737
 On the other hand, Mariana’s emphasis on obedience throughout his Mirror indicates 
he was also concerned with the political values of order, stability, peace, and security. 
Obedience was expected from subjects to the constituted authorities, as long as they 
conducted themselves in accordance with the laws and customs of the Commonwealth.  He 738
also cites Paul’s dictum that whoever resists a magistrate resists God, and adds the historical 
basis for obedience as well: “Further, they who try to change princes often bring great 
misfortune to the state; nor is government overturned without serious disturbance. . . . The 
histories are full of examples; ordinary life is replete with them.” The fear of the aftermath of 
revolting against authority makes Mariana affirm that: “therefore people conclude that the 
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unjust ruler must be accepted like the just, and the rule of the former must be alleviated by 
passive obedience.”  This emphasis on obedience because of the fear of sedition can also be 739
explained by Mariana’s natural mistrust of human nature. Evidence of this mistrust is that 
Mariana, like many medieval Christian and Muslim authors, attributes a ruler’s lack of virtue 
to the character of his subjects. However, these notes on obedience cannot overtake the 
relevance of Mariana’s accent on the destiny of tyrants: “the prince who becomes a public 
enemy and afflicts his fatherland, he is a tyrant . . . and he may be removed by any 
means. . . . And he who kinds the tyrant will have acted in no wise unjustly.”  The relevance 740
of justice over obedience is evident in Mariana’s De rege, affirming like other authors that “it 
is a fixed opinion that empires do not last without the protection of justice.”   741
!
Islamic Mirrors 
  In the chapter devoted to Mirrors for Princes we tried to explain how the multiple 
formats of the Islamic Mirrors found their place in the genre, equating them to works of 
advice literature, or in a more general sense, works of adab. But most importantly, they also 
constitute a textual production founded on the idea of justice and equity as depicted in the 
following maxims: “Better is the government of an infidel prince than the iniquity of a 
Muslim sovereign;” “Two hours of justice of an infidel are more worthy that a year of 
tyranny in Islam,” and as al-Ghazālī writes in his Naṣīḥat al-mulūk: “The government can 
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exist with unbelief but not under injustice.” It is difficult to trace the exact source of all these 
maxims, but their frequent presence in Islamic Mirrors shows how significant was the idea of 
justice.  There are other explanations for the Islamic Mirrors’ emphasis on justice (as we 742
explained in the chapter on Justice), but even if it is due to an assimilation of the Sassanian 
idea of justice, the way it was incorporated into Islamic treatises tells us of the authors’ 
concern for this valuable religious and political principle. 
 On the other hand, while the idea of theological and political justice was present in 
the Islamic tradition, a parallel emphasis on obedience was assimilated in the form of hadith, 
and then adopted into Islamic political and theological treatises, most of them Mirror for 
Princes. As we have seen when we examined the duty of obedience in Islam, it was 
recommended sometimes in an exaggerated way, as in the hadith that instructs the reader to 
obey “even an Ethiopian slave.” It is worthwhile noticing that there was also a tension 
regarding this tradition between the value of obedience to any authority versus the value of a 
democratic origin for the leaders of the Muslim community. As Crone explains, the 
discussion is around determining if the need to “obey even an Ethiopian slave” was a 
Khārijite statement emphasizing egalitarianism, or if it was part of a more quietistic Sunnī 
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tradition.  This tradition was first quoted by Abū Yūsuf in his book Kitāb al-Kharāj, where 743
in the farewell pilgrimage of the Prophet he says, “O people, fear God, hear and obey. Even 
if a crop-eared Ethiopian slave were to be appointed over you, you should hear and obey 
him.” Crone argues that the same compiler of the tradition in a twelfth-century hadith 
collection attributed to al-Rabīʿ b. Habīb has ʿUmar saying, “obey the imām even if he beats 
you or deprives you or oppresses you, for the messenger of God enjoined obedience to the 
amīr even if he is a sinner (fājir) and prayer over him when he dies.” This tradition is also 
cited with a variant by Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Baṭṭa.  744
 How did the Islamic traditions embrace, at the same time, counter traditions of justice 
and obedience? Sadan poses the same question: how could the two antithetical concepts 
coexist in the same civilization?  After exploring medieval Christian authors, we can see 745
that the same paradox also existed in the Western civilization. Sadan detects a general 
inclination to prefer, in times of war, but not only, an Islamic regime (even if it is only 
nominally) over a regime that adheres to an idea of justice: “God allows kings to continue to 
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reign in spite of injustice as long as the foundations of religion are not damaged,” says Sibṭ 
ibn al-Jawzī.  Thus, the authority of the regime must be accepted, even if bad and unjust, 746
provided that the ruler at least nominally adhered to the principles of Islam. But Sadan also 
detects in the Arab literature an inclination to give priority to justice, as expressed in the 
maxim: “government may exist even along with unbelief, but not with injustice.”  This 747
maxim is mainly found in Islamic Mirrors for Princes as in the case of al-Māwardī and al-
Ghazālī. Thus, it is really interesting to find a tendency preferring a just ruler to a Muslim 
ruler. 
 Even more striking is to find that these two “inclinations,” towards justice or towards 
obedience, are present in some cases in the same author. We saw this with Aquinas in the 
case of Christianity; in Islam we can see it in the qāḍī of Damascus, Ibn Jamāʿa (d. 1333). 
Concerned with security and stability after he witnessed the extinction of the caliphate, Ibn 
Jamāʿa affirms: “The sovereign has a right to govern until another and stronger one shall oust 
him from power and rule in his stead. . . . For a government, however objectionable, is better 
than none at all, and between two evils we must chose the lesser.”  But Ibn Jamāʿa also 748
presented justice as essential for Islamic government, as we see in his quoting of the sayings 
from hadith in his Taḥrīr al-aḥkām fī tadbīr ahl al-Islām: “the justice of the king is the life of 
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the subjects and the spirit of the realm. . . . On justice depends the wellbeing of their 
kingdom, and the preservation of their dynasties. . . . Injustice and tyranny are the reason for 
the destruction of empires.”  Yet in contrast, Ibn Jamāʿa also quotes a saying he attributes to 749
wise men: “the tyranny of the sultan for forty years is preferable to the flock (raʿiyyat) being 
left without a master for a single hour.”  As with many of our medieval authors, he was 750
wary of human nature, and preferred strong leadership rather than the perils of anarchy. But 
there are other reasons that can explain why the two emphases on justice and obedience 
coexist. 
 First, it is argued that there is a gap between the real historical situation that the 
authors were witnessing, mainly the deterioration of the caliphate, and its ideal notion as 
expressed in the classic theory of the caliphate.  According to this position the need for 751
justice according to Islamic principles became imperative; therefore the ideal of the just 
government was expressed in the Mirrors for Princes.  The other possible reason for the 752
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different emphases on justice and obedience is the importance of justice in Persian political 
and literary tradition. Lambton insisted that “the theory of the mirrors . . . seeks in some 
measure to assimilate Islamic norms to Sassanian traditions of kingship.”  H.A.R. Gibb 753
more clearly explains why there may be contradictions between the Islamic and Sassanian 
traditions: 
The Sassanian strands which had been woven into the fabric of Muslim thought were, 
and remained foreign to its native constitution. The ethical attitudes which they 
assumed were in open or latent opposition to the Islamic ethics, and the Sassanian 
tradition introduced into Islamic society a kernel of derangement, never wholly 
assimilated yet never wholly rejected.   754!
 Thus we find a range of theories, including: Persian elements of kingship, a historical 
deterioration that created a nostalgic call to revive the ideal notion of Islamic government, 
and finally the theological principles of Islam which stress the responsibility of the Muslim 
rulership to command and enjoin good and forbid evil (al-amr biʾl-ma’ruf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-
munkar).  Yet as we explained at the beginning of this chapter, examining the reasons for 755
the different emphases on justice and obedience is mainly the task of historians. What 
follows is an analysis that detects the presence of both imperatives in the production of 
medieval Muslim authors, as we did with the Christian Mirrors. 
 We depart with the Mirror for Princes written by Ibn Muqaffaʾ (d. 759), Risala fīʾl 
ṣaḥāba, dedicated to the caliph al-Manṣūr. Although this text is concerned, among other 
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things, with the nature of the caliph’s authority, it is also sometimes considered not to be a 
Mirror for Princes.  As a translator of Sassanian Mirrors, Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ believes that the 756
absolute power of the prince finds its limits in the administration of justice and equity. 
Nevertheless, in the Sassanian Mirrors, justice is attached, as we have seen in the Circle of 
Justice, to the prosperity of the kingdom, so the ruler’s tyranny causes the kingdom’s ruin.  
 Although the same premises that we found in Sassanian Mirrors for Princes are 
present, we find that Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ experiences a tension between the duty of almost 
“unconditional” obedience and the duty of justice together with the limitations of the law. 
Similarly, there is a contradictory position between the extension of the ruler’s power and the 
limitations of his office. The following passage shows a contradiction regarding the space of 
intervention regarding divine law, and the duty of obedience to the ruler if he follows the 
revelation and the traditions:  
God has given other dispositions to the personal judgment of those who hold power. 
The common people has not in this matter any right beyond giving advice if they are 
consulted. . . . but, a government/ruler has the right to obedience only when he 
follows the prescriptions of revelation and to the tradition of similar contents.   757!
 On the one hand, Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ understands the imām’s power in a negative way, 
meaning only when there is no precedent in the Quran and the Sunna. This allows the ruler to 
use personal opinion (raʾy) and to dispose according to it: “in everything else that it is not 
established in the sacred texts the imām is sovereign even to the point to legislate according 
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to his personal opinion in situations of administration when the Quran and the Sunna are 
silent. The use of reason and thus raʾy are for those in authority.”  On the other hand, he 758
again says that obedience to the imām is expected in terms of well-defined aspects and it is 
wrong to leave the imām’s attribution of power vague.  So, it seems that there is a 759
contradiction between the raʾy and the power of the imām, and obedience to the imām’s 
established and precise attributions of authority. Furthermore, Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ says that those 
“who are right in asserting that obedience to the imām is due establishing at the same time 
necessary conditions, and vice versa are wrong those who leave this question undefined.” 
The author lists the areas over which God has given power to the imām: the setting of a 
military expedition, the withdrawal of troops, the imposition/collection and distribution of 
taxes, the appointing and destitution of functionaries, the faculty of judging when a written 
disposition does not exist, the execution of sentences and penalties based on the Quran and 
the Sunna, and the combating of the enemy with weapons or stratagems.  So he seems to be 760
precise on the duty of obedience expected from subjects: “in those dispositions that God has 
put in the hands of those of power obedience is due, linked to obedience to God, and 
disobedience to the imām equal to lose the soul.”  Thus, the duty of obedience is 761
established, but only in relation to those established functions of the imām. Subjects’ 
obedience to issues the imām decided based on his personal opinion is not required. Ibn al-
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Muqaffaʾ sees the imām as the custodian of the law, and thus rulership is based on justice and 
not on the arbitrary disposition of the ruler. Further, as he comments in his Risāla, “no 
obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator.”  762
 Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) first addressed the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd his book Kitāb al-
kharāj, developing the theme of the ruler as a shepherd and underlining the caliph’s duties as 
the shepherd to his flock by saying that:  
The rulers are responsible to their creator, as the shepherd to his master. Dispense 
justice, and be it only for an hour every day, in all matters entrusted and assigned to 
you by God. The happiest of the shepherds appearing on the Day of Resurrection 
before God will be the shepherd whose subjects were happy under his rule.   763!
He makes clear that a shepherd’s iniquity and injustice spells ruin for his flock, a warning 
that goes in line with the Sassanian theory of rulership.  He also stresses justice, citing the 764
traditions when he reminds the ruler: “So behave with justice for the day when it will be 
judged only with justice, that you may dwell in the abodes of justice.”  The punishment for 765
oppression is emphatically repeated, mainly by referring to the hadiths we listed in the prior 
chapter on justice: “Al-Faḍl b. Maʿzūq Abū Saʿid: The Prophet said: a just ruler is the most 
beloved by me and will sit near me on the Day of Resurrection, but the most hated one that 
day and the most severely punished will be an oppressive ruler.”  Even when Abū Yūsuf 766
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explains the rules of taxation, he emphasizes the just treatment of taxpayers and again warns 
the caliph, “beware of the complaint of the oppressed! Such appeals have a response.”  767
 The other parallel concern for Abū Yūsuf is the need for obedience. And as he did 
with the principle of justice, he also cites the traditions to emphasize the duty of obeying the 
ruler: “Al-Aʿmash Abū Ṣāliḥ- Abū Hurayra: The Prophet said: He who obeys me obeys God 
and he who obeys his ruler obeys me. However, he who opposes me opposes God and he 
who opposes his ruler opposes me.” He even goes further, specifying that the right to revolt 
is prohibited: “Some of our scholars Ḥabīb b. Abī Thābit Abū al-Bakhtarī- Ḥudayfa: ‘There 
is nothing in the established precedents which permits you to raise in arms against your 
ruler.”  For Abū Yūsuf the only possibility in the face of bad ruling is patience and 768
submission. The argument is the familiar; obedience to rulers is required and there is not 
even the possibility to curse, cheat, or oppose them. As we have seen in different authors in 
Christianity and Islam, bad rulers are the scourge through whom God punishes. 
 Nevertheless, Abū Yūsuf still considered the possibility of admonishing the ruler if he 
goes astray. The opportunity of addressing the caliph was even welcomed on the part of 
people, and this is a new turn:  
Abū Bakr b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Hudhalī al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī said that a compliant one called 
out to ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb: “Fear God, O ʿUmar!” and repeated it several times. A 
bystander told the man to keep silent: “you have overdone it against the Commander 
of the faithful.” But ʿUmar intervened saying: “Leave him alone! For there is nothing 
good in the silence of people who do not say it to us, and there is nothing good in us 
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rulers if we refuse to listen to such words.” He then turned to reply to the person who 
has admonished him.  769!
The capacity to admonish the caliph is in line with the Islamic tradition of contesting power 
and is part of Islam’s more egalitarian strand. This impulse parallels developments in the 
Sassanian hierarchical theories of royal absolutism. Abū Yūsuf in his Mirror is then an 
example of a simultaneous accent on the duty of justice and the duty of obedience, 
combining Persian and Islamic traditions of conceiving power. 
 A much more complex figure given his vast production is al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). He 
also is a clear example of the anxiety based on the inconsistency between the emphasis on 
obedience and the religious imperative for the Muslim polity and its ruler to ‘mirror’ divine 
justice. The following quotations show al-Ghazālī’s reluctance to justify usurpation; 
importantly, these statements have had a pervasive influence on the way medieval Islamic 
political thought has been analyzed in terms of activism or quietism. Al-Ghazālī’s argument 
is set forth in these terms:  
The concessions which we hereby make are not voluntary, but necessity may render 
lawful even that which is forbidden. We know that it is forbidden to eat carrion, but it 
would be worse to die of hunger. If anyone does not consent on this, and holds the 
opinion that the imamate is dead in our time, because the necessary qualifications are 
lacking, and he persists in this opinion but he is not able to replace the imamate, not 
having at hand anyone who possesses the necessary qualifications, then we would ask 
him “Which is the better part, to declare that the qādis are revoked, that all 
authorizations are invalid, that marriages cannot be legally contracted, that all acts of 
government everywhere are null and void, and thus to allow that the entire population 
is living in sin –or is it better to recognize that the imamate exists in fact, and 
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therefore the transactions and administrative actions are invalid, given the actual 
circumstances and the necessities of these times?”  770!
In the same line and fearing the unpredictable conditions of anarchy, al-Ghazālī, writing to 
the Seljuq sultan Sanjar in 1109, recalls the adage: “a hundred years of injustice (ẓulm) are 
better than a day of chaos.”  Even further, he seems to acquiesce to a bad ruler when he 771
affirms: “forty years of tyranny from the sultan are better than the abandonment of his 
subjects for one hour.”   772
 Parallel to this argument that legitimizes usurpation, al-Ghazālī is concerned with 
rightful government because he quotes in his Naṣīhat al-mulūk the maxim that a just non-
Muslim ruler would be preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler.  But he also stressed justice 773
through different adages like: “one day of justice of a just sultan was better than the worship 
of sixty years,” and alleges that "the person most beloved of God is a just sultan and the most 
despised a tyrannical sultan.”  This stress on justice can be understood, as Rosenthal 774
argues, as mere pious platitudes  or, as Lambton proposes, explained by the historical 775
context: “today affairs have reached such lengths that the justice of one hour is equal to the 
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worship of one hundred years.”  However, Lambton also argues that al-Ghazālī’s use of this 776
maxim was part of the Persian notion of justice in his thought.  Apparently he read this 777
maxim in Persian in the Niẓām al-Mulk treatise and was influenced by it. Nevertheless, it 
seems to us that al-Ghazālī’s mention of the maxim has less to do with Persian traditions’ 
quietist notions of justice, and more to do with his theological concern with mirroring divine 
justice. In fact, in the first pages of his Mirror for Princes, Naṣīhat al-mulūk, al-Ghazālī 
presents the theological image of God’s laws as a “mirror” for the ruler: “the ruler who 
makes God’s decrees the mirror which he holds before his eyes and in accordance with which 
he passes judgment.”  778
 As in the case of Aquinas, al-Ghazālī’s Mirror is of contested authorship. The 
discussion includes arguments that the second part of his Naṣīhat al-mulūk was not written 
by him, or at least that there were different works of Ghazālī’s put together in the same 
book.  The introductions to one Arabic and two Persian manuscripts explain how al-779
Ghazālī came to write it at the request of the sultan of the Seljuq empire, Sanjar (d. 1157) 
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after having spent the whole day together in religious devotion; for that reason Crone argues 
that what al-Ghazālī wrote was only the first part or the religious treatise and not the 
mirror.  Given the contents as well as the format of the first part of the book and the advice 780
that Ghazālī provides to the ruler, we find no reasons not to consider the first part of his 
Nasīhat as a Mirror for Princes. More to our point, Hillenbrand argues that al-Ghazālī also 
wrote a “little mirror for princes” in his Kīmiyā, which is a draft of the first part of his 
Naṣīhat al-mulūk.  781
 As in many Christian Mirrors (mainly Carolingian), the basic teaching of part one is 
that rulership is a gift bestowed; therefore the ruler does not possess the power given to him. 
He will be held accountable for it to God, but he is not accountable for it to fellow men. 
Writing about the Principles of the Creed, in the first principle Ghazālī reminds the king (as 
Christian authors did), of his human and ephemeral nature: “O king that you are a creature 
and that you have a Creator.”  Immediately after, justice is discussed through the Islamic 782
principle of “commanding good and forbidding evil.” In fact, in the theological discussion of 
the actions which are roots of faith, Ghazālī reminds the ruler, “refrain from everything that 
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is prohibited, and . . . perform every duty that is prescribed.” These actions are divided in two 
categories, one between the ruler and God, and the second between the ruler and his subjects. 
Here Ghazālī reminds him: “treat the subjects justly and [keep] your hand from unjust 
oppression. . . . The fundamental principle is that in any matter between you and the true God 
you should observe the same obedience as you would deem right that your servant observe 
towards you.”  The elaboration on the principle of justice continues when he discusses the 783
maxim that al-Ghazālī attributes to the Prophet: “One day of just rule by an equitable sultan 
is more meritorious than sixty years of continual worship.” He also adds, “[the] Apostle 
declared that the man dearest to God on High is the just sultan and the most hateful and 
contemptible is the unjust sultan.”  784
 Al-Ghazālī presents in his Naṣīḥat different notions of justice. In Part II, since it is 
more based on the theories of Sassanian rulership, justice is associated with prosperity and 
the Circle of Justice. This is clear when al-Ghazālī (or pseudo-al-Ghazālī) comments, “the 
development of the universe depends on kings, for if the king is just, the universe is 
prosperous and the subjects are secure,” and then he lists the Sassanian kings. He even 
comments that the Prophet being born under the “just king,” or Anūshīrvān, enforces justice, 
equity and discipline (order).  Here he draws on the idea of the Circle: “the effort of these 785
kings they knew that religion depends on the monarchy, the monarchy on the army, the army 
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on the supplies, supplies on prosperity, and prosperity on justice.”  This concept of justice 786
as found in the Circle is mixed with reports of tradition and a different account of justice: 
“Qatādah in his explanation of the verse (Q. 55:7), says ‘that you should not transgress the 
balance,’ i.e. in justice, meaning that you should ‘Treat the sons of Adam kindly and be just 
with them, as you would wish them to be just with you.’”   787
 In Part I, the discussion of justice has a more Islamic tone, in that it is based on 
egalitarianism and restitution of balance as found in the Quran. The egalitarian impulse of 
justice is present in statements like: “Treat every Muslim who is younger than you as he were 
your father, and he who is older than you, treat him as he was a son, and he who is of your 
same age, treat him as a brother.”  Al-Ghazālī explains that to avoid a fraudulent use of the 788
authority entrusted to him, the ruler “in every situation which arises . . . should figure that he 
is the subject and that the other person is the holder of authority.”  This emphasis that the 789
ruler should govern as if he were the subject and the subject the ruler is eminently Islamic. In 
the second part of the Naṣīhat, al-Ghazāli also mixes Muslim and Persian traditions, linking 
in this case justice and order: “Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ said: ‘If my prayers were answered, I would 
pray for nothing except [that we might have] a just sultan; for in the well-doing of such a 
ruler lies the well-being of the world and the good ordering of God’s slaves.’”  This is a 790
mix of a Muslim and Persian traditions linking justice with order. He also compares justice 
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with balance, citing the quranic verse: “All deeds are weighted in the balance of justice, as 
God on High has said (Q. 55: 6): ‘And the sky, he raised up, and he set the balance.’”  791
Finally, in Part II, the ruler is advised that perfect justice means impartiality, so he should 
“treat the unknown litigant of no repute and the well-known litigant of high wordily rank” in 
the same way.  Thus, both parts of al-Ghazālī’s Naṣīhat al-mulūk present us with different 792
notions of justice, from a more hierarchical idea as found in the Circle of Justice, to just 
ruling, impartiality, and mainly (similar to what we found with Aquinas), conscious rule. 
 The duty of obedience is justified in al-Ghazālī’s Mirror by divine predestination and 
the need for security. In Part II, the emphasis on obedience is greater. In fact, right at the 
beginning the author stresses that the sultan is God’s shadow on earth and remembers the 
need to obey him: “to dispute with kings is improper, and to hate them is wrong.”  793
Likewise, the first chapter of Part II ends with the same accent on obedience:  
On the authority of the rulers there is much to be said . . . in order [that] they refrain 
from treating [their] commoners unjustly. [At the same time] the subjects are under 
the obligation to honor their sultan and never in any way to rebel against him, if they 
are to comply with the command of God on high.   794!
This goes in line with other statements that al-Ghazālī made regarding the relevance of 
obedience. In his Iḥyāʾ, on the treatment of the licit and the illicit, he states that public 
interest requires obedience to rulers who possess military power, however unjust they may 
be! The argument is that resistance would bring a greater injury to the community through 
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civil war.  Also in his Kitāb al-mustaẓhirī, a book written before Ghazālī’s spiritual crisis, 795
he comments that obedience to the ruler is a form of worship to God.    796
 Nevertheless, in his book Faḍā’iḥ al-bātiniyya, despite being written in a time of 
turmoil and worry for the threat posed to Islam by Bāṭinism, Ghazālī stresses that the 
condition for obedience is the ruler’s justice or his adjustment to God’s law. In his chapter on 
the “duties connected with action [al-ʿamal]” he states: “The imām should know that the 
approval of men can be rightly gained only by conformity to the law, and that obedience to 
the imām is incumbent on men only when he invites them to conformity to the law.”  797
Although Faḍā’ih al-bāṭiniyya mainly stresses the caliph’s predestination and rules out the 
possibility of changing the ruler, al-Ghazālī recognizes that the caliphate can lead to bliss or 
to unsurpassed misery; therefore, “Obedience to the imam is obligatory, but only in 
obedience to God and not in disobedience to him.”  Should we accept that these conditions 798
are, as Rosenthal argues, al-Ghazālī’s “pious platitudes”? Or can we argue that, despite his 
concern for security and order, he also believed that the need for justice and adherence to 
God’s law was primary for the Muslim polity? Following our criteria, and given the different 
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emphases in al-Ghazālī’s various works, al-Ghazālī is an example of the tension between the 
Islamic theological imperatives of justice and obedience. 
 Another Muslim author who experienced the same tensions, but in this case across the 
Mediterranean, was Muhammad ibn Walid al-Ṭurṭūshī (Spain, d. 1123), called Ibn al-
Rundakah, and in Spanish Abubéquer De Tortosa. al-Ṭurṭūshī composed his Mirror, Lampara 
de los Principes, or Sirāj al-mulūk, in light of Ghazālī’s Naṣīhat al-mulūk, despite both of 
them being enemies. After arriving in Egypt and witnessing the tyranny of the Fatimid vizier 
whose ruling was a catastrophe, al-Ṭurṭūshī dedicated his Mirror to the new Fatimid vizier, 
who was his protector, the vizier al-Maʾmūn b. al-Baṭāʾiḥī. Al-Ṭurṭūshī hoped the Mirror 
would guide al-Baṭāʾiḥī to the good of his people.  
 The sources for al-Ṭurṭūshī were Persian, Indian, and Islamic traditions. As in other 
Mirrors, the spiritual perfection of the prince is the basis for the spiritual and temporal 
wellness of the people. As a consequence of al-Ṭurṭūshī’s negative anthropology, he affirms 
that authority is a proof of God’s existence.  However, al-Ṭurṭūshī also says that: “God has 799
created men and favor[s] them with perfect senses and potencies, and has poured on them his 
grace.”  These various conceptions of men will be the first tension in al-Ṭurṭūshī’s work, 800
and also the basis for his simultaneous emphasis on justice or obedience. The tension 
between these two values leads the author to affirm: “the justice of the king is the life of the 
people;” yet immediately after, he says, “it is preferable a tyrannic sulṭan for forty years than 
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a people in mutiny for only one hour.”  801
 Al-Ṭurṭūshī begins his treatment of justice with a parallel concern for obedience and 
fear of rebellion. This leads him to affirm that: “The subjects perish due to their ruler but not 
otherwise,” and also to confirm that if the ruler is unjust, “religion is also weakened and also 
morals, prosperity leaves the country.” However, he immediately reminds the reader of the 
peril of revolting: “Beware of the civil discord, since not only tyrants ended up punished with 
them.”  He continues citing the same traditions for the just ruler or the just sultan, who will 802
find refuge under God’s shadow, since he is God’s shadow on earth: “The acts of a just imām 
with his subjects are better than the devoted practices of a subject for a hundred or fifty years. 
. . . If he is just he will be rewarded, besides the thankfulness of his subjects, if he is unjust 
upon him will be his iniquities and also suffering upon his subjects.”  As we found before 803
in Islam and Christianity, the character of the ruler affects the character of his subjects: “if the 
sultan is just, rightfulness is spread among his subjects, and the scale of equity is settled 
among his subjects in a way that all of them expect to adjust their business to this justice and 
equity.”  Lastly, al-Ṭurṭūshī also cites the Persian tradition of the Circle of Justice, 804
explaining to the ruler the benefits of this circular balance among the different social strata.  805
 The concern for the disastrous effects of rebellion and disorder leads al-Ṭurṭūshī to 
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repeatedly underline the value of obedience, even under a tyrannical rule: “If we can put in a 
scale how much weighs tyranny over people for a year, we can see that an hour of revolts 
weighs more than the tyranny of a sultan for a year.”  Obedience is linked to obedience to 806
God, and it is due to the just or unjust sultan. Obedience is therefore linked to religion, while 
rebellion attacks the fundamentals of religion. It is true that al-Ṭurṭūshī describes both justice 
and obedience as indispensable for the life of man. But it seems that the basic functions of 
the ruler are carried on in the service of obedience rather than justice.  He also cites the 807
same maxim on obedience that we have seen in other Muslim authors: “If it could be 
determined the tyranny of one year weigh less than one hour of revolt” and “sixty years of 
tyranny are preferable than one hour of revolt.”  The bad conduct of the ruler is attributed, 808
as we have seen in the Christian authors, to the sins of the community. For that reason it 
seems that there is no other choice for the subjects than to pray for the ruler and wait on 
God’s deliverance from tyranny. This pessimism regarding the political destiny of the 
Muslim community leads al-Ṭurṭūshī to compare the ruler with the rain, wind, night, etc., and 
to explain that: “if it benefits more than it harms, it is a general advantage, but if it harms a 
lot and benefits a few it is a general disadvantage. For that reason, it is obligatory to pray for 
the rectitude of the sultan, communicate to him these warnings, and dedicate to him our 
prayers.”  809
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 Despite his permanent stress on obedience and submission, al-Ṭurṭūshī seems to stick 
to an inner conviction that just ruling ultimately matters. In chapter nine of his Sirāj he 
explains that: “The sultan is like the vital spirit to the body. . . . If the spirit is contaminated 
[it] will ruin the organ, and the senses, and the members. . . . The body will be taken to 
destruction and finally to death.”  Furthermore, justice compels the ruler towards restitution 810
of a balance in favor of the oppressed.  This scale is not only among his subjects, but also 811
between the subjects and the ruler: “Whoever deviates from the just middle that God has set 
exposes himself to God’s wrath.”  Finally, despite his prior call of patience with tyrannical 812
rule, the possibilities of revolt against the unjust ruler are not completely ruled out: “The 
tyrant sultan is like a thorn stuck in the foot. He who carries it has permanent pain and 
against it protests all the body; and he want to get rid of it for whatever means are available, 
because it is off its natural place; and if necessary he who has [it] pays to get it out.”  813
 The list of Muslim authors who struggled with the duty of justice and the duty of 
obedience in their Mirrors is more extensive than can be mentioned here. Yet for the sake of 
concision, we will briefly mention only three more cases, in order to illustrate that this 
anxiety between the political values of justice and obedience took place across time and 
space. The first case is al-Māwardī (d. 1058) who, as a representative of Sunni orthodoxy, has 
been identified as a conservative jurist concerned mainly with order in a time of political 
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uncertainty. His famous Aḥkām al-ṣulṭaniyya and his mirror Naṣīhat al-mulūk are part of his 
production as a Sunni jurist. It is well known that he argues in his Naṣīhat al-mulūk in favor 
of political expediency, as Gibb has noticed as a ground for his own disappointment with the 
author’s political thought.  But al-Māwardī also wrote a particular treatise on justice in one 814
of his untranslated works called Tashīl al-naẓar. Although al-Māwardī, acting as a jurist, 
justified usurpation as legitimate, in his mirror Tashīl al naẓar wa-taʻjil al-ẓafar fi akhlāq al-
malik wa siyāsat al-mulk, al-Māwardī is writing as a theologian, and states that rulership 
based on force could only become legitimate if the ruler is just with his flock. To support this 
idea, al-Māwardī equates justice and religion. In fact, he argues that power, if it is not based 
on religion, will never endure, nor will its days be ‘cloudless.’ He also adds that: “if power is 
not based on religion, which creates a consensus so that people will consider obedience a 
religious duty and cooperation an obligation . . . is an oppressive and corrupting power.”  815
This contradicts most medieval jurists, who thought that a ruler might be following the sharia 
while still being unjust. As argued before, the explanation for these inconsistencies are 
mostly found in the political role played by al-Māwardī, the disintegration of the caliphal 
power, and the emergence of contesting powers. It has also been argued that Māwardī's 
contradictions are part of an 'intellectual evolution’ in the life of the author. In fact, this 
position contends that Aḥkām al-ṣulṭaniyya represents a mature period in the intellectual life 
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of al-Māwardī, whereas Naṣīhat al-mulūk, Tashīl al-naẓar, and Adab waʾldunya waʾl-dīn, 
represent ‘steps in his intellectual way.’  Although taken into consideration, these theses are 816
contested by the present research since we have seen that different Muslim authors have 
experienced the same uneasiness when trying to reconcile the duties of justice and obedience. 
Furthermore, a topic for further research is to examine to what extent his Mu’tazilite leanings 
or his ‘Asharite orthodoxy contributes to his ambiguity. 
 The Iraqi historian Ibn Tiqtaqā also coped with the ideals of the Islamic government 
and the devastation of the Abbasids after the Mongol conquest. In his Mirror for Princes, 
Kitāb al-fakhri, dedicated to the governor of Mosul, Fakhr al-Dīn ʿĪ sā, and written in the 
winter of 1302, Tiqtaqā presents justice and obedience as the duties of the ruler and the ruled 
respectively, but establishes the basis of justice on the subjects’ obedience: “The subjects owe 
duties to the ruler and he duties to them. As for the duties owed to the ruler by his subjects, 
among them is obedience, the basis of which is organized [by] the public weal, and by which 
the ruler is enabled to do justice between the weak and the strong.”  Nevertheless, and 817
despite the historical turmoil that the author witnessed, it seems that the obedience Ibn 
Tiqtaqā presents always carries a thread of conditionality based on the justice of the ruler. In 
fact, after listing the duties owed by the king to his subjects, including “the protection of the 
capital, the defense of the frontiers, the fortification of the marches, the safety of the roads, 
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and the restraint of evil doers,” the author says that “these duties are obligatory to the ruler as 
obedience is obligatory to subjects.” Immediately after, he cites the case of ʿAlī when the 
dissenters said to him, “you have not performed your duty in guarding this frontier, i.e., that 
of Syria .  . . you were wrong and did not perform your duty, so we not owe you 
obedience.”   818
 Further on in his Mirror there is another passage that shows the tension between the 
ideal imperative of justice, and the real historical imperative of order and security. However, 
Ibn Tiqtaqā remembers the excellence of the words of the caliph Yazīd when the oath of 
allegiance was taken by him:  
I will safeguard the frontiers and the needs of its inhabitants adequately. . . . I will not 
shut my door in your faces, you shall have your salaries each year and your wages 
each month, so that the most distant of you shall be the same as the nearest of you. If I 
fulfill my promise to you, you owe me ‘complete obedience' and loyal help. But, if I 
do not, you may depose me unless I repent. If you know of anyone of recognized 
integrity who will, of his own accord, give you what I have freely offered to you, and 
you wish to take tone oath of allegiance to him, I will be the first to take the oath to 
him with you. No obedience is due to a creature involving disobedience to the 
creator.   819!
Immediately after, Ibn Tiqtaqā takes a historical perspective and affirms that Yazīd’s speech 
is good in relation to ‘that time’: “but nowadays these words would be accounted to a fool 
and deserve that another than himself be made ruler;” Tiqtaqā further clarifies that in that 
period the Umayyad organization began to fall into disorder. Is there a clearer encounter 
between the ideal and real principles for any Islamic government? 
 In Spain, ʻUmar ibn Mūsá Rajrājī (d. 1465?), a North African pious Muslim wrote his 
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Mirror or Hidāya with the purpose of offering guidance to those who are misguided and 
taking as sovereign someone other than God. He understands that the duty of political 
obedience is linked to the religious duty of obedience to God: “The favor of God who gave 
them a sultan . . . but they took him as their lord and sovereign, whereas God gave him 
(sultan) for the sake that through him they obey God.”  Despite this theologico-political 820
assertion, in chapter one of the first book of the Hidāya, Rajrājī deals with the dilemma of 
obeying the ruler: “We obey not the sultan when he orders an act in disobedience to God, but 
also it is not licit to be apart from them, be as they are.”  Furthermore, also in his first book, 821
he continues showing some traces of conditional obedience, highlighting “the duty that 
subjects have to listen and pray their sultans, and the reward which God reserves for them if 
they are rightful.” Then Rajrājī continues, citing the cases of the rightly-guided caliphs as the 
example to follow: “the correct thing to say is that, if the sultan follows the conduct of Abū 
Bakr, ʿUmar, and the just caliphs, [he] deserves total obedience. In the contrary case, we owe 
him only obedience to his dispositions if they not imply disobedience to God, for in that case 
we do not obey him.”  822
 Rajrājī also emphasizes that although according to the Prophet there will be corrupt 
princes, it “is superior the good that God does through them. If they act rightly they will have 
their recompense; if they don’t they will bear their sins, and you bear suffering.”  And later 823
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on, he reminds us, “the right path is the sultan,”  adding that, “without the caliph we will 824
not have security in our roads and the stronger would oppress the weak among us.”  825
Nevertheless, commenting on the well-known hadith that stresses obedience in the Muslim 
tradition “who obeys the prince obeys me,” Rajrājī comments that there is a version that says 
“my prince,” which implies “the prince who follows my path;” the other “competing” version 
which says to obey “the prince” has to be understood as a more general statement which 
implies obedience because of fear of sedition. Here the author seems to be aware that in this 
interpretation comes the divergence on obedience to the unjust prince. In the same line, he 
closes chapter one of his first book showing how the struggle between asserting obedience 
for the sake of order over the principle of justice is present in the Islamic tradition of 
government. In fact, he quotes the Ḥilya of Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣbahānī Rajrajī: “ʿUmar b. ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz said in a sermon (khuṭba): ‘it is not true? You call obedient to he who escapes the 
injustice of the imām! Certainly he who deserves to be called disobedient is the unjust 
imām!!’”  826
 Finally in this chapter, we will attempt to show how the tension between justice and 
obedience led what we call the “sequence of best ruling.” This sequence is a trend found 
mainly in Islamic Mirrors, although it has its specular image in some Christian authors. In 
this genre of advice for princes (and also in related theological-political literature), one finds 
a preferred order for the possible types of ruler. In the sequence, different authors state that a 
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just and a believer ruler is preferable; however, a just though unbeliever ruler is preferable to 
an unjust believer. In the same line, an unjust and strong ruler is preferable to just and weak 
one. Thus, first justice and religion are assimilated; second, justice is preferable since it 
“mirrors” the theological principle of justice, although the ruler may be an unbeliever; third, 
the worries of security make a weak ruler (even if just) not viable; and finally, order has the 
primacy even if under tyrannical rule. Although this is topic of further research, here we 
mention some cases of authors who experience the dilemma of the previously mentioned 
sequence. 
 Ghazālī begins the sequence by going against justice for the sake of order and the fear 
of chaos. For him, royal weakness is worse than royal injustice:  
If God forbid, the sultans in their midst were weak, universal ruin will befall the 
religion and the whole lower world; for a century, say, of unjust rule by sultans will 
not cause so much damage as one hour of the injustice of subjects to one another. 
When the subjects oppress one another, God on high will appoint a forceful (and 
oppressive) ruler over them.  827!
Ibn Tiqṭaqā follows suit, showing in an anecdote on the Mongol conqueror how a just infidel 
ruler is preferred before an unjust believer:  
when the emperor Hulaku conquered Baghdād in A.H. 656, he ordered that a ruling be 
obtained from the doctors of law as to whether a just infidel emperor was better or a 
believing unjust emperor. The doctor hesitated, until the senior scholar took the ruling 
and signed it preferring the just infidel to the unjust believer.  828!
Later on in his work Tiqṭaqā continues with the sequence, but now the dilemma is concerned 
with the weak ruler versus the strong one:  
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They have disagreed as to the unjust ruler and the weak just ruler. They (mostly) 
prefer the strong unjust, arguing that the unjust powerful ruler guards his subjects 
against vested interests, and protects them by his power from others than himself. So 
his subjects are in a position of one who is spared damage by all men but suffers 
damage by one. The weak just ruler neglects the interests of his subjects, and 
everyone has authority over them. . . . A wise man said, “A ruler whom his subjects 
fear is better than a ruler who fears them.”   829!
Turtūshī concisely summarizes the different preferences: “ʿAlī, son of Abū Ṭālib said, ‘A just 
ruler is better than abundant rain; a wild lion better than a tyrant sultan, and a tyrant sultan 
better than lasting riot.”  830
 Finally, in Māwardī’s legal treatise Aḥkām al-sulṭaniyya, justice is still the criterion 
by which to judge the new political arrangement after the seizure of power: “The acts of him 
who seizes control over the imām must be examined.” Then, the just usurper comes into 
action: “If they are in accordance with the ordinances of religion and the requirements of 
justice it is permissible that the usurper be confirmed in his position.”  Also in his Tasḥīl al-831
nazar, al-Māwardī deals with the political aspects of usurpation, and states that rulership 
based on force could only become legitimate if the ruler is just with his flock.  In the same 832
theologico-political work, Māwardī affirms that the just conduct of a usurper towards his 
flock is equivalent to his receiving delegated authority in the non-religious sphere, for he 
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calls “rule by delegation” the just rule of a usurper.  Marsilius of Padua is the specular 833
image of Māwardī when he affirms that even an infidel should be obeyed, if after examining 
his acts they are not contrary to God’s laws, good morals and customs:  
all men, whatever their status and condition, should be subjects in goods and in 
person to the jurisdiction of the princes of this world, and obey them in all things that 
do not contradict the law of eternal salvation, and specially those that are in 
accordance with human laws or honorable and approved customs. . . . Again, such 
lords whom we are bound to obey might be infidels, as the gloss said towards the 
beginning.   834!
 After comparing the treatment of the theological and political principles of justice and 
obedience in Christian and Muslim authors, the most important conclusion is to see how this 
comparison carries a theological image, where the author in the other tradition is the 
“mirror,” or as we have said at the beginning of this chapter, the mirror is the “other.” 
Second, the struggle-anxiety-contradiction-tension (and the chain of equivalent terms may 
continue) that Christian and Muslim authors experience when writing their Mirrors for 
Princes is found across time and space. Thus, we can contest the argument which explains 
that the parallel emphasis on justice and obedience is due to the historical circumstances and 
the time of turmoil that authors witnessed, and that the treatment of justice is just testimonial. 
It is true that in both traditions there is a permanent summoning of the theological principles 
of government. But to explain that the emphasis on justice in Mirror for Princes is merely 
due to a certain nostalgia for an ideal past or model is not sufficient.  
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We can also affirm that the argument that explains the inconsistencies based on the 
influence of different Eastern traditions (Greek, Persian) that affected Christian and Islamic 
political thought is not enough. As we have seen in different authors, they have worked out a 
synthesis between foreign and religious-traditional views on government and its principles. 
Moreover, the emphasis on justice and obedience is justified by foreign, Christian, and 
Islamic traditions of government. We can thus venture to say that the tension experienced by 
the authors mentioned in this study is due to the encounter of the religious and political 
imperative of justice for the ruler vis á vis the historical imperative of order and security, 
which ultimately led those giving advice to also stresses the religious and political duty of 
obedience for the ruled.  
 This research, focused on Mirror of Princes, has also indicated other topics for further 
development: the idea of the contract and its consequences, how the ruler affects the nature 
of his subjects, and how the nature of the subjects also explain the nature of the ruler given to 
them, the idea of the ruler as punishment to his community, and more. Because the genre 
Mirror for Princes is heterogeneous, comparative studies that cover these and related topics 
are still pending. Also pending is the refinement of the methodological tools to carry out the 
comparison across traditions. 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Conclusion 
 We began this research affirming in the introduction that this is a work of 
comparative political theology. As such, we focused on the discussion of political justice and 
obedience in Christianity and Islam to show how the two concepts were related to the nature 
of God, his attributes, and the reflection of his order and authority in this-world polities. 
While working with two ideas and two religious/political traditions, we felt sometimes as 
though we were working with a four-sided mirror: the images and reflections multiplied 
themselves to the point that the comparisons encountered their methodological limits. At the 
same time, by working with Christian and Muslim authors in light of the same topics, we also 
experienced the idea of working on an oriental medieval tapestry where the threads were the 
concepts under study (mirroring the divine, kingship, justice, and obedience), allowing us to 
set a dialogue across religions, time, and space. Looking at the tapestry we can say that those 
writing Mirrors for Princes in both traditions were experiencing similar dilemmas or 
anxieties when stressing the principles of justice and obedience. 
 We planned this study to be in the form of an ideological-conceptual funnel, starting 
with the field of political theology, followed by the common genre of Mirrors for Princes, 
the Christian- and Muslim-contested notions of kingship, a study of political and theological 
justice and obedience in both traditions, and finally presenting the tension between these two 
values in Christian and Islamic Mirrors for Princes. In sum, we intended to introduce the 
reader to the field, the universe of study, the reflection metaphor, the concepts under study, 
ending with the concrete survey of these concepts in a common genre for Christianity and 
Islam.  
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 Regarding political theology, as we stated in the introduction, we noticed not only a 
lack of comparative studies, but also a need of an aggiornamento of the field to see more 
research done on political issues enlightened by their theological interpretations of the 
traditions studied here. In fact, after the revival of the 60’s with the impact of the Liberation 
Theology’s discourse in Latin America and Europe, the field has not been taken much into 
consideration. The alternative in scholarship has been examining the political theory or 
political philosophy of Christianity and Islam in light of the theological principles of both 
religions. In the case of the present research, we consciously wanted to rescue the value of 
the field, showing its potentialities in the case of comparative studies across religions. In this 
survey, the competing principles of ensuring order and questioning the authority of the ruler 
explain why political theology is, in our criteria, the ideal field for the study of Christian and 
Islamic concepts of justice and obedience in medieval times. 
 When it comes to Mirrors for Princes or Fürstenspiegel, in its different Latin titles 
(Speculum regis, Speculum principis, Speculum regale, or De regimine principum), and in 
Arabic literature (Naṣīhat al-mulūk), we think that, at least, we have contributed to sorting 
out the different possible manuscripts which can fall under this category, particularly in the 
case of Islam. In fact, the confusion or divergence in considering particular texts as Mirrors 
still remains in Islam, as we have seen in the case of some of the works of the Muslim 
theologian al-Ghazālī. Considering the writings of key medieval Muslim theologians under 
the category of Mirrors will also help us to consider an alternative genre for the negotiation 
between religious and political values. Furthermore, the metaphor of the mirror has been 
shown to be in common use across traditions as a powerful theological image, demonstrating 
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its potentiality for further comparisons by authors of the same and different religions. In fact, 
the different references to the mirror as a reflecting metaphor of the encounter between the 
divinity and human beings show how influential the mirror and its analogue images have 
been in Christian and Islamic literature. The mirror as the heart and soul of the believer is 
found in both traditions, as well as the mirror as conveying truth and knowledge, and 
ultimately, God himself. We also found that the mirror conceived of as the “other” is one of 
the more recurrent images for Christian and Muslim authors, and thus, worthwhile for further 
scholarly consideration. Finally, the mirror metaphor for the figure of the ruler of the 
Christian and Muslim community also lends itself to comparison, as we have shown in this 
survey, since in both theologies God’s or the prophet’s representative was also expected to be 
a mirror of the divine, as well as a mirror for his subjects. This common use of the ruler as a 
mirror has also helped us to understand what we have seen as common expectations among 
Christian and Muslim thinkers regarding the rulers of their communities. 
 The chapter on kingship was also devoted to seeing the commonalities as well as the 
symbols, images, and justifications for the institutions of Christian kingship and the Muslim 
caliphate. We also accounted for the process by which these symbolic commonalities in 
Christian and Islamic political theologies absorbed the influences of Eastern traditions on 
kingship. We intended to account first for the theological tension between the absolute power 
attributed to the king and the absolute divine sovereignty, and second for the tension between 
the medieval theories which understood the authority of the ruler as divine, and those 
theories which limited the ruler and even held him accountable not only to God but also to 
the community of believers. Whereas the ideal prince in medieval Christian political 
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literature is rex gratia Dei, stating that all power comes from God, in Islam the elevation of 
the Muslim ruler to a king contradicts formal theology, which stresses the indivisible 
sovereignty of God and also the reticence in using the term mulk for earthly rulers. Thus, the 
notion of the ruler’s power and its prerogatives encountered theological tensions in Christian 
and Islamic discourse on the scope of rulership, whether in the form of kingship or the 
caliphate. 
 It was interesting to present how the idea of the ruler as the image of God is also 
reflected in some metaphors that convey the particular conditions of Middle Eastern culture. 
The image of the Christian king and the Muslim caliph as a “sun” was contrasted with the 
role of the ruler on earth as a “shadow” of God, reflecting the divine function of providing 
protection and refuge. Finally, we intended to contrast the image of the ruler as he mirrors 
divine attributes to the point of divinizing the figure of the Christian and Muslim prince (and 
considering him superior to his subjects), with those shared images in Christianity and Islam 
which call on the ruler’s responsibility and set limits to his authority. As part of this analysis, 
we surveyed the figure of the ruler as a shepherd, his role facing the law, and his main role 
facing divine justice. Thus, the absolute power and the thaumaturgical properties of the king 
and the caliph and his sacredness encountered their limits when facing not only divine and 
positive law, but also (and mainly) the theological implications of political justice. 
 To understand how the term justice was used by medieval Christian and Muslim 
authors, we comparatively examined justice and its multiple meanings, as well as the various 
terms used for it in scripture. We found some patterns in the scriptural treatment of justice in 
both Christianity and Islam: first, justice is seen as an attribute of God, or as the action of 
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God par excellence. Second, it is equated with God’s law or the order of his creation. This is 
clear in the treatment of injustice as not only a mere transgression, but also a transgression of 
divine harmony as manifested in this world. Third, in both traditions, God’s justice is 
moderated with piety, as present in charitas in Christianity, and in taqwa or birr in Islam. 
Lastly, divine justice as absolute justice is acknowledged as a mystery in Christianity and in 
Islam.   
 When focusing on the medieval notion of justice in Christianity and Islam, we tried to 
show in both traditions how key thinkers understood justice as a theological virtue and how 
this was translated into a more concrete notion of political justice. In fact, when facing 
absolute power and its abuses, Christian and Muslim theologians found other ways to make 
clear the need for the connection with the theological principle of justice, as well as the 
radical possibilities of this principle for escaping injustice. We also show how the 
relationship between justice and truth has a common treatment in Christianity and in Islam. 
Despite the more conservative aspect of justice as it appears in the “Circle of Justice” (and 
the whole percolation process through Greek and Persian encounters across the formative 
period of Christian and Islamic political thought), justice appears not only as a key element in 
the organization of the Christian and Muslim polity, but also as a theological imperative for 
both traditions. This impulse for justice is clearly shown in the case of the Muslim principle 
of “Commanding good and forbidding evil” (al-ʿamr bi-l-ma’rūf wa al-nahya ‘an al-
munkar), a principle also shared with Christianity. 
 Another relevant commonality is the presence of parallel or contested religious and 
philosophical traditions regarding the need for justice and the consequences of injustice. On 
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the one hand, the medieval emphasis on justice seems to focus on the enforcement of order 
and the quest for stability. On the other hand, Christian and Muslim authors were aware that 
by stressing justice, they were also opening the door to contest the current political 
organization, even accounting for the possibility of facing the uncertainty brought about by 
sedition. But besides noticing the presence of these parallel traditions in the political 
theologies of Christianity and Islam, it is more relevant to notice that for both religions, when 
justice is understood as righteousness (and thus understood as a “reflection” of a divine 
attribute), the limits of absolute power are set.  
 We also presented obedience as the specular image of the medieval notion of justice. 
In fact, for Christianity and Islam, both justice and obedience are considered elements of a 
political relationship informed by their theologies, as well as two interconnected rights. In 
other words, the relation between the rulers and the ruled reflects a relation between the 
concepts of justice and obedience: obedience is understood as the right of the ruler to be 
obeyed, a right that depends upon the right of the ruled to be governed with justice. Thus, 
justice and obedience are the key “political goods” for the Christian and Muslim 
communities. 
 In Christian and Islamic political theology, these political-religious relationships can 
also be represented in an axis representing obedience on one extreme and justice on the other, 
as terms of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. We took into account that in the 
case of Islam, the Western idea of a linear continuum for the values in question does not 
serve as well as the idea of a center-periphery relationship. As such, injustice represents an 
outwardly movement from a pivotal center where mainly order and obedience to this order 
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are the exalted political virtues of the Muslim city. We decided to present this spatial notion 
for the principles under study to show how the opposition between justice and obedience is 
grounded in similar religious principles in both Christianity and Islam. What is significant is 
that in Christian and Islamic theologies, rebellion is also represented as a form of injustice, 
and obedience as the expected attitude of the ruled in a just order of the polity.  
 The tension between justice and obedience lies in the very metaphor of the 
“reflection,” or “mirroring” of the heavenly order. If obeying the earthly authority reflects the 
obedience due to God, the justice of the rulers should also reflect God’s justice. The main 
commonality in Christian and Islamic political theology is that obedience is not only a 
political, but also a religious duty. For that very reason, the Muslim and Christian reflection 
on the duty of obedience found its own limits: obedience is not absolute and it is linked to 
other religious duties: first, obedience to God, and second, the religious obligation to promote 
a righteous (just) society that will help believers to eventually attain salvation. 
 By exploring the spectrum of religious and political attitudes towards obedience to 
rulers, we also touched upon the possibilities of contesting power as a way to contest the 
prevailing static theories of power and authority in Christianity and Islam. As in the case of 
justice, we found traditions on obedience and traditions on contested obedience. The first 
group considered security, order, and the need for authority to be primordial religious and 
political values, to the point that even injustice did not compromise the nature of the Muslim 
community. The second group of traditions emphasized that the injustice of the civic order in 
fact compromises salvation. This double aspect of obedience reflects the same concern 
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experienced by Christian and Muslim authors when examining justice: they were aware of 
the tension between the respect due to God’s authority, and the respect due to God’s justice. 
 In Islam, as was the case with political justice, political obedience was understood as 
part of the Islamic theological principle of “commanding good and forbidding the 
wrong” (al-ʿamr bi-l-ma’rūf wa al-nahya ‘an al-munkar).  In fact, contesting obedience by 
not obeying unjust rulers and their policies is also part of the same theological duty. Thus, 
again justice and obedience are linked by being part of a theological and political 
relationship, being expressed as a tension between two poles of a continuum in the case of 
Christianity, or of a center-periphery spectrum of values in the case of Islam. This spatial 
notion that we have used to show the tension-anxiety-inconsistency-anguish between 
commanding obedience and commanding justice makes clear that, despite the multiple 
efforts to stress obedience in times when order was a paramount political good, the 
consequences of unjust ruling were present in the rumination of Christian and Muslim 
authors.  
 This tension or anxiety caused by emphasizing both principles lies in a theological 
premise, that the perpetuation of injustice is an impossible ethical and theological luxury for 
a Christian as it is for a Muslim. As we have also shown, obedience to injustice compromises 
the salvation of the believer, and sometimes the salvation of the community as a whole. We 
are aware that in both traditions it has been argued that obedience is also a requirement for 
salvation. But it seems that the theological principles that lead the believer to consistently 
strive for justice weigh ultimately more than the command to obey authority. There is thus a 
preeminence of the theological principles of justice and obedience to what is just, over the 
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needs of political expediency, and even over the basic political principles of the relation 
between rulers and ruled. This preeminence of the theological dimension over the political 
one is more explicit in the case of Islam, as we discussed in the case of the etymology of 
fitna, and on the religious duty of “commanding good and forbidding the wrong” (al-ʿamr 
biʾl-ma’rūf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-munkar). In these cases, the theological imperative seems to 
weigh more than the historical one. 
 The traditions on obedience, and the counter-traditions on disobedience also have 
shown how the negotiation process between the historical and the theological imperatives 
was articulated first at the juristic level, and then in the field of political theology. As we 
argued, one of the preferred genres in which to do so is the genre of advice to rulers, or 
Mirrors for Princes. By surveying Christian and Islamic Mirrors we found that obedience 
depends heavily on the definition of justice. Furthermore, in both Christian and Islamic 
political theologies, obedience and justice arise out of a religious, rather than a political, 
obligation. Thus, we can locate the different emphases on political justice and political 
obedience in the tension within Christian and Islamic theologies. In fact, Christianity bears 
the tension of the contradiction between the Old Testamentarian theories of kingship, and the 
more egalitarian principles of the primitive Christian community. In the case of Islam, the 
influence of Sassanian theories of kingship were processed in tension with the egalitarianism 
of the early Muslim community. In fact, the capacity to admonish the Christian king or the 
Muslim caliph goes in line with the religious tradition of contesting power and is part of the 
Christian and Islamic egalitarian strand. 
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 We also briefly elaborated on what we called the “sequence of best ruling,” or the 
preferences for rulers, namely: the just believer, the just unbeliever, and the tyrant who 
preserves order. Thus, first justice and religion are assimilated; second, justice is preferable 
since it “mirrors” the theological principle of justice, although the ruler may be an 
unbeliever; third, the worries of security make a weak ruler (even if just) not viable; and 
finally, order has the primacy even if under tyrannical rule. This sequence of rulers shows the 
extent to which the duty of obedience was linked to the need for order and security; at the 
same time it shows the dilemma with the duty of just ruling for this-world polities.  
 After observing the series of commonalities between Christian and Islamic Mirrors 
for Princes in the treatment of justice and obedience, we can affirm that first and most 
importantly, the comparison itself carries a theological image. As such, the common concerns 
experienced by Christian and Muslim medieval thinkers shows that the author in the other 
tradition is the “mirror,” or as we have commented before, the mirror is the “other.” Second, 
we can also affirm that the struggle-anxiety-contradiction-tension which Christian and 
Muslim authors experience when writing their Mirrors for Princes is found across time and 
space. Thus, we can contest the argument which explains that the parallel emphasis on justice 
and obedience is due to the historical circumstances and the time of turmoil that authors 
witnessed, and that the treatment of justice is simply testimonial. 
 While aware of the methodological limitations we encountered while conducting this 
research, we were also aware of the benefits of carrying out this comparative study. First, it 
allowed the encounter of traditions. Second, we presented the encounter of contested 
accounts for the field of Christian and Islamic political theory. Third, by resorting to the 
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thematic approach with the concepts of justice and obedience, the comparison allowed us to 
let the authors speak through the sources. As we explained before, in some chapters we were 
able to keep some balance between the two religions, presenting the same amount of 
evidence for Christian and Muslim authors. Again, for the concepts under study, Christianity 
and Islam found their “reflection” in the “other” for a better understanding of their own 
tradition. In other chapters we found more evidence in the Muslim authors; in this case it was 
Islam who held the “mirror” of Christianity for a better self-understanding.  
 All in all this survey has shown, through the parallel treatment of justice and 
obedience in both Christianity and Islam, that justice provides a basis for criticizing and for 
rebelling against tyrannical authority, understood in the case of Islam under the religious duty 
of “commanding good and forbidding the wrong” (al-ʿamr biʾl-ma’rūf waʾl-nahy ‘an al-
munkar). Thus, despite the theories that emphasize a quietistic trend in Christian and Islamic 
medieval political attitudes, the theological imperative of righteousness, understood as a 
mirror of God’s attribute, appears as a powerful tool to criticize the abuse of power. We also 
found in both traditions that the same contradictory positions regarding the notion of 
authority and kingship were passed or “reflected” in the tension between the duty of justice 
and the duty of obedience. In fact, the tension between asserting absolute versus limited 
power, or considering the ruler above the law or within the limitations of the law, also 
affected the way authors emphasized the duty of obedience vis á vis the duty of justice. We 
can also affirm that the dilemma between both religious and political imperatives goes 
beyond setting the limitations of power, and it constitutes a “trend” in the Christian and 
Islamic moral conception of authority. The religious-moral dimension ultimately affirms that 
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all power belongs to God and although it stresses the justice of the ruler, it always carries the 
possibility of resistance to power. This religious and moral indignation regarding the abuses 
of authority in both Christianity and Islam remains a task of future scholarship.  We think 835
that such religious resentment with the unfairness of the political system has also relevance in 
the contemporary case of Islamic nation-states.  
 Lastly, given the heterogeneity of the genre Mirror for Princes, there are multiple 
comparative studies waiting to be undertaken. For example, one could compare Christian and 
Muslim authors by date and period, or by considering the works’ similar historical 
circumstances and contexts. Further, Mirrors could be divided into practical-impractical 
categories and compared across traditions, or according to whether they were written by 
religious scholars or administrative officials.  Still, the present study is content to have tried 836
to contest the predominant historical imperative in contemporary scholarship, which stresses 
the concern with order and stability in medieval Christian and Islamic political arrangements. 
At the least, we hope to have shown the benefits of setting this imperative in tension with the 
theological duty of justice as righteousness.  
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 The idea of considering justice as a theological reflection and as a criterion for good 
ruling helps us to think differently about medieval political thought in Christianity and Islam, 
as well as to see the theological imperative for the limitation of authority. In other words, this 
survey intended to show the competing historical and theological imperatives. This clash 
demonstrates the pervasive relevance for any political arrangement which claims, even in 
contemporary times, a connection with the divine.   
 A final remark pertinent to the real purpose of this research is found in the words of 
William C. Chittick in his introduction to al-Ṣaḥīfah al-Sajjādiyyah. He compares the Islamic 
civilization as a whole to a Muslim city, to which we can add that the model of the Christian 
medieval city also bears the comparison. Those studying the medieval Christian and Islamic 
institutions, along with their history and political events, deal only with the “walls,” which 
from the outside, seem impenetrable. Yet as Chittick says in the case of Islam, those who 
venture to study architecture, poetry, music, art and Sufism have access to “gardens:”  
the most traditional and authentic gardens, and the most difficult to access, are the 
hearts of the greatest representatives of the civilization . . . since they provide direct 
access to the types of human attitudes that are the prerequisites for a full flowering of 
the Islamic ideal.  837!
Although we have ventured into the sternness of politics, we expect that this research has 
shown, through the theological metaphor of the mirror as used by the representatives of both 
civilizations, the Christian and Muslim spirit and ideal of just government. 
!
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